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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I study the factors that influence the performance of short-term teams
engaged in an entrepreneurial activity. This is an important area to study because team-started
businesses account for a disproportionately greater number of high-growth firms (Kamm,
Shuman and Seeger, 1990). Unfortunately, there has been limited research on team started
businesses. The entrepreneurial teams that I study are participants in the MIT $50K Business
Plan Competition. This sample is chosen because business plan competitions are increasingly
becoming the meeting place for new ideas, people interested in starting business ventures and
others who are interested in participating in these ventures (e.g., patent attorneys, investors and
venture capitalists). In addition, the sample overcomes some problems typical of many
entrepreneurship studies including left censoring biases, population identification and low
response rates. Chapter 1 is an overview of the thesis while chapter 2 describes the
entrepreneurial activities at MIT. Chapter 3 describes the MIT $50K Business Plan Competition
and elaborates the steps taken to collect information from competition participants.
Since entrepreneurial team performance is influenced by factors both internal and
external to the team, this thesis takes a comprehensive approach, presenting three papers that
explore the effects of team composition, team design and external contacts on entrepreneurial
team performance. Both external and team-member evaluations of entrepreneurial team
performance are used. Both evaluations are important because positive external evaluations can
increase the venture's chances of getting resources (e.g., Roberts, 1991a) while positive internal
evaluations can increase the chance that members will be satisfied with their teams and continue
in team involvement (e.g., Hackman, 1987).
The first paper, described in chapter 4, explores the influence of team design, both team
structure and member interaction, on short-term entrepreneurial team performance. The findings
show that there are different drivers of performance. While task design predicts external
evaluations of performance, the way in which members interact predicts member-rated
performance.
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The second paper, described in chapter 5, explores the influence of team-member
functional diversity on short-term entrepreneurial team performance, with team design as the
mediating variable. This study shows the need to investigate the indirect effects of functional
diversity on performance and to distinguish between external and team-member evaluations. The
results show that functional diversity has negative indirect effect on member-rated performance
but no effect on external-rated performance.
The third paper, described in chapter 6, explores the influence of member contacts with
people outside the team on short-term entrepreneurial team performance. The study shows that
high-performing teams gather a range of information and are efficient in information gathering.
The study shows that social capital concepts, such as strong and weak ties, can be integrated with
the team literature.
The concluding chapter proposes a model that combines the influence of internal and
external factors on entrepreneurial team performance. The chapter also summarizes the findings
and compares them to the new venture and team literatures. Finally, areas for future research are
proposed.
Thesis Committee:
Deborah G. Ancona, Seley Distinguished Professor of Organizational Studies (Chair)
M. Diane Burton, Assistant Professor, Harvard Business School
Scott A. Shane, Leghorn Career Development Assistant Professor of Entrepreneurship
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CHAPTER 1
OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION
There is increasing interest in entrepreneurship as a field of study for both academics
(e.g., Shane and Venkataraman, forthcoming) and students (e.g., Roberts, 1991a). Shane and
Venkataraman (forthcoming) provide three reasons to study entrepreneurship. First,
entrepreneurship is the primary mechanism through which technical knowledge is converted into
products and services. Second, entrepreneurship is a significant mechanism through which
inefficiencies in the economy are discovered and mitigated. Third, through the above factors,
entrepreneurially led innovation is an important engine that drives change in society.
Although the study of entrepreneurship is essential, most studies have focused on the
individual founder instead of the founding team (Cooper and Daily, 1996). Consequently, the
founding team has remained very much a black box and the limited research in this area is
mostly anecdotal, lacking a theoretical base (Cooper and Daily, 1996). This is surprising because
team-started ventures account for a disproportionately greater number of fastest-growing firms
(Kamm, Shuman and Seeger, 1990) and have greater chances of success than firms started by
individuals (Chandler, 1998). For example, Kamm et al. (1990) found that of 33 successful high-
technology companies, 23 were founded by teams. The authors concluded that the benefits of
team-founded ventures cut across different industries, geographic locations and gender.
Similarly, Roberts (1991a) discovered that 14 percent of multiple-founder ventures from MIT
laboratories were the highest performing compared to only three percent of individual-founded
ventures. Further, Roberts (1991a:258) reported that performance of business ventures started by
teams was superior to that of single-founder companies, regardless of how performance was
measured. He notes that the number of original company founders is one of the strongest and
most consistent correlates of later success and this is shown repeatedly in almost all of his studies
over a 25-year period. Despite these significant findings, the founding team has been neglected
by researchers. Most studies focus almost exclusively on individual entrepreneurs resulting in
weak predictions of new venture performance (Chandler and Hanks, 1998). Chandler and Hanks
(1998) argue that stronger links to performance might be revealed by enlarging the scope to
include the characteristics of the founding team.
This dissertation explores the factors that influence the performance of short-term teams
in the early stage of an entrepreneurial activity because early experiences shape future routines
(e.g., Stinchcombe, 1965; Burton, 1995:13), culture (e.g., Schein, 1983) and performance (e.g.,
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990). Unlike most studies, I focus on the founding team rather
than on the lead founder (e.g., Schein, 1983) because research shows that it is the members'
combined characteristics that influence performance (e.g., Smith et al., 1994).
This thesis is an exploratory study on short-term entrepreneurial teams and makes the
following contributions. First, it expands the thin body of extant literature on entrepreneurial
teams (e.g., Cooper and Daily, 1996) and contributes to the knowledge base of both academics
and practitioners by examining factors that influence the success of venture teams. Second, by
focusing on the effects of both internal team make-up and external activities on performance this
study shows how and why both team characteristics and contacts with others are important.
Third, the dissertation shows that the drivers of external and team-member evaluations of short-
term entrepreneurial team performance are different. For a team to be effective, both drivers of
performance need to be managed (e.g., Hackman, 1987).
Chapter 2 describes the entrepreneurial activities in MIT and shows how these activities
contributed to the growth of high-technology start-ups in the Route 128 region (a ring road
around the Boston/Cambridge Metropolitan area). Following that, chapter 3 describes the MIT
$50K Business Plan Competition and how data was collected from the competition participants
during different phases-the business idea and business plan-of the competition. This
competition is one manifestation of the University's entrepreneurial spirit and is a suitable
sample for an exploratory study of entrepreneurial teams because the competition and the events
surrounding it have become a focal point where ideas, financiers (such as venture capitalists or
business angels) and supporting infrastructure (such as consultants or lawyers specializing in
assisting start-ups) intersect (e.g., Ballon, 1998a). In addition, a sample drawn from a business
plan competition overcomes some problems of other entrepreneurial team studies including left
censoring biases, population identification and low response rates. Among business plan
competitions, the MIT $50K Competition is one of the most successful in terms of spinning off
new ventures (Ballon, 1998b). Since 1996, 201 teams that participated in the MIT business plan
competitions have started new ventures compared with 15 such teams from the University of
Texas at Austin, 12 from Harvard University, 11 from the University of Arizona and six from the
University of Oregon (Ballon, 1998b). Throughout the dissertation, I refer to such short-term
groups as entrepreneurial teams2. They are entrepreneurial as defined by the activity they are
engaged in, which is the preparation of a business plan although I do not assume that they are
entrepreneurial in the sense of being good at networking, getting resources or coming up with
products and services that will be accepted by the market.
1 30 companies from 1990 (MIT entry kit, 1998).
2 For this thesis, unless stated otherwise, entrepreneurial teams and short-term entrepreneurial teams are used
interchangeably.
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The remaining chapters explore different factors influencing entrepreneurial team
performance in the early start-up phase. Three papers separately explore the internal and external
factors on performance but as a collection, they offer a better understanding concerning the ways
in which entrepreneurial teams can be high-performing. Many studies (e.g., Hackman, 1987)
have focused on the internal design of the team including task allocation and how members go
about performing these tasks (e.g., West and Anderson, 1996). Other investigators have focused
on diversity issues (e.g., Pfeffer, 1983) and some researchers (e.g., Ancona and Caldwell, 1992a)
have found that it is a team's external ties that account for team performance. Because there are
relatively few studies on entrepreneurial teams (e.g., Cooper and Daily, 1996), I elected to study
all three areas to determine whether or not, and if so, how, these factors influence performance.
The first paper, described in chapter 4, explores the influence of team design, both team
structure and member interaction, on performance. The findings show that there are different
drivers of entrepreneurial team performance. While task design predicts external evaluations of
performance, the way in which members interact predicts member-rated performance.
The second paper, described in chapter 5, explores the influence of team-member
functional diversity on entrepreneurial team performance, with team design as the mediating
variable. This study shows the need to investigate the indirect effects of functional diversity on
entrepreneurial team performance and to distinguish between external and team-member
evaluations. The results show that functional diversity has negative indirect effect on member-
rated performance but no effect on external-rated performance.
The third paper, described in chapter 6, explores the influence of member contacts with
people outside the team on entrepreneurial team performance. The study shows that high-
performing short-term entrepreneurial teams gather a range of information and are efficient in
information gathering. The study shows that social capital concepts, such as strong and weak
ties, can be integrated with the team literature.
The concluding chapter proposes a model that combines the influence of internal and
external factors on entrepreneurial team performance. The chapter also summarizes the findings
and compares them to the new venture and team literatures. Finally, areas for future research are
proposed.
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CHAPTER 2
MIT's ROLE IN PROMOTING ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Overview
This chapter describes the role of MIT in promoting entrepreneurship and included in this
thesis because the sample used in the thesis, i.e., teams participating in the MIT $50K Business
Plan Competition, represents part of the overall University's focus on entrepreneurship. The
chapter first presents the impact of entrepreneurial activities at MIT and relates two success
stories that illustrate entrepreneurial leadership. I then describe how MIT's involvement with
industry and the government promoted entrepreneurship in the Boston region. I also explore
whether MIT's capability to encourage the growth of entrepreneurship is unique, or whether
other universities can replicate this success. Finally, I describe how entrepreneurship has become
a legitimate area of study, with a corresponding increase in the prestige of professors teaching in
this area (Kotter, 1995).
MIT Background
Since the University's founding in 1861, MIT encouraged entrepreneurship (The Economist,
1987) and for a long time, MIT stood virtually alone as a university that encouraged rather than
shunned industry (The Economist, 1995). Its motto of Mens et Manus, which translates from
Latin to "Minds and Hands," reflects the ideals of the founders who advocated education with a
practical focus. Early programs included placing student interns in factories, a practice that is
widespread today (Rosegrant & Lampe, 1992:18). The university also developed close ties with
industrialists, including Thomas Edison, Alexander Graham Bell and alumnus Alfred P. Sloan
(Roberts, 1991a:33).
In the 1930s, when Karl Compton, then MIT President instituted the regulation that faculty
could spend 20 percent of their time on consulting projects, the purpose was to limit rather than
to promote nonacademic activities (Rosegrant & Lampe, 1992:18). Faculty members were
allowed to do part-time consulting and to start their own companies (Rosegrant & Lampe,
1992:18). Research staff and employees were also allowed to form companies and consequently
almost half of all MIT spin-off companies, and most faculty-started companies, were started on a
part-time basis. In this way, the faculty members and researchers could evaluate whether their
ideas could be developed into a viable business before attempting to devote more attention to
their businesses. A large number of faculty members, including Amar Bose, the founder of Bose
sound systems, continued to teach and do research at MIT. Few faculty actually resigned, instead
turning control of daily business operations over to their partners, many of whom were their
former graduate students (Roberts, 1991a:34).
Impact of entrepreneurial activities at MIT
BankBoston (1997) studied the impact of business formation by MIT alumni and discovered
that if MIT alumni-founded companies were an independent nation, they would form the world's
2 4 th largest economy in terms of revenue. In 1997, business ventures of the alumni accounted for
annual sales of $232 billion and employment of 1.1 million people. The bank report also gives
other impressive facts: inventions by MIT faculty, researchers and students add about $20 billion
and 150,000 jobs to the U.S. economy every year. MIT alumni start about 150 companies
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annually-a large number considering that annual enrollment is about 2,400 students, with
approximately equal numbers of graduate and undergraduate students. Given MIT's focus on
engineering, high-technology and research, many of these firms gravitated towards knowledge-
based industries. They included software, higher technology manufacturing and consulting work.
Compared to the national average, MIT-related companies are more likely to sell outside of the
states where they are founded and to produce cutting-edge, high-technology products (Roberts,
1991a:355). MIT is the number one university in terms of patents granted annually, and it signs
about 70 license agreements with private companies annually.
The most successful MIT-related start-up is the Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) that
was founded in 1957 by Kenneth Olson and Harlan Anderson, with $70,000 venture funding
provided by the American Research and Development Corporation (AR&D) (Rosegrant &
Lampe, 1992:4). Olson joined the Whirlwind Project, a team of MIT-based researchers headed
by Jay Forrester, which developed the first electronic computer. Olson and Anderson aimed to
develop a company that would design and build machines that reflected the Whirlwind/TX-2
real-time interactive approach, in contrast to the large number-crunching data processing
computers that IBM and Univac already had on the market (Roberts, 1991a:6). Another
legendary MIT spin-off is Raytheon, a firm that was started in 1925 by Vannevar Bush, an MIT
faculty member in the Electrical Engineering department who later served as the vice-president
of MIT. Bush also helped found the American Appliance Company, the precursor of the
Raytheon Manufacturing Company (Saxenian, 1994:13). MIT and Raytheon researchers
collaborated closely, often working side by side on projects which included work on ultra-high
radio frequencies and dielectrics to aircraft guidance and detection systems. Today, the company
has close contacts with MIT faculty and researchers (Rosegrant & Lampe, 1992:68).
While the BankBoston study and the stories of DEC and Raytheon illustrate the
entrepreneurial spirit of people linked to MIT, this spirit is also institutionalized in the programs
in MIT to promote entrepreneurship. For example, one reason for MIT's capabilities in
commercializing its technology is the MIT Technology Licensing Office (TLO) that helps
faculty and researchers patent their inventions. The TLO also licenses these technologies in
exchange for royalties. In 1988, John Preston, then director of the TLO, further encouraged the
commercialization of MIT-developed technology by accepting founder stock in exchange for
licensing MIT's technology. This was a bold step beyond the royalty agreements that were
standard at the time (Roberts, 1991a:43). There are also extensive connections between MIT and
industry, and MIT and government. In the next section, I describe some of these connections
which contributed to the development of high-technology industries in the Route 128 region.
MIT's involvement with industry
MIT has a long history of involving industry in its academic and research programs. In
1918, MIT started the technology plan (Roberts, 1991a:33) which encouraged large companies
such as GE and Dupont to provide financial support for the University's projects. In exchange,
the companies received assistance from faculty and other researchers in keeping up to date with
the latest technological developments. Based on the technology plan, the Industrial Liaison
Program was established in 1948. The program coordinators organized conferences on
developments in science, technology and management practices and also helped set up individual
meetings among leaders in industry and academia (Saxenian, 1991:13, Rosegrant & Lampe,
1992:60). Today, this program is the largest university-industry collaboration (Roberts,
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1991a:33) and perhaps its size is not surprising, considering the seven industry giants in its
beginnings: Standard Oil of New Jersey, Humble Oil, Standard Oil, the Texas Company
(Texaco), Socony-Vacuum, Stone and Webster, and A.O. Smith Corporation.
In addition to creating joint industry and faculty programs in research, MIT was also
instrumental in developing the venture capital industry. In fact, the venture capital firms that we
know today started with the 1946 founding of the American Research and Development
Corporation (AR&D), based in Boston (Rosegrant & Lampe, 1992). Karl Compton, a former
MIT president, headed the defense laboratories in Washington, D.C., during World War II. After
the war, he began efforts to commercialize the technologies that had been developed by these
defense-related laboratories. Together with Merrill Griswold, then chairman of the
Massachusetts Investors Trust, and Ralph Flanders, then president of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Boston, they organized the AR&D to supply capital to New England entrepreneurs. Compton
became a board member; the MIT department heads of Chemical Engineering and Aeronautical
Engineering acted as advisors; and MIT's treasurer served as AR&D's treasurer. In total, more
than 1,200 organizations and high net-worth individuals invested in AR&D whose mission was
not only to turn in high returns for the investors, but also to stimulate the creation of new
companies in New England and to commercialize new ideas and technologies (Roberts,
1991a:33, Rosegrant & Lampe, 1992:111). Georges Doriot, professor of Industrial Management
at Harvard University, was the first president of AR&D and also served as mentor to these
companies, giving management and strategic advice-a practice that is common with venture
capital firms today (Roberts, 1991a:33, Rosegrant & Lampe, 1992:111). AR&D invested mainly
in ideas promoted by MIT faculty and assisted the ventures in various ways, including housing
them in MIT buildings (Roberts, 1991 a: 134).
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AR&D was the incubator for many other venture capital companies, providing the skills,
experience and networks that led AR&D alumni to establish their own venture capital firms
(Roberts, 1991a:134). The success of AR&D-funded companies also spurred New England's
financial institutions, including the banks and insurance companies, to invest in start-ups. For
example, the First National Bank of Boston served as an intermediary between nascent
entrepreneurs and wealthy families. The bank also formed an investment company to lend money
to early-stage firms, based on receivables from government research and development contracts,
a very risky move at that time. In 1958, the bank became the first Small Business Investment
Corporation (SBIC) (Saxenian, 1994:15; Roberts, 1991a:36).
MIT's involvement with the government
In addition to working jointly on programs with industry, MIT collaborates with the
government, especially the Department of Defense, on high-technology research (Roberts,
1991a). The government sponsored many of the laboratories during World War II. Today, MIT
has an annual research budget of about $800 million-larger than any other university in the
United States, and a large portion of the money is secured through the Department of Defense
contracts. In 1990 for example, MIT received $455 million in defense contracts, more than any
other nonprofit organization. This collaboration in turned facilitated the growth of high-
technology products and industries, through the commercialization of the technologies developed
by MIT faculty and researchers (Rosegrant & Lampe, 1992:15).
The entrepreneurial activities of MIT alumni, and the university's involvement with industry
and government, contributed significantly to the development of the Route 128 region.
According to Rosengrant and Lampe (1992), more than any other school, MIT is closely tied to
the creation and growth of the Boston area's new-technology community. They argue that any
study of the Route 128 phenomenon "becomes by necessity an examination of the policies at
MIT that have made it such a fertile source of ideas, entrepreneurs, and innovative relationships
with industry and government" (Rosegrant & Lampe, 1992:14). Route 128 is a symbol of one of
the world's leading centers of innovation and is "a region where, on a grand scale, a broad array
of emerging technologies has been developed and gotten its first taste of the marketplace. This is
an unpredictable process that is not always dramatic, not always financially rewarding, and not
always successful, but it is crucial to the productivity and competitiveness of the nation"
(Rosegrant & Lampe, 1992:13).
Can other universities replicate MIT's success in developing high-technology industries?
It is still an open question whether or not other universities that aspire to encourage high-
technology entrepreneurship, such as Cambridge University in England, could be as successful
as MIT has been. For example, Rosegrant & Lampe (1992) argue that the success of Route 128
is due to the tripartite cooperation and tensions among universities, government and industry.
They note that universities, industry and government do not always share the same objectives.
Universities need to train individuals to be capable of handling future technologies; companies
need to make profits; and the government needs to meet social and economic objectives
(Rosegrant & Lampe, 1992). The authors argue that it is the tensions and interplay, rather than
the straight commonality in objectives that encourage the development of high-technology
industries in the Route 128 region (Rosegrant & Lampe, 1992). Similarly, Roberts (1991)
reasons that the positive feedback loops among this tripartite of academia, industry and
government support, were instrumental in the growth of high-technology industries in the Route
128 region. Roberts (1991a) adds that it is uncertain whether the region would have taken off
without the huge defense funding and technologies that were developed during World War II and
the Cold War that followed. Roberts (1991a:36) also argues that the presence of other
universities with strong engineering departments, such as Boston University, Tufts University
and Northeastern University, also provides the skilled manpower to staff the high-technology
start-ups.
Although it is uncertain whether other universities would be as successful as MIT in
promoting high-technology entrepreneurship, there is evidence that these universities can
contribute to the growth of high-technology industries in their own regions. The most notable
example is the Silicon Valley area (i.e., around Palo Alto, in California), in which two world-
class universities, namely Stanford University and the University of California at Berkeley,
contribute to the growth of high-technology firms in the region. Silicon Valley also has the
support of venture capital firms and large defense contracts that fund universities in the region
(Herbig and Golden, 1993). However, even in Silicon Valley, the rate of university-based start-
ups is lower than that at MIT. For example, Cooper (1971) found that only eight out of 243
technology companies in Silicon Valley have their roots in Stanford. MIT alumni, on the other
hand, account for 21 percent of the manufacturing employment in Palo Alto (Roberts,
1991a:351). In other regions, Roberts (1991:351) reports that North Carolina's Research Triangle
Park shows few ties between university spin-offs and the region's major universities. In Austin,
Texas, Roberts (1991:351) found that only 23 firms were University of Texas at Austin spin-offs
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and Feeser and Willard (1988) found only one university spin-off in their nation wide sample of
108 computer-related start-ups.
Overall, these studies support the "cluster effects" summarized by Porter (1998) that the
concentration of similar types of industries supported by cluster-specific assets and infrastructure
such as university and other training centers, can encourage entrepreneurial activity. Cooper
(1986) also note that access to venture capital, availability of support personnel and services,
access to customers, and favorable economic conditions can help develop a region's
entrepreneurial environment. However, the evidence also suggests that MIT is more successful
than other universities in commercializing its technology. Roberts (1991a) concludes that the
"MIT-Route 128 model still today remains unusual in its degree of regional entrepreneurial
dependence upon one major academic institution. Perhaps other regions need other 'models' if
they are to achieve technology-based industrial growth."
Entrepreneurship as an area of study
The earlier parts of this chapter describe the entrepreneurial climate and activities at MIT
emphasizing how they have spurned the growth of high-technology industries in the Route 128
region. This discussion leads to the next topic, which is entrepreneurship as a legitimate area of
study. The development of this discipline is important because it gives students the skills to start
businesses and legitimizes working for start-ups after graduation. At Stanford, for example, 28
percent of the graduating class of 1998 work in small firms or run their own companies
(Business Week, 1998). Entrepreneurship as a distinct discipline is a recent development. In
1970, only 16 business schools offered classes in entrepreneurship. Today, over 500 universities
in the United States offer such classes, with 100 schools offering a specialty in the field
(Business Week, 1998). In Harvard Business School for example, only two out of 42 elective
courses in 1973 focused on small businesses and almost none of the Harvard faculty wanted to
teach them. They were not a business school specialty with any prestige and adjunct and visiting
professors were usually recruited to teach them (Kotter, 1995:29). But today, about 25 percent of
the student body specialize in the entrepreneurship area (Kotter, 1995). Roberts (1991a) notes
that the growth in student interest and enrollment in entrepreneurship classes and majors is a
national occurrence, manifested "by the outbreak of national academic society meetings devoted
to the same topic. Awards for papers or research on entrepreneurship are suddenly being
provided by business and engineering schools across the country, further nourishing the interests
and exposure" (Roberts, 1991a). There is also some evidence to suggest that the growth of
entrepreneurship as an area of study is occurring outside the United States. For example, in 1998,
Cambridge University in England announced that it was implementing a US-style school of
entrepreneurship (Financial Times, 1998) and in Asia, the National University of Singapore will
be offering entrepreneurship as a major area of study for the first time in 1999.
Given the focus of MIT in promoting entrepreneurship since its founding in 1861 and the
increasing interest of students in entrepreneurship, this thesis looks at one particular sample
within MIT that is a relatively new addition to the entrepreneurial spirit in the University-the
MIT $50K Business Plan Competition. The next chapter gives describes the competition and the
types of data collected from competition participants.
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CHAPTER 3
BACKGROUND OF THE MIT $50K ENTREPRENEURSHIP
COMPETITION AND DATA COLLECTION
This chapter describes the MIT $50K Entrepreneurship Competition (referred to here as
the MIT $50K Competition or the MIT $50K) and the types of and timeline that information was
collected from the competition participants. The competition is central to this study because
some of its participants agreed to take part in my research, forming the sample group of team
members under discussion here. The chapter explains why it is useful to study a business plan
competition within MIT giving a brief history of the competition, together with its stages and
judging process, and the set of activities that its organizers use to assist team participants. Before
describing the competition itself, the chapter describes the entrepreneurial team context.
Understanding of which is necessary because context often moderates the effects of various
factors on team performance (e.g., Jehn, 1995).
CONTEXT
To understand the various factors that influence the performance of entrepreneurial
teams, it is first necessary to understand the context of such teams. Entrepreneurial teams differ
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from the types of work teams typically studied in the academic literature, and we must expect
that there would be different theoretical explanations of behavior for different types of teams.
First, entrepreneurial teams are founded instead of concocted teams. According to McGrath,
Arrow and Berdahl (forthcoming), in founded teams, members select the people with whom they
want to form a team. On the other hand, in concocted teams (e.g., project development teams),
external parties, such as management, play a central role in the group's formation. One
characteristic of a founded team is that people tend to select members who are similar to
themselves (e.g., Westphal and Zajac, 1995) leading to tightly held teams (e.g., O'Reilly et al.,
1989). Thus, while holding--defined by Louis and Yan (1996) as the extent members share
similar identities, sense of purpose and know who is and is not a team member-is expected to
have a curvilinear effect on work team performance', entrepreneurial teams with higher holding
are expected to have lower performance than teams with lower holding. Another possible
consequence of self-selection is that these teams tend to be small since teams that are too large
tend to break up (e.g., Calsyn and Becker, 1976). Consequently, while size is expected to have a
curvilinear effect on the performance of work teams (e.g., Cohen and Bailey, 1997) (teams that
are too small lack sufficient resources to be effective and teams that are too large experience
process losses) larger entrepreneurial teams are expected to have better performance than smaller
ones.
A second context facing entrepreneurial teams is that they are engaged in innovative
Teams with too little holding, are not efficient (e.g., Louis and Yan, 1996), while teams with too much holding are
closed to outside sources of information (e.g., Louis and Yan, 1996).
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activities. Shane and Venkataraman (forthcoming) argue that the entrepreneurial act requires the
possession of private information about an opportunity. They explain that this opportunity must
not be evident to everyone all of the time and that for any given opportunity, only a subset of the
population will identify it. Similarly, Kirzner (1997) argues that through information asymmetry,
unthought-of-possibilities are discovered and form the basis for entrepreneurial opportunities.
And my expectation in this study is that teams that are better able to get information, either from
within the team or from contacts outside the team, will perform better than teams that are less
adept at information gathering.
Third, because young firms often lack a track record entrepreneurial teams lack the
support of people outside the team (e.g., Stinchcombe, 1965) which leads to higher failure rates
of such firms (Stinchcombe, 1965). To be successful, entrepreneurial teams need to take steps to
gain the approval of people outside the team but because they are resource-constrained (e.g.,
Stinchcombe, 1965), they also need to be efficient in their operations. The lack of external
support and adequate resources are less severe in other work teams, such as product development
teams, because the teams' organizations often support and provide resources to them (e.g., Arrow
and McGrath, forthcoming).
Thus entrepreneurial teams are in an interesting setting to explore the scope conditions of
what is known from our research on teams. In addition, as compared to other types of teams,
both laboratory and work teams, the stakes can be higher because the failure of these teams could
mean the loss not only of time and effort but also the financial resources that these potential
entrepreneurs put in their teams. The remaining sections of this chapter describe the MIT $50K
31
Competition because the teams in this competition are engaged in a short-term entrepreneurial
task to determine the factors influencing these teams' performance.
WHY TEAMS IN A BUSINESS PLAN COMPETITION FORM A SUITABLE SAMPLE
While it is important to study team-based entrepreneurial ventures, such an endeavor is
fraught with difficulties. This section discusses some of these problems and show how a study of
teams in a business plan competition can overcome some of these problems. Morever, there are
several characteristics of a business plan competition that makes it similar to "real world"
entrepreneurial teams. Finally, the section discusses several advantages of such a competition
over laboratory-based team studies.
There are several problems with studying "real" entrepreneurial teams. First, it is difficult
to identify a sampling frame from the population of entrepreneurial teams because these teams
are identified only after they have successfully formed new ventures and less successful teams
are likely to be omitted from the sample, leading to selection biases (Shane, 1998). In addition, it
is important to study entrepreneurial teams from the early start-up phase because origin
conditions become imprinted on firms (formed by these team members) that influence how these
firms develop (Stinchcombe, 1965; Hannan and Freeman 1977) and limiting the scope of future
changes (Hannan, Burton and Baron, 1995). Second, it is hard to locate a sample to have
comparable performance measures across teams because there are significant differences in start-
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up activities (Carter, Gartner and Reynolds, 1996). Thus, even if a population of entrepreneurial
team is identified, it would be difficult to select a performance measure that could consistently be
applied to this population. Third as noted above, entrepreneurial teams face resource constraints
and it would be difficult to get them to participate in the study and to provide detailed
information about the backgrounds of team members, team characterisitics and the teams'
business ideas. For example, Amit (1994) had a response rate of 24 percent in a study of factors
that led individuals to become entrepreneurs. This low response rate is to my knowledge typical
of other entrepreneurship studies and consequently, it is uncertain the extent to which these
studies represent the views of the population that they are drawn from.
There are several ways a business plan competition can overcome the above limitations.
In a business plan competition, the population of entrepreneurial teams is well defined since all
teams, whether they are successful or not, must submit their business plans. Furthermore, all the
teams are in the early start-up phase, a phase that has been shown in past research (e.g., Hannan
and Freeman, 1977) to determine how a venture progresses. Second, in a competition, a
consistent performance measure (based on a rating sheet that the judges use) is applied to all the
teams. Third, detailed information of the teams can be gathered since the teams must submit
extensive team information, including the resumes of all participants and copies of their business
plans to the organizers. Since the population is small and well-defined, extensive efforts can be
taken to get a high response rate. For these reasons, I use a sample of teams that participate in a
business plan competition in an exploratory study of early-stage new venture team performance.
In addition to overcoming some limitations of "real world" samples, a business plan
competition also resembles "real world" samples in three ways. First, business plan competitions
have increasingly become incubators for new companies (Ballon, 1998b). Currently, in
universities in the United States, there are about 50 business plan competitions (Ballon, 1998b).
Of these, the MIT $50K Competition is especially important because it is the most successful in
terms of spinning off new businesses (Ballon, 1998b).
Second, many students do start companies, such as Michael Dell who founded Dell
computers in the early 1980s when he was an undergraduate student in the University of Texas.
While in college, he assembled and sold computers from materials and components bought from
manufacturers' excess stock (Business Week, March 22, 1993). Another example is Bill Gates,
who developed and sold his computer system's software, written in BASIC, while he was an
undergraduate student in Harvard University (Gates, 1995). Although these are two extreme
examples of successful student-entrepreneurs, they are good illustrations of the type of
entrepreneurial activities that students are involved in. Unfortunately, few studies to my
knowledge have researched student-based entrepreneurial activities and instead have focused on
spin-offs from research laboratories (e.g., Roberts, 1991a).
Third, a business plan competition (at least the MIT $50K Business Plan Competition)
sample compares well to those used in other studies of entrepreneurs in high-technology fields.
The main comparison will be with Roberts's (1991a) studies, because he, too, focused on high-
technology start-ups. As shown in Table 3.1, my sample and that used by Roberts' (1991a) are
made up of participants with relatively similar educational levels. Roberts (1991a) reported that
63 percent of the participants in his sample had at least Master of Science degrees. In the sample
for this dissertation, 58 percent of the participants had (or were pursuing) Master or Ph.D.
degrees. Similarly, every participant in both Roberts's (1991a) study and this dissertation were at
least high school graduates. The samples also have small team sizes. The median founding team
size for Roberts's (1991a) study was two members. The average team size for the participants of
the MIT $50K Competition was 3.9, with a median of four. Roberts (1991a) reported twice as
many male participants than female, while in the MIT $50K Competition, 85 percent of the
participants were men and 15 percent were women. Most of the entrepreneurs were young;
Roberts (1991 a) reported a median founder age of about 32 while Smilor, Gibson and Kzmetsky
(1989) found that the entrepreneurs from the University of Texas-Austin spin-offs had an
average age of 34 years when they started their business ventures. Similarly, Utterback (1988), in
a study of 60 Swedish entrepreneurs, found a median age of 34. The participants in this study
were also young, on average, even younger than the subjects in the studies reviewed and two
possible reasons may explain the age difference. First, there is some evidence to suggest that
today, people of a younger age are starting new ventures. For example, Lewis (1999) reported
that an increasing number of students, even those who are still in high school are starting
business ventures. Another reason for the age difference between the participants in this study
and the studies reviewed is that the participants in this study are attempting to start business
ventures while the subjects in other studies had already started their businesses.
INSERT TABLE 3.1 HERE
In addition to the suitability of studying teams participating in a business plan
competition, a sample based on these teams has several advantages over laboratory-based team
studies. First, the reward for successfully doing their task-a $30,000 prize award, pro bono
assistance and publicity-is greater than that which most laboratory studies can provide. Second,
the participants are involved in a task that requires about 200 man-hours to complete (Olive,
1996). In contrast, many laboratory-based studies are completed in a few hours or in a day.
Third, teams in a business plan competition are engaged in a cognitive task that is more complex
than many laboratory-based studies. Preparing a business plan requires the team to build a
business model that involves the development of the marketing, financial and technological
portions of the plan and to integrate these diverse parts together (Olive, 1996). Many laboratory
studies focus on less complex tasks, such as the Winter Survival Exercise by Volkema and
Ronald (1998).
Overall, the combination of the potential to identify a population of teams with members
that are interested in an entrepreneurial activity, the potential to have a high response rate with
detailed information from team members as well as a setting that resembles that of "real"
entrepreneurial teams makes this a suitable sample to study factors influencing early stage
entrepreneurial team performance. The remaining parts of this chapter describe the competition
and steps taken to collect data from competition participants.
DESCRIPTION OF THE MIT $50K COMPETITION
Overview
In the previous section, I described the context in which entrepreneurial teams are
situated and the suitability of this sample for an exploratory study of factors influencing
entrepreneurial team performance. In the remainder of this chapter, I describe the MIT $50K
Competition itself, based upon information gathered from its organizers and from my own
participation in the meetings, judging sessions and events.
Background of MIT $50K competition
The MIT $50K Competition was started in 1990 by a group of students from the MIT
Entrepreneurs Club and the MIT Sloan New Venture Association. The competition is "designed
to encourage students and researchers in the MIT community to act on their energy, ideas, and
talent to create tomorrow's leading firms" (MIT $50K entry kit, 1998). From 1990 to 1997, the
competition has contributed to the establishment of over 30 companies, with an estimated market
capitalization of $180 million dollars (MIT $50K entry kit, 1998).
While the business plans are the immediate outputs of the competition, the goal of the
competition is to assist teams in building tomorrow's leading firms (MIT $50K entry kit, 1998).
To achieve this goal, the competition organizers provide a range of resources for team-building,
mentorship, education and networking. These activities help teams form and develop required
skills, and then help them move from ideas to plans and into businesses (MIT $50K entry kit,
1998). Team-building events come first in order to assist participants in finding team members.
There are two major types of team-building events. The first is the networking in informal
dinners, that are attended by between 30 and 60 people. These get-togethers are held every other
week during the early phases of the competition, and once a month in the later stages. They are
attended by participants who want to join a team and by people who are looking for team
members. Non-participants with start-up experience are also invited to the dinners for the
purpose of networking and providing ad hoc advice. Networking also occurs via the second
team-building mechanism which is the MIT $50K Competition website on which participants
can list the type of team members they are looking for. Individuals can also list their skills on the
site so that inchoate teams can contact them.
The second set of support activity is the educational programs. First, there are talks given
by distinguished speakers. For example, in the MIT $1K Competition in November 1997, the
lead speaker for the kick-off event was Robert Metcafle, the founder of 3Com, a major network
hardware manufacturer. In the 1998 MIT $50K Competition kick-off, the lead speaker was Guy
Kawasaki, one of the developers of Apple Macintosh and for the 1998 MIT $50K Competition
semi-finals, the lead speaker was Geoffrey Moore, the author of the best-selling book on high-
technology marketing strategies, Crossing the Chasm. These talks are designed to encourage
potential participants, stimulating their interest in entrepreneurship through the speakers' own
experiences. The second type of educational outreach consists of specialized talks and short
courses. In the 1998 MIT $50K Competition, for example, a panel discussion was conducted on
intellectual property. Short courses (about a week long) were also conducted on preliminary
venture analysis, personal entrepreneurial strategy and starting and running a high-technology
company. The third type of educational program is consultation sessions. Professional services
firms set aside office hours during which their staff will give advice to participants in areas such
as finance, law and marketing.
The final type of support activity is the mentorship program. Individuals with start-up
experience or those having experience with business plans (such as venture capitalists) are
encouraged to participate in the competition as mentors. Mentor-participant relationships help
teams focus on important issues and also help them avoid potential pitfalls (MIT $50K entry kit,
1998). While the competition organizers provide the opportunity for mentor involvement with
teams, team members must take the initiative to contact mentors. Similarly, mentors have the
right to decline to help a team if they do not have interest in a particular team or if they cannot
offer expertise in a given area. This flexibility is offered to help facilitate a good match between
the needs and interests of both teams and mentors.
Phases of the business plan competition
The MIT $50K Competition consists of two competitions. The first, held in November
each year, is called the MIT $1K Warm-Up Business Idea Competition. In this arena, teams
submit a business idea (approximately two to five pages long). In November 1997, 120 teams
participated in the MIT $1K Competition and 10 winners were selected, with each receiving
$100. The MIT $1K serves as a primer to the main competition held three months later-the
MIT $50K Business Plan Competition.
The winner of the first business plan competition received $10,000 while the second- and
third prize-winners were awarded $3,000 and $2,000 respectively. The first competition attracted
54 entries and in 1997, the competition increased the prize money to $30,000 for the winner and
$10,000 each for the two runners up. In addition to prize money, the winners receive pro bono
services from professional firms in areas such as accounting, legal and strategic management. To
encourage the winners to start companies, half the prize money is distributed when the teams
incorporate and the other half is distributed a year later, after one of the competition judges has
reviewed the ventures' progress.
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Business plan phase of the MIT $50K Competition in 1998
This section describes the business plan phase of the competition in 1998. I focus on the
judging process because the judges' ratings are used as a performance measure in this study. The
judges have two major functions: to select winners of the competition and to provide feedback to
the teams. The judges are selected from the venture community, and include successful
entrepreneurs, venture capitalists and providers of legal and financial services (MIT $50K entry
kit, 1998). Among the competition judges in 1998 were: Jean Notis-McConarty, Partner in
Coopers and Lybrand, J. William Poduska, Founder of Prime Computer and Apollo Computer
and Mitch Kapor, the founder of Lotus Development Corporation and Co-founder of Electronic
Frontier Foundation. A list of all the 19 judges in the MIT $50K Competition are listed in
Appendix 1. Since the specifics of judging vary from year to year, I describe the judging process
in the 1998 MIT $50K Competition because the sample is drawn from the entrants in that year.
In the first of the competition's rounds, the judges evaluated 82 entries. They were
grouped into four judging cells, three that evaluated plans in the "high-technology" category and
one that evaluated plans in the "others" category. Participants chose the category placement for
their plans. Each judging cell consisted of four judges (note that this does not match exactly with
19 total judges in the competition because not all the judges were involved in every stage of the
competition), each of whom evaluated between 19 and 22 plans. Each judge read all the plans
submitted to his or her judging cell and provided written feedback on half of these plans, so that
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each plan received written feedback by two judges. The judges also rated the plans in 10
categories (on a scale from one to five, with the higher the better). The categories were: the
ability of the team to define the customer, identify who pays for the product or service, show
high potential, describe the product or service, analyze the competitors, differentiate from
competitors' products or services, protect competitive advantage, balance the team, substantiate
claims and quantify the business model. The form that the judges' used to evaluate the teams are
shown in Appendix 2. Competition organizers chose these items for evaluation because they
corresponded to the written comments of past competition judges. Over one afternoon, the
judges met and each cell selected the best eight to nine business plans in their own cells. After all
the cells had selected their best plans, all the judges convened and selected 36 teams for the
semi-final round.
In the semi-final round, the 36 teams submitted full business plans of approximately 30 to
60 pages each. The judges then met again in the same cell and each cell selected the best two to
three plans. Following this session, they convened for a plenary session where they selected six
teams for the finals and in the finals phase of the competition, the teams presented their plans
before all of the judges. Two teams were selected as first-prize winners and were awarded
$30,000 each, while the team that was placed third received $10,000. According to the 1998 lead
organizer, the competition is structured much like the real-world funding environment. While a
good plan is required to get a foot in the door with potential investors and financiers, those who
get their foot in the door still have to make convincing presentations to get funding.
DATA AND METHODS
While the above sections offer insights into the significance of the entrepreneurial teams
under scrutiny in this study and how the MIT $50K Competition operates, the remaining sections
of this chapter describe the data, mostly quantitative, but with 13 interviews that illustrated team
activities, that were collected during the competition. Table 3.2 shows the dates of major events
in the MIT $1K and $50K competitions and the actions taken for this research during these
events.
INSERT TABLE 3.2 HERE
The lead organizer of the MIT Business Plan Competition was contacted during the
summer of 1997 to get her permission to study teams in the competition. She supported the study
and gave me full access to the competition including the organizer's meetings, plans submitted
by the competition participants, contact information and resumes of the participants, judging
sessions and judges' feedback to the teams. The initial proposal was to study team members from
the pre-team-formation stage, that is, people who had indicated an interest to join the competition
but had not formed their teams, and to follow them over the course of the MIT $1K and $50K
competitions. Doing this would allow me to observe team issues as they developed over time and
to get real time data of the team formation process. However, in the Fall of 1997, I decided to
start data collection from the MIT $1K Competition onwards and to forgo data collection during
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the pre-formation stage since the participants' identify were known only after the entries were
submitted.
MIT $1K data collection
The purpose of data collection during the MIT $1K Competition was to pre-test the scales
and questions developed to explore how team members interacted. Data collection for the MIT
$1K Competition began in November 1997 and ended in December 1997. In 18 November 1997,
the competition participants submitted their business ideas to the organizers and included in their
submissions the names and contact information of team members. In total, 100 entries from 277
participants were received, comprising 23 individual and 97 team entries. Since the study was
about team issues, questionnaires were only sent to the participants that belonged to teams. The
questionnaires, a copy of which is attached in Appendix 3, were mailed on 20 November 1997
and participants were requested to complete them by 4 December 1997. For each questionnaire,
the names of the participant's team members were listed and the participant was asked to
consider only the people listed as members when answering questions. This procedure was
adapted from Ancona and Caldwell (1992a) to increase the chances that members had the same
people in mind when they described their team's interactions. On 12 December 1997, I
telephoned the participants who had not returned the questionnaires and requested that they did
so as soon as possible. Of the 250 questionnaires mailed, 64, or 26 percent, were returned.
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Although the response rate was low, I did not do any follow up after the telephone
reminder because many of the participants (about 80 percent of the participants were university
students) had examinations during that month. Follow-up after their examinations was also not
practical for two reasons. First, the examinations were followed by winter holidays and second,
the MIT $50K Competition questionnaire would be mailed in February 1998 and I did not want
the participants to complete two questionnaires within a month of each other. Doing that could
potentially lower response rate during the MIT $50K Competition phase of data collection.
Although only 64 questionnaires were received, this number was sufficient to test the reliabilities
of the scales developed. The MIT $1K Competition data were not used to do confirmatory data
analysis on how team factors influenced performance because informal interviews with the
competition participants indicated that many of these teams spent little time working together. In
some cases the teams prepared their competition submissions over lunch or during a meeting in
one of the participant's dormitory. Data from the questionnaires showed that team members spent
an average of five hours working together.
The teams in this sample were small, comprising mostly males (74 percent) and MIT
students (76 percent). Of the 97 team entries, 27 teams had two members, twenty-six teams had
three members, twelve teams had four members, four teams had five members, three teams had
six members, four teams had seven members and one team had eight members. Of the students in
the sample, 61 percent were graduate and 38 percent undergraduate students, representing 33
percent in management and 48 percent in engineering (including computer science) majors. This
description suggested that there was limited demographic diversity among team members and a
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limitation is that the results of the study might not apply to entrepreneurial teams in general. In
the final chapter, I discuss the generalizability of the study to entrepreneurial teams in other
settings.
Nine scales were used to determine different aspects of team factors, including internal
task processes (Ancona and Caldwell, 1992a), coordination (Ancona and Caldwell, 1992a),
effort (self-developed), boundary management (Ancona and Caldwell, 1992a; Louis and Yan,
1996), social integration (Smith et al., 1994), conflict (Jehn, Northcraft and Neale, 1997), team
identity (Hinkle et al., 1989), satisfaction (Jehn, 1995) and member-rated performance (Ancona
and Caldwell, 1992a). A listing of these scales together with their reliabilities are shown in Table
3.3 and the correlations among scale items in Table 3.4.
INSERT TABLES 3.3 AND 3.4 HERE
With the exception of the effort scale (Cronbach alpha of 0.19) that included questions on
the number of hours members worked, both individually or as a team, and the percent of
meetings attended, the other scales had at least average reliabilities (lowest Cronbach alpha of
0.64). Due to its low reliability, the effort scale was dropped from the study. The social
integration scale was also dropped because it correlated highly (r=0.73) with team identity scale.
In addition, it included questions relating to team boundary management (e.g., the members of
the team are quick to defend each other from criticism from outsiders and the members of this
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team really stick together) and decision-making (e.g., when final decisions are reached, it is
common for at least one member of the team to be unhappy about the decision) that had been
asked in other parts of the questionnaire. The coordination scale was also dropped because it
correlated highly with the internal task processes scale (r=0.66). Although the boundary
management scale also correlated highly with the internal task processes scale (r=0.62), the
scales were retained because some researchers (e.g., Ancona and Caldwell, 1998) had
documented the need to study factors both internal and external to the team. The team identity
scale correlated highly with the boundary management scale (r=0.69); however, the team identity
scale was retained because team identity is an important component of a team (e.g., Hinkle et al.,
1989) but few studies have examined how team identity influences performance (Scott,
forthcoming). The correlations also showed that member-satisfaction correlated highly with
member-rated performance (r=-0.66), a finding that was similar to that found by Gladstein (1984).
In addition to these scales, the questionnaire also included questions on how members made
major decisions in the team, and semi-open ended questions (in tabular form) that asked
participants to describe the division of tasks in the team and member external contacts. An
examination of the responses to these questions suggested that members did not have problems
answering them. Overall, the pre-test of the questionnaire showed that the scales were reliable
and the participants did not have problems answering the questions. The pre-test also enabled me
to determine which scales were redundant and thereby omitting them from the questionnaire to
be mailed after the MIT $50K Competition-having a shorter questionnaire is beneficial because
that could potentially increase response rate (Dillman, 1972).
MIT $50K data collection
This section describes the steps taken to collect information from the MIT $50K
Competition participants, a process that lasted from 25 February 1998 to 5 May 1998, and a
description of the sample characteristics. The information collected were mostly similar to that in
the MIT $1K Competition questionnaire with four major differences. First, some scale items that
were identified in the pre-test to be either not reliable or highly correlated with other scale items
were omitted. Second, participants were asked to submit their resumes together with their entries.
Third, in addition to member perceived team performance, judges' ratings of team performance
were collected and fourth, 13 interviews were conducted to illustrate team functioning.
The main difference between the process of data collection during the MIT $50K
competition and the MIT $1K Competition was that a series of steps, including pre-questionnaire
notification and post-questionnaire follow-ups were conducted to increase the chances of getting
higher response rates. As in the case of the MIT $1K Competition, information was only
gathered from participants who were members of teams. On 25 February 1998, I collected the
business plans from the MIT $50K participants and checked that the participants' resumes and
contact information were present. On that day, a total of 82 entries were received, comprising 78
team and four individual entries.
On 26 February 1998, an email, attached in Appendix 4, was sent to the participants-95
percent of the participants had email addresses-telling them to expect a questionnaire in the
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mail. On the morning of 27 February 1998, a questionnaire, attached in Appendix 5, was mailed
to each participant requesting that they return it by 8 March 1998. On 5 March 1998, a postcard
reminder, attached in Appendix 6 was sent to all participants, reiterating the importance of their
responses so that the study accurately represented the opinions of the teams. On 18 March 1998,
a reminder letter was sent to participants who had not responded to the questionnaire. This
mailing included another copy of the questionnaire in the case that they had misplaced the
original questionnaire. On 31 March 1998, I telephoned all the participants that had not
responded to the mail questionnaire. Data collection for the questionnaire ended when the
participants either agreed or did not agree to a telephone interview or could not be reached by
telephone. In total, 257 out of 310 participants, or 83 percent, responded to the questionnaire.
With the exception of one team, all the other teams turned in at least one questionnaire.
However, in four teams, less than 50 percent of the members returned the questionnaires and
these teams were omitted from the study. Thus the sample in this study comprised 73 teams that
participated in the 1998 MIT $50K Competition.
Description of the sample
The characteristics of the sample resembled that in the MIT $1K Competition in that
most teams were small, with a range of two to 10, and comprised mostly of participants affiliated
to MIT (81 percent) and in engineering (49 percent) or management (31 percent) majors. Within
the range of team sizes, seventeen teams had two members, 15 with three members, 14 with four
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members, 15 with five members, four with six members, four with seven members, three with
eight members, none with nine members and one with ten members. About 77 percent of the
teams did a plan in a technology area, a finding that was not surprising giving MIT's focus on
engineering education. The team members also had limited work experience, with an average of
31 months and a median of 24 months with 52 percent in engineering, 50 percent in management
and 13 percent in other areas. More than half the team members were whites (58 percent) and of
U.S. citizenship (67 percent). The team members were highly educated with seventy-seven
percent of the participants having or pursuing graduate degrees and the remainder having or
pursuing undergraduate degrees. Of the undergraduate students, 61 percent were seniors and 33
percent juniors (only four participants were freshmen or sophomores). Of the teams in the study,
39 percent proceeded from the initial stage of the MIT $50K Competition (the focus of the study)
to the semi-finals stage of the competition. A listing of the sample characteristics is shown in
Table 3.5 and the limitations of the sample are discussed in the final chapter.
INSERT TABLE 3.5 HERE
Interviews
In April till early May 1998, I decided to do some interviews to augment the
questionnaire data. The semi-structured interviews, with the interview guide attached in
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Appendix 8, collected information on team formation, team activities, structures, member
interactions with people outside the team and steps that the team had taken to start a business
venture. The decision was to choose interviewees that represented different backgrounds
(management and engineering, and undergraduate and graduate students) and from teams with
different sizes and types of industries (teams represented by all four judging cells). The
interviewee characteristics are shown in Table 3.5 above. Over a period of three weeks, starting
20 April 1998, a total of 13 tape recorded interviews were done, comprising one member of
different teams. The interviews lasted from a half to an hour each. After three weeks, I stopped
interviewing because to match the interview data with the quantitative data, the interviews
should be conducted close to the time the plans were submitted. In addition, the participants who
were university students had examinations in May and many had already been contacted several
times to get them to complete the mail questionnaire. The interviewee characteristics resembled
that of the team members in the sample in that most were males, with engineering or
management backgrounds and in teams that submitted technology related plans. However, the
interviewees over-represented males (there was only one female), non-U.S. citizens and all were
MIT students. Since a small number of interviews were conducted, the information that the
interviewees provided was only used for illustrative purposes. Given this number, no particular
analysis procedure was conducted other than to read the transcripts to get a sense of how the
teams functioned. Limitations of the interview plan are discussed in the concluding chapter.
Information from judges
In addition to the questionnaires and the interviews, data were also collected from the
competition judges. On 8 March 1998, the MIT $50K judges met to select teams for the semi-
final stage. The judges' ratings covered different aspects of a business plan including the team's
ability to define the customer, show high business potential, describe its product or service,
differentiate from competitor's product or service, protect its competitive advantage, balance the
team, substantiate claims and quantify the business model. On average, each team was evaluated
by two judges with the average ratings positively correlated at 0.38 (judges ratings taken as the
average of 10 performance items) with a median correlation of 0.43 and in only five instances
did the judges have negative correlations. The judges' ratings form a performance measure used
in this thesis and a copy of the form that they used to rate the teams is attached in Appendix 2.
Conclusion
This chapter describes the advantages of studying team-based entrepreneurial activities in
a business plan competition and steps taken to collect data from sample participants. However,
several limitations of this sample should be noted. First, this study is about the early stage
performance and not about entrepreneurial teams in general. For example, Reynolds (1997) notes
that new firms go through the stages of gestation, new firm at infancy, fledging new firm and
established new firm. The teams in this study are still in the gestation stage. Second, the
characteristics of these teams resemble start-up teams although they are not "real world" start-up
teams because some team members may join the competition for the experience of preparing a
business plan rather than to start a new business venture2 . In addition, all the teams in this study
are engaged in preparing a business plan and according to Carter et al. (1996), entrepreneurs do
not go through the same start-up sequence. Further, eighty percent of the participants come from
one institution, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Thus the findings should be
interpreted as suggestive, rather than conclusive, of factors influencing early stage new venture
team performance.
The next three chapters present different papers that explore the effects of team factors on
short-term entrepreneurial team performance. The method sections in these papers describe the
scales (including scale reliabilities) used in each paper and the results of factor analyzing these
scales. The next chapter also describes the performance measures used in this thesis. Since all
papers in this thesis use the same performance measures, the papers after that do not describe
how short-term entrepreneurial team performance was measured.
2 The structure of the competition mitigates this, since only teams that incorporate and are evaluated by the judges to
have made sufficient progress in their ventures will get the prize money awarded to them.
Table 3.1. Comparing Education Level in Roberts's (1991a) Sample of High-Technology
Entrepreneurs and the Sample in This Dissertation
Education level Roberts (1991a) technical This study
Entrepreneurs ( percent) (percent)
High School 1 0
College, without degree or pursuing college 8 13
Bachelors degree 27 10
Pursuing Masters degree NA 42
Masters degree or Prof. Engineer 32 16
Pursuing Ph.D. N.A. 13
Ph.D. 31 6
Source: Roberts, 1991a:60
Table 3.2. Major Events in the MIT $1K and MIT $50K Competitions and Actions
Taken for this Study.
Date MIT $1K & $50K Action Taken For This Study
Events
1997 Contacted lead organizer of the MIT Business Plan
Competition and got her support to study teams in
Late the competition.
summer
Initial plan to track members from pre-team-
formation stage till the end of the MIT $50K
Competition.
Early Fall Attended organizer meetings.
Discovered that it was not possible to identify the
population of "pre-formed" teams and decided to
track teams from the MIT $1K Competition stage
onwards.
18 Nov MIT $1K Competition entries Collected the entries from the participants and the
due. participants' contact information.
20 Nov Questionnaires mailed to participants.
Late Nov Informal interviews with MIT $1K members. Found
that most members spent little time, approximately
five hours, working together as a team.
04 Dec Due date for the MIT $1K questionnaires.
12 Dec Telephone reminder to MIT $1K participants.
24 Dec Stopped data collection. Response rate of 26 percent.
1998 MIT $50K Competition entries Collected the entries from the MIT $50K participants
due. and checked that their resumes and contact
25 Feb information were present.
26 Feb Sent email to the MIT $50K participants informing
them to expect a questionnaire in the mail.
27 Feb Mailed questionnaire to MIT $50K participants.
5 March Postcard reminder to all MIT $50K participants.
Table 3.2 continued. Major Events in the MIT $1K and MIT $50K Competitions and Actions
Taken for this Study.
Date MIT $1K & $50K Action Taken For This Study
Events
8 March Due date for MIT $50K questionnaire.
Attended judging session. Collected judges' feedback
on the teams (written) and the judges' mental models
describing what they thought was important to be in
a plan.
18 March Reminder letter to MIT $50K participants who had
not responded to the questionnaire.
31 March Telephoned MIT $50K participants who had not
responded to the mail questionnaire.
5 April Stopped data collection. A response rate of 83
percent.
20 April Started interviews.
05 May Ended interviews and data collection for the study.
Table 3.3. Reliabilities of the Scales in the MIT $1K Questionnaire.
Cronbach Questions in Appendix 3 Number of
alpha scale items
Internal Task Processes 0.75 Section 1, questions Intl to Int 3. 3
(Ancona and Caldwell, 1992a)
Coordination 0.68 Section 1, questions Coordl to 3
Coord3.
(Ancona and Caldwell, 1992a)
Effort scale 0.19 Section 2, questions Effl to Eff3. 3
(Self developed)
Boundary Management 0.79 Section 3, BM to BM7. 7
(Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Louis and
Yan, 1996)
Social Integration 0.64 Section 4, questions SocInI to 9
SocIn9.
(Smith et al., 1994)
Conflict 0.92 Section 4, questions ConRi to 11
ConR4, ConTI to ConT4 and
(Jehn, Northcraft and Neale, 1997) ConPI to ConP3.
Team Identity 0.80 Section 5, questions Idenl to Iden9 9
(Hinkle et al., 1989)
Satisfaction 0.72 Section 5, questions Sat I and Sat 2. 2
(Jehn, 1995)
Member-rated Performance 0.86 Section 5, questions Perfl to Perf 6. 6
(Ancona and Caldwell, 1992a)
Table 3.4. Correlations Among the Scales in the MIT $1K Questionnaires
Scale
Internal Task Processes
Coordination
Effort
Boundary Management
Social Integration
Conflict
Team Identity
Satisfaction
Member-rated Performance
Mean
5.51
5.23
6.10
5.40
5.87
1.93
6.04
5.82
5.19
SD
0.97
1.01
5.47
0.94
0.55
0.73
0.75
1.07
0.98
1
1.00
0.66
0.12
0.62
0.49
-0.05
0.59
0.56
0.65
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1.00
-0.02
0.62
0.46
-0.13
0.55
0.52
0.59
1.00
-0.01
0.10
0.01
-0.02
0.02
0.12
1.00
0.56
0.04
0.69
0.64
0.60
1.00
-0.17
0.73
0.56
0.49
1.00
-0.10
-0.11
-0.11
1.00
0.80
0.57
1.00
0.66 1.00
-II-
Table 3.5. Characteristics of the MIT $50K Sample and the Interviewee Characteristics.
Interviewee INT 1 INT 2 INT 3 INT 4 INT 5 INT 6 INT 7 INT 8 INT 9 INT 10 INT 11 INT 12 INT13 Interviewee Sample summary
number summary
(N= 73 teams)
(N = 13
individuals
from 13 teams)
Type of Hi-tech Hi-tech Hi-tech Hi-tech Hi-tech Non hi- Non hi- Non hi- Non hi- Non hi- Hi-tech Hi-tech Hi-tech 62 percent high- 77 percent high-
product tech tech tech tech tech tech. tech related plans.
described
in business 38 percent non - 23 percent non-
plan high-tech. high-tech related
plans.
Race Information omitted for confidentiality purposes 69 percent non- 58 percent
whites. members non-
whites.
31 percent
whites. 42 percent
members whites.
Nationality Information omitted for confidentiality purposes 62 percent non- 33 percent
U.S. members non-U.S.
citizens.
38 percent U.S.
67 percent
members U.S.
citizens.
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Table 3.5 continued. Characteristics of the MIT $50K Sample and the Interviewee Characteristics.
Interviewee INT 1 INT 2 INT 3 INT 4 INT 5 INT 6 INT 7 INT 8 INT 9 INT 10 INT 11 INT 12 INT13 Interviewee Sample
number summary summary
(N = 13 (N= 73 teams)
individuals
from 13
teams)
Education Graduate Graduate Graduate Graduate Undergr Graduate Undergr Graduate Graduate Graduate Undergr Graduate Graduate 77 percent in 77 percent
level ad ad ad grad. school. members in
graduate school
23 percent or with graduate
undergrad. degrees.
23 percent
members with or
purusing
bachelors'
degrees.
Education Mgmt Engr Engr Engr Engr Engr Engr Mgmt Mgmt Engr Engr Manage Engr 69 percent 49 percent
major ment Engr. members in
Engr.
31 percent
Mgmt. 31 percent in
Mgmt.
20 percent in
others.
Months of Above below Below Below below below Below above above Below Below below below Average of 20 Average member
work median median median median median median median median median median median median median months, work experience
experience median of 12 of 31 months,
months. median of 24
months.
I ii - - -------------------- -- ---- -------~
-- - -------------- -- - - -- ,- ---- - ~_ __ ~ ~ ~
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Table 3.5 continued. Characteristics of the MIT $50K Sample and the Interviewee Characteristics.
Interviewee INT 1 INT 2 INT 3 INT 4 INT 5 INT 6 INT 7 INT 8 INT 9 INT 10 INT 11 INT 12 INT13 Interviewee Sample
number summary summary
(N = 13 (N= 73 teams)
individuals
from 13
teams)
Area work Engr Engr Engr Mgmt Engr Engr Engr Mgmt Engr Engr Engr Mgmt Engr 77 percent 52 percent
experience Engr. members in
Engr.
33 percent
Mgmt. 50 percent in
Mgmt.
13 percent in
others.
Entered No Yes No No No No No No Yes Yes No No Yes 31 percent 39 percent semi-
Semi-finals semi-finalists finalists.
Team Size Above Above Below Below Below Below Above Below Above Above Below Below Above 4 Average and
median of 4.mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean median of 4.
Specifically:
Size # teams
2 17
3 15
4 14
5 15
6 4
7 4
8 3
10 1
CHAPTER 4
EFFECTS OF TEAM TASK DESIGN AND PROCESSES ON ENTREPRENEURIAL
TEAM PERFORMANCE
This chapter explores how short-term entrepreneurial teams can be designed to be high-
performing. Team design is important, because some researchers have argued that unlike other
factors, such as the environment, design is within the control of team members (Cohen and
Bailey, 1997:243). Design is especially important at the early stage of a team's development
because early experiences get routinized (e.g., Stinchcombe, 1965), affecting the venture's
culture (e.g., Schein, 1983) and future growth rates (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990).
This paper makes several contributions. First, it shows that both team task design and
processes affect short-term entrepreneurial team performance. Some researchers concentrate on
task design (e.g., Hackman, 1987), while others on team processes (e.g., Argyris, 1964; Senge,
1991). This study shows that both sets of factors need to be scrutinized. Second, this study shows
that task design and processes have different effects on performance. While task design affects
external evaluations of performance, processes affect members' evaluations of performance. No
study to my knowledge has shown that task design and processes have different effects on team
performance. Both external and internal evaluations are important (e.g., Hackman, 1987). While
positive external evaluations increase the likelihood of entrepreneurial teams getting external
support, such as funding (e.g., Roberts, 1991b); positive internal evaluations increase the
likelihood that members are satisfied with team participation (e.g., Hackman, 1987). The third
contribution of this study is that it highlights that a more parsimonious description of team
processes is needed. The study shows that the different components of team processes (such as
conflict, internal task processes and team identity) are highly correlated. Consequently, some
factors, such as task conflict and internal task processes, might belong to the same construct.
In the next section, I describe how three aspects of team design, including team size,
extent of team decision making and level of specialization, influences the performance of short-
term entrepreneurial teams. These task-design factors are important because they affect the
amount of information available to the entrepreneurial team and information is crucial for
entrepreneurial teams to perform well (Kirzner, 1997). This is followed by the exploration of
how teams processes-defined as how members interact with one another (e.g., Ancona et al.,
1996, Module 3:10; West and Anderson 1996; Hackman, 1987)-affect performance. I focus on
internal task processes, team identity and conflict because these processes influence the extent
members work towards a common objective and are able to combine their information
effectively. The task design and processes variables modeled in this chapter are shown in Figure
4.1.
While some researchers argue that task design affects team interaction patterns which in
turn affects team performance (e.g., Hackman, 1987), the study models both task design and
processes as main effects. This is because teams in this study are in the early start-up phase; a
phase in which many team practices have not been routinized (e.g., Stinchcombe, 1965) and
consequently structures and processes co-evolve. After describing the methodology, research
findings are described. Finally, the chapter concludes with implications concerning how short-
term entrepreneurial teams can be designed to be high-performing.
INSERT FIGURE 4.1 HERE
TASK DESIGN AND ENTREPRENEURIAL TEAM PERFORMANCE
This section describes how team task design affects the performance of entrepreneurial
teams. I focus on task design factors that can impact the amount of information available to the
team, because the ability to discover entrepreneurial activities depends on the accessibility of
new information and the ability to use it in new ways (Kirzner, 1997).
Benefits of larger team size for entrepreneurial team performance
Size is one of the team structural components (e.g., Gladstein, 1984) that has been shown
by numerous researchers (e.g., West and Anderson, 1996) to affect team performance. There are
two effects of size on performance. Larger teams have potentially more information and that is
beneficial to performance (West and Anderson, 1996). However, larger teams also face process
losses (Gooding and Wanger, 1985), such as coordination costs (West and Anderson, 1996) and
difficulty of communication (Smith et al., 1994). Supporting these arguments, the effects of size
on performance have been mixed. For example, Vinokur-Kaplan (1995) found size to negatively
predict performance of interdisciplinary hospital teams of between five and 12 members. On the
other hand, Campion et al. (1993) found that larger clerical worker teams performed better. West
and Anderson (1996) conclude that the effect of size on performance is curvilinear. In smaller
teams the information benefits outweigh process losses and size positively predicts performance
while in larger teams, defined by them as more than 12 to 13 members, process losses outweigh
information gains and size predicts negative performance.
Although, the effect of size on team performance is curvilinear, within entrepreneurial
teams, I expect size to positively predict performance because research on entrepreneurial teams
show that these teams tend to be small-with four or less founding members (e.g., Roberts,
1991a; Vyakarnam, Jacobs and Handelberg, 1997). For example, Roberts (1991a) in a study of
MIT laboratory spin-offs found a median founding team of two members while studies by
Chandler and Hanks (1998) and Vyakarnam et al., (1997) found an average of four founding
members. In this study, the average founding entrepreneurial team size was four with a range of
two to 10.
Hypothesis 1: Within the range of team size in entrepreneurial teams, larger entrepreneurial
teams will perform better than smaller entrepreneurial teams.
Benefits of team decision making for entrepreneurial team performance
In the previous paragraphs, I argue that within the range of team size in entrepreneurial
teams, larger entrepreneurial teams tend to have more information and are thus more likely to
perform better than smaller entrepreneurial teams. This section explores how tasks that are
designed to increase members' ability to pull their information together would also have a
positive effect on performance. I focus on how tasks are allocated in the team-namely, the
opportunity for members to participate in decision making and the opportunity for members to
perform different tasks.
I expect that entrepreneurial teams that are designed so that members can make decisions
together will perform better than teams where decision making is more autocratic. The ability to
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make decisions collectively facilitates information exchange among team members and results in
more information being available to the team (Shaw, 1981). This in turn promotes innovation
(West and Anderson, 1996) and cross-fertilization of existing ideas (Pearce and Ravlin, 1987;
Porac and Howard, 1990). For example, in a laboratory study, Volkema and Ronald (1998)
found that teams that were able to jointly formulate their problems performed better in the winter
survival exercise than teams that did not formulate their problems together. Similarly, Lipshitz
and Bar-Ilan (1996) found that teams that jointly discussed issues produced better results than
teams that did not. In a field study, Eisenhardt, Kahwajy and Bourgeois (1997) found allowing
members to work together to shape options resulted in more creative problem solving. In another
field study, Simons (1995) found that discussions among top management members increased
members' understanding of their environments. These teams were less resistant to change and
were more profitable than teams that had less discussion among top management members. The
need to combine information is especially important for the teams in this study who are in the
early start-up phase. Their task requires that they conceptualize a whole business model (Olive,
1996), which demands that they know how different aspects of a business, including finance,
marketing and product development, fit together (Olive, 1996).
Various participants illustrate the advantages of participation in decision making. For
example, one interviewee (INT 13) said that "We don't shun what anybody says. We always give
that person half a chance to speak and that is important because you need a diverse amount of
ideas, and then you realize that this is something truly different ... We realized that if we wanted
this company to succeed, then we really had to give each other the chance to speak out."
Another team member (INT 9) said that the team's strength is that "everyone is very open to one
another, no one idea is shot down." Although this team did not win a prize during the
competition, its competition performance was above average, and it had started operations with
an office in Waltham, Massachusetts.
Hypothesis 2: Entrepreneurial teams in the early start-up stage that are designed with member
participation in decision making will have higher performance than teams designed with less
member participation.
Benefits of assigning tasks to members as generalists to entrepreneurial team performance
The previous section hypothesizes that designing decision making to be participatory
benefits the entrepreneurial team by enabling it to pull together team members different
information. Another approach proposed by this study is to divide team tasks in a way that
allows members to function as generalists rather than specialists. Assigning tasks to generalists
instead of specialists is expected to be beneficial for performance because it allows members to
contribute to different parts of the business model rather than to just a narrow portion of it. In the
context of this study, I define a specialist to be a person that participates in specific team tasks
while a generalist participates in the full range of team tasks.
The division of tasks among teams is defined as task differentiation or the extent of
specialization in the team (Jones, 1994:49). When specialization is low, members perform a wide
scope of tasks; when specialization is extensive, members perform within a narrow scope of
tasks (Daft, 1995:16). High specialization has been defined as mechanistic structures (Bums and
Stalker, 1961) or as bureaucratic structures (Spender and Kessler, 1995), and low specialization
as organic structures (Bums and Stalker 1961). In mechanistic structures, there is a clearly
delineated one-to-one correspondence between person and task, so that each person has an area
of specialization and is expected to work within the structural role boundaries (Jones, 1994:77).
By contrast, organic structures are characterized by loosely defined roles, where members
execute a range of different tasks (Jones, 1994:77).
The literature suggests that there is no one best way to divide the tasks, but that the best
way depends on the nature of the task the teams are engaged in. Task specialization can be
beneficial in routine procedures, where knowledge needed to get the work done is common and
the focus is on knowledge application (Spender, 1995; Adler and Borys, 1996). In this instance,
task specialization improves team performance because it allows team members to delve deeply
into the particular task at hand (Alder and Borys, 1996; Daft, 1995). In innovative activities,
however, where tasks are nonroutine and knowledge is incomplete, task generalization is
preferred (Alder and Borys, 1996; Spender, 1995) because it enables team members to have a
better understanding of the issues faced by the team as a whole (Van de Ven, 1986). The teams
in this study are engaged in the innovative task of preparing of business plan, which demands
that they conceptualize a whole business model (Olive, 1996). Thus for this task, I expect that
teams that generalize will perform better than teams in which members specialize in a few areas.
Hypothesis 3a: Entrepreneurial teams in which tasks are divided so that members are generalists
perform better than entrepreneurial teams in which tasks are assigned to members who specialize
in different areas.
Although most researchers have focused on either generalization or specialization (e.g.,
Adler and Borys, 1996), the interviews reveal that instead of either allocating tasks to generalists
or specialists, some teams make use of the hybrid form of tasks division, where members
specialize in some areas but are generalists in others. This study therefore expands the existing
literature by showing that generalization and specialization are not two ends of the continuum,
but that teams can both specialize and generalize simultaneously. One member illustrated the
point (INT 3): "Individuals each knew their strengths. Business, selling, . . . each person [was
strong in] some of that. Writing the proposal was back to a group effort. Two wrote, two persons
reviewed and as a group, we compiled together." Another team member said that each team
member (INT 6) had a "piece that we could take care of. I looked into how we could integrate
the technology, and this guy looked at the technology side and [the third] person looked at the
corporate relations side . . [but] we voice our opinion even if it falls onto someone else's
category." These teams are able to divide work so that each member specializes in some area yet
at the same time has the opportunity to combine different perspectives. Therefore, I expect that
teams in which members are both specialists and generalists to perform as well as entrepreneurial
teams where members are generalists.
Hypothesis 3b: Entrepreneurial teams in which tasks are divided so that members are both
generalists and specialists perform just as well as teams in which tasks are assigned to members
who generalize.
ENTREPRENEURIAL TEAM PROCESSES AND TEAM PERFORMANCE
The previous section argues that entrepreneurial teams should be larger and that tasks
should be designed to utilize participatory decision making and generalized task allocation. This
section explores how team processes-that is, the way in which members relate to one another
(Hackman, 1987, Hambrick, 1994)-affect entrepreneurial team performance by influencing the
ability of members to integrate their perspectives and to deal with differences constructively.
Benefits of good internal task processes on entrepreneurial team performance
Good team dynamics reduces process loss and allows team members to work smoothly;
without good processes, team members could pull in different directions (Ancona and Caldwell,
1992a). Although there are many team processes, I focus on processes related to the task since
some researchers argue that these processes are the key drivers of team performance (e.g.,
Ancona and Caldwell, 1992a). Task processes comprise the ability of the team to define goals,
develop workable plans and prioritize work (Ancona and Caldwell, 1992a).
Successful teams develop commitment to a common approach to how they will work
together to achieve their common objectives (Katzenbach and Smith 1993). Superb teams
usually have clear and engaging goals (Weldon and Weingart, 1993, Wageman, 1997), which
provide a reason for the team's existence and what the team wants to achieve. These goals help
members make intelligent trade-offs, (Wageman, 1997) and the ability to comprehend what they
want to achieve facilitates members' ability to combine their efforts (West and Anderson, 1996).
Consequently, the presence of clear goals predicts team performance (e.g., Guzzo and Shea,
1992; Pritchard, Jones, Roth, Stuebing, and Ekeberg, 1988). In fact, West and Anderson (1996)
concluded that the presence of goals is the only consistent factor positively predicting team
performance. In a study of 418 project teams, Pinto and Prescott (1987) found that clarity of
goals was the only factor that was associated with team success at all stages-conception,
planning, execution and termination-of the innovation process.
The interviews with team members illustrate benefits of having good processes. One
member (INT 9) said that during its first meeting, the team members "had different ideas of what
was going on ... [and] during the first meeting, [we sorted out]..,. these differences and by the
end of the meeting we came to an understanding of what we wanted out of [the team]." Another
member (INT 13) illustrated the problems of a lack of clear goals stating that "One thing we
could change is the improvement of our organizational efficiency and [have] more focused
meetings ... we have a vision, but in our next two meetings, we had a new vision ... We need to
step up front and say, 'if we are going to do this, let's just do that right now.' It is always hard to
find the super best idea, because new ideas are always popping in. Just stick with the really,
really good idea and work with that and then mention in your business plan that there are these
potential businesses you want to go into. Otherwise, we would just be rehashing old ideas, we
weren't getting anywhere."
H4: Entrepreneurial teams that are better able at managing their internal task processes-as
determined by the ability of the team to define its goals, prioritize work and to develop workable
plans-will perform better than teams that are less able to manage their internal task processes.
Benefits of a common team identity to entrepreneurial team performance
Teams with good internal task processes are aware of their team's goals and are in turn
able to make intelligent trade-offs to achieve these common objectives (Wageman, 1995). This
section predicts that entrepreneurial teams in which members share a common team identity will
perform better than entrepreneurial teams where members do not have a common identity.
Campion, Papper and Medsker (1996) define team identity as members' perception of
themselves as belonging to one team and as permanent members of the team. Similarly, Scott
(forthcoming) defines team identity as the members' cognitive identification with a team, and
adopting the team's problems as their own, irrespective of personal feelings towards other team
members. Other researchers (e.g., Tajfel, 1978) argue that there are at least two dimensions of
team identity, namely, the cognitive and the interpersonal components. According to Hinkle et
al. (1989), cognitive identity refers to the extent that individuals adopt team goals as their own
while emotional identity refers to interpersonal attraction among team members. Supporting
Hinkle et al. (1978), Tajfel (1978) defines social identity as "that part of an individual's self-
concept which derives from his [her] knowledge of his [her] membership of a group, together
with the value and emotional significance attached to the membership" (p.63.)
Although few studies have explored the effects of identity on performance (Scott,
forthcoming), indirect evidence is provided by the cohesion literature. Goodman, Ravlin and
Schminke (1987:144) found that most definitions of cohesiveness included attraction to team
(e.g., Back, 1951:9; Organ and Hammer, 1982:325) and a wish to continue membership in the
team (e.g., Festinger et al., 1950, p.164; Steers 1981, p. 199)-definitions that are similar to the
emotional component of team identity. Guzzo and Shea 1992, and Mullen and Copper, (1994),
found that team cohesion is a positive predictor of team performance. Similarly, in a meta-
analysis, Cohen and Bailey (1997:256) note that both laboratory and field studies have found
moderate support for the positive effects of cohesion on performance (e.g., Mullen and Cooper,
1994). More direct evidence is provided by Scott (forthcoming) who found that team identity is
beneficial for team performance. Specifically, in a sample of 42 product development teams, she
found that team identity positively predicted the team's ability to keep to budgets and schedules
and higher technical quality outputs.
As suggested in the interviews, a lack of team identity can be detrimental to performance
as members are not committed to working towards team objectives. One member (INT 8) said
that "I think not everybody is as committed or not equally committed. I feel like I am very
committed to the team and so is Zenith, but Mike sometimes seems committed but sometimes is
not. For me it is an idea that I came up with and I feel close to it and to really make it work but
for others it might be oh, it is a good idea, good to do it while we are in school." In this instance,
the leader has committed to starting the business after graduation, but the other members have
not. Although performance is the result of a variety of factors, it is possible that this team's
mixed level of member identity, contributed to its average performance level.
Hypothesis 5: Entrepreneurial teams that have higher levels of team identity will perform better
than entrepreneurial teams with lower levels of team identity.
Mixed effects of conflict on entrepreneurial team performance
Different perspectives among team members can lead to more creative solutions (e.g.,
Eisenhardt, Kahwajy and Bourgeois, 1997). However, differences in opinions can quickly
degenerate into interpersonal hostilities (e.g., Eisenhardt et al., 1997). The ability of members to
combine their perspectives effectively depends on the members' ability to focus on differences
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constructively (e.g., Eisenhardt et al., 1997). In accordance with the literature reviewed below, I
argue that teams that are able to focus their differences on task issues perform better than teams
that focus on interpersonal differences.
Jehn (1995:257) defines conflict as perceived incompatibilities or perceptions by parties
that they have different views or interpersonal differences. Many researchers have distinguished
task from relationship conflict (e.g., Simons and Peterson, 1998; Amason and Sapienza, 1997;
Shah and Jehn, 1993; Jehn, 1995). Task conflict is sometimes defined as cognitive conflict (e.g.,
Amason and Schweiger 1994) or content conflict (e.g., Shah and Jehn, 1993). Task conflicts are
disagreements about the work that the team is doing (e.g., Jehn, 1995; Simons and Peterson,
1998), or incompatibilities in judgments or perspectives among team members (Shah and Jehn,
1993; Simons and Peterson, 1998; Amason and Schweiger, 1994). Relationship conflict is
defined as interpersonal differences among team members (e.g., Jehn, 1995), not directly linked
to the task, and resulting from personal incompatibilities and disputes (Amason and Schweiger,
1994). It usually includes tension, annoyance and hostility among team members (e.g., Priem and
Price, 1991). Relationship conflict has been described as emotional conflict by Shah and Jehn
(1993), socio-emotional conflict by Priem and Price (1991) and affective conflict by Amason and
Sapienza (1997:496). With few exceptions, the difference between task and relationship conflict
has survived over 40 years of research (Simons and Peterson, 1998). Empirically, Pinkley (1990)
found that in disputants' interpretations of conflict, individuals were able to distinguish between
task and relationship conflict.
Conflict can both facilitate and hinder team performance (Amason and Schweiger 1994).
There is increasing evidence that task conflict can be beneficial to team performance, while
relationship conflict hinders team performance (e.g., Jehn, 1995, Shah and Jehn, 1993; Priem and
Price, 1991). Conflicts focusing on task issues facilitate exchange of information among team
members (Jehn, 1995) and enhance understanding of the tasks that need to be performed
(Schweiger, Sandberg and Ragan, 1986; Schwenk, 1990). Similarly, Amason and Sapienza
(1997:496) argue that cognitive conflict improves strategic decision making because it facilitates
information exchange among top management members and can lead them to "see different
environments" (Mitroff, 1982, p. 375). Eisenhardt et al., (1997) argue that conflict is beneficial
to teams because when members challenge one another, it creates a better understanding and
generates a broader range of options. This is illustrated by a team member (INT 6) who said that
"Part of the work itself is to have some arguments; otherwise we will not be able to really be
self-analytical at all. Arguing actually is good, depending on how people see it. Giving challenge
to ourselves [and] making it better, [and] in that sense it is good."
Jehn (1995:260) reasons that teams doing nonroutine tasks benefit from having diverse
ideas. Pressure to agree instead of allowing for differing opinions may cause the team to miss
higher quality choices as members focus on building consensus, rather than on accepting
innovative solutions (Jehn, 1995). She explains that task conflict heightens critical appraisals,
which reduces the group-think phenomenon by facilitating evaluation of alternative options.
Putnam (1994) found that task conflict facilitated problem identification and understanding;
Baron (1991) found that task conflict promoted the development of creative solutions. That lack
of conflict can impede performance is illustrated by a team member (INT 1) who said that the
team proceeded "smooth[ly], because we felt comfortable working with each other. It was
relatively straightforward; we didn't go ahead with something unless we all agreed that was a
good thing to do. So maybe in a way that was too little conflict. I think if we had a bit more
conflict, we probably would have made decisions easier."
Jehn (1995) argues that the effect of conflict on performance is curvilinear. Beyond an
optimal level, the team becomes less effective. Too much task conflict can impede the team's
ability to integrate and evaluate information (Brown, 1992). However, within entrepreneurial
teams, it is unlikely for there to be high conflict levels, because when members have the
opportunity to select their own members, they tend to select those who share similar
backgrounds (Westphal and Zajac, 1995). This in turn is associated with fewer differences of
opinions among team members (Hambrick, 1995). In this study, the average task conflict was 2.7
on a 7-point scale. Consequently, within the range of task conflict in entrepreneurial teams, it is
expected that task conflict will be associated with higher levels of team performance.
Hypothesis 6a: Within the range of task conflict in entrepreneurial teams, teams with higher
levels of task conflict have higher performance than teams with lower levels of task conflict.
While task conflict can enhance the performance of teams (e.g., Jehn, 1995), relationship
conflict impedes team performance (e.g., Jehn, 1995). Pelled (1996) describes different ways that
relationship conflict hampered team performance. First, relationship conflict curbs cognitive
processing because it lowers members' capacity to access new information furnished by other
team members. Second, it makes members less accepting of the ideas of other team members.
Jehn and Mannix (1997) add that conflict restricts cognitive functioning of members because of
the stress and anxiety produced, and because the focus of team efforts shifts to group problems.
Amason and Sapienza (1997:496) argue that relationship conflict produces suspicion, distrust
and hostility. Thus, it can be concluded that this type of conflict causes members to lose
perspective, work less effectively with one another and consequently produce suboptimal team
results (Jehn, 1995:258).
Hypothesis 6b: Relationship conflict leads to lower entrepreneurial team performance.
RESEARCH METHOD
Sample
The sample consisted of 73 teams that participated in the MIT $50K Competition in
1998. The questions used in the study were pre-tested during the MIT $1K Competition held
three months before the MIT $50K Competition. For the MIT $50K Competition, usable
responses were received from 83 percent of the participants. To test the representativeness of the
sample, I compared the respondents and non-respondents in the dimensions of age, sex and team
size. No statistical differences were found between these groups suggesting that the sample was
representative of all the participants in the MIT $50K Competition for that year.
Procedure
The procedure used to collect data followed closely that stipulated by Dillman (1978). A
day before mailing the questionnaires, an email was sent to most participants (95 percent of them
had email accounts) informing them that a study of entrepreneurial teams was being conducted
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and to expect a questionnaire in the mail. A week after mailing the questionnaires, a postcard
was sent to each participant reminding him [her] to complete the questionnaire. Two weeks later,
a reminder letter was sent, followed by a telephone interview (two weeks after the reminder
letter) to those who did not respond to the mail questionnaire. Data collection for the
questionnaire stopped when participants either could not be reached by telephone or refused to a
telephone interview. I addition to these questionnaires, 13 interviews were conducted to illustrate
team functioning.
Task design independent variables
Team size
Teams participating in the competition had to submit a form to the competition
organizers, listing the members of their teams. The number of members listed in the form was
used to define team membership. Although the effects of team size on performance is expected
to be curvilinear, in this study, I modeled a first order effect of size on performance. This was
because empirical research on entrepreneurial teams showed that entrepreneurial teams tended to
be small, ranging from two (Roberts, 1991) to four (e.g., Chandler and Hanks, 1998; Vyakarman,
Jacobs and Handelberg, 1997). In this study, the average team size was four with 95 percent of
teams with seven or fewer members. In addition, given the small range of team size, there was
high correlation between team size and the square of team size of r= 0.97. Thus, in this study, it
would not be possible to empirically detect the curvilinear effects of size on performance.
Extent of member participation in decision making
Extent of member participation in decision making was determined by asking the
respondents to choose one of five statements that best described how their teams made main
decisions. These statements were constructed by adapting Vroom and Jago's (1988) definition of
autocratic, consultative and team decision making. The statements ranged from most autocratic
of "One member makes most of the key decisions for the team" to the greatest extent of member
participation in decision making of "The team makes most key decisions together as a group."
The other three intermediate modes from least to most participative were: "One person makes all
the key decisions after consulting other members individually"; "One member makes all the key
decisions after consulting members as a group"; and "The key decisions are made as a team but
with some members having more influence than others." Members' responses were converted to
a Likert scale from 1 to 5, with 1, the most autocratic and 5 the most democratic. The variable
was coded as Participation in Decision Making. The mean square of error between and within
team were 1.96 and 0.76 respectively (difference statistically significant at p<0.01). This
suggested within team agreement on how decisions were made. Therefore, I calculated
participation in decision making by averaging individual members' ratings. The higher the score,
the more members participated in decision making. Although this was a single item scale, it
preserved Vroom and Jetton's definition of participation in decision making and a similar scale
was used by Barsade, Ward, Turner, and Sonnenfeld (1998).
Level of team specialization
In the questionnaire, members were asked to give an evaluation whether each member in
their team was a team specialist, a generalist or both. The definition given to the respondents was
that "A specialist participated in specific team tasks while a generalist participated in the full
range of team tasks." The questionnaire illustrated that a person who focused mostly on financial
projections and the marketing plan was a specialist; a person who participated in all tasks except
developing the prototype was a generalist; and a person who participated in all tasks and focused
on writing the computer codes was both a specialist and a generalist. A team's score for each
category was the average of respondents' ratings for that team. I did not give extra weight to a
person who rated himself [herself] because I could not ascertain which provided a better
judgment of the overall classification of a member's job scope. An example of specialization was
mentioned by a member (INT 2) that "there were a couple of people whose main purpose was to
fine-tune the technology and make the demo better and a couple of people whose main purpose
was to go out and get research and statistics and documents that would be pertinent to our
business and a couple of people would be doing the writing." Some teams generalized as
illustrated by a person who wrote in the questionnaire that we "all worked on issues of
technology, marketing, intelllectual property, etc."
__
Processes independent variables
Internal task processes
Internal task processes was measured using the scale developed by Ancona and Caldwell
(1992a). The respondents rated their agreement on a scale of 1 to 7 with 1 meaning the statement
was very inaccurate to 7 meaning the statement was very accurate. The questions were: "The
team is able to define its goals"; "The team is able to prioritize work and determine which
aspects of the work are important"; and "The team is able to develop workable plans." The scale
was pre-tested with the MIT $1K dataset. Factor analysis with Varimax rotation extracted only
one with eigenvalue greater than 1 (Cronbach alpha of 0.74). For the MIT $50K Competition, the
Cronbach alpha of the 3-item scale was 0.79. The high Cronbach alpha suggested that this scale
was internally consistent. One-way ANOVA showed that the mean square of error between
teams was 1.17 and that within team was 0.72 (F value of 1.62, p<0.01). This suggested within
team agreement on the level of internal task processes and justified averaging members' ratings
to calculate a team's level of internal task processes. An example of good internal process was
illustrated by a member (INT 2) that "we usually met twice a week and they usually lasted for
about an hour and my thesis advisor ran the meeting and made sure everyone was doing their
thing. We would meet and go over where we are and what we had to, what statistics we needed
to find and what we should be working on."
Team identity
The questions for team identity were adapted from Hinkle et al. (1989) and the scale
included emotional, individual/group and cognitive components of identity. According to Hinkle
et al. (1989), the emotional component of team identity represents a person's feelings towards
the team and measured by: "I identify with this team"; "I am glad to belong to this team"; "I
think this team worked well together"; and "I see myself as an important part of this team." The
individual/team component reflects the extent that individual and team goals are similar,
measured by: "I feel held back by this team" (reverse coded); "I feel uneasy with the members of
this team" (reverse coded). The cognitive component refers to the extent members feel a
belonging to the team, measured by: "I do not consider the team to be important" (reverse
coded); and "I feel strong ties to this team."
The items were pre-tested during the MIT $1K Competition. Factor analysis using
Varimax rotation extracted two factors with eigenvalue greater than one. The first factor, with
eigenvalue of 3.92 consisted of the emotional identity items and the cognitive identity item of "I
feel strong ties to this team." The second factor consisted of individual/team identity and the
cognitive item of "I do not consider the team to be important." The two-factor conflict structure
was retained in this study since "I feel strong ties to this team" fit into the emotional identity
while "I do not consider the team to be important" fit into individual/team identity. The first
factor was labeled as emotional Identity and the second factor as goal Congruence Identity. The
Cronbach alpha for emotional identity scale was 0.86, while that for goal congruence identity
scale was 0.62.
For the MIT $50K participants, the emotional identity scale had a Cronbach alpha of
0.87 while that for the goal congruence identity scale was 0.63. One-way ANOVA showed that
the mean square of error between and within teams for emotional identity were 1.59 and 0.93
respectively, statistically different at p<0 .01. The similar figures for goal congruence identity
were 1.09 and .86 respectively, statistically different at p< 0.10. The ANOVA tests suggested
that there were within team agreement on the levels of emotional and goal congruence identities.
Thus for each factor, a team score was calculated by averaging member-ratings.
Conflict
The conflict scale developed by Jehn and associates (e.g., Jehn, Northcraft and Neale,
1997) was used to determine the level of team conflict. The task conflict items in the scale were:
"How often do people in your team disagree about opinions regarding the work being done?";
"To what extent are there differences of opinion in your team?"; "How much conflict about the
work you do was there in your team?"; "How frequently are there conflicts about ideas in your
team?" The relationship conflict items were: "How much were there personality conflicts among
team members?"; "How much tension was there among team members?"; "How much emotional
conflict was there among team members?" In addition to task and relationship conflicts, Jehn et
al. (1997) had questions on procedural conflict which they defined as how members went about
doing their tasks. The procedural conflict items were: "To what extent did you disagree about the
way to do things in your team?"; "How frequently were there disagreements about who should
do what in your team?"; and "To what extent did you disagree about the procedures in your
team?"
Exploratory factor analysis with Varimax rotation extracted two factors with eigenvalues
greater than one. Factor 1, with an eigenvalue of 5.87 loaded highly on task conflict items and
two items from procedural conflict-"To what extent did you disagree about the procedures in
your team?"; and "To what extent did you disagree about the way to do things in your team?"
Since procedural conflict related to task differences, I retained them in the factor and labeled the
factor as Task Conflict. Factor 2, with an eigenvalue of 1.38 loaded highly on the relationship
conflict items and one procedural conflict item of "How frequently were there disagreements
about who should do what in your team?" This item which referred to task disagreements did not
fit with the relationship conflict items in the factor. I removed that item and labeled the
remaining items as Relationship Conflict. The Cronbach alpha for relationship conflict was 0.86
while that for task conflict was 0.87. The factor structure found in this study was consistent with
most past research (e.g., Amason and Sapienza, 1997) of a two-factor structure comprising task
and relationship conflicts.
For the MIT $50K Competition, the Cronbach alpha for relationship conflict was 0.87
and 0.88 for task conflict. One-way ANOVA showed that the mean square of error between and
within teams for task conflict were 1.56 and 0.95 respectively, statistically different at p< 0.01.
Similar figures for relationship conflict were 1.33 and 0.78 respectively, again statistically
different at p<0.01. The ANOVA tests suggested within team agreement on each conflict type
and justified averaging member-ratings to team scores.
The interviewees suggested low conflict levels such as a team-member (INT 8) who said
that "we don't have any surprises, we know we can count on each person and [we know] what
problem we would encounter with that person and [how] you can avoid it in advance." Another
member (INT 5) when asked to describe the conflicts in his team said "I think both of us were
pretty much easy going, so there weren't really any conflict."
Judges' ratings of entrepreneurial team performance
The judges rated the teams using a 10-item, 5-point scale with the higher the better. The
items included the teams' ability to: "define the customer", "say who pays for the product or
service", "show high potential", "describe the product/service", "analyze the competitors",
"differentiate from competitors", "protect the competitive advantage", "balance the team",
"substantiate claims" and "quantify the business model." The teams were rated by on average
two judges. The competition organizers chose these items to be evaluated after categorizing the
written comments of past judges.
The correlations among the items showed that with the exception of the items "protect the
competitive advantage" and "balance the team", the average correlations among all the other
items were at least r-0.4. The two items were removed because they did not seem to fit with the
other performance measures. "Protect the competitive advantage" was primarily about later team
performance instead of early stage performance that this study seeks to understand. "Balance the
team" did not fit well with the other items because this item related to team factors instead of the
quality of plan that the other items referred to. Overall, the high correlations among the eight
remaining items (average r of at least 0.4) suggested that the judges tended to evaluate a plan
holistically rather than to gauge each item separately. Factor analysis also supported this
assertion. Factor analysis using Varimax rotation and eigenvalue greater than one as the cutoff
value extracted only one factor with a Cronbach alpha of 0.87. The average of the judges' ratings
for the teams-using these eight items-was used to determine external evaluations of
entrepreneurial team performance. This variable was labeled as judges' ratings.
Member-ratings of entrepreneurial team performance
In addition to judges' ratings, the team members were asked to rate their teams'
performance. They were asked to do this because some researchers have found significant
differences between ratings by team members and external performance measures. For example,
Gladstein (1984) found that good team processes predicted higher team member-rated
performance but these processes did not predict sales revenue.
Following Ancona and Caldwell (1992a) participants were asked to rate their teams on a
7-point scale from 1 meaning the team was deeply disappointing to 7 meaning the team exceeds
my expectations. The items were: "Efficiency of team operations", "quality of work we
produce", "number of innovations or new ideas introduced by the team", "our adherence to
schedules", and "our overall performance." A similar scale was used by Campion, Papper and
Medsker (1996) who measured performance measured by "quality of work done", "customer
service provided", "productivity", "completing work on time", "completing work within budget,
and providing innovative products and services", "responding quickly to problems or
opportunities", and "overall performance."
The Member-Ratings of Performance scale was pre-tested using the MIT $1K dataset.
Factor analysis using Varimax rotation extracted only one factor with eigenvalue greater than
I also regressed the independent variables with the eight items separately. All the statistically significant
coefficients were in the same direction as that using the eight items in one scale. This provided some evidence of the
robustness of the findings.
one. This factor, had an eigenvalue of 3.05 and a Cronbach alpha of 0.82. For the MIT $50K
sample, the Cronbach alpha was 0.81. One-way ANOVA showed that the mean square of error
between teams was 1.17 while that within teams was 0.77, statistically different at p<0.01. This
suggested within team agreement on the level of entrepreneurial team performance and
supported aggregating members' ratings to team scores.
These performance measures will be used throughout this study, namely in chapters five,
six and seven.
Industry control
I controlled for industry since investors preferred some industries for early financing
(Haar, Starr and MacMillan, 1988). Teams that were involved in technology products or services
were given the code of 1 and the rest with a code of 0. Although a more refined measure-
comprising more categories-could lead to a better understanding of the attractiveness of
different industries, the small sample size limited the number of categories I could include.
Although it is likely that other factors can influence entrepreneurial team performance,
given the small sample size and the exploratory nature of this study, only these two variables
which I expected to have a large influence on entrepreneurial team performance were controlled.
RESULTS
Table 4.1 gives the correlations, means and standard deviations of the control, dependent
and independent variables. Task and relationship conflicts were highly correlated to each other at
r=0.66 (p<0.01). Similarly, emotional identity and goal congruence identity were highly
correlated at r= 0.60 (p< 0.01). To test the robustness of the findings to these correlations,
Models 4 and 8 (the former for judges' ratings as the independent variable and the later for
member-ratings as the independent variable) combined the conflict factors into one conflict scale
and the identity factors into one identity scale.
INSERT TABLE 4.1 HERE
For the control variable, 77 percent of the teams were in high-technology related
industries. This was negatively correlated at r=-0.40 with judges' rated performance (p<0.01).
Size positively correlated (r=0.19) with judges' ratings but negatively with member-ratings (r=-
0.12). However, both correlations were not statistically significant at p<0.05. Average
participation in decision making was 3.56 with a standard deviation of 0.89. This suggested that
members perceived their teams to use participatory decision making. Participation in decision
making positively correlated with judges' (r=0.17) and member-ratings (r-0.33). However, the
correlation was only statistically significant (p<0.01) for member-ratings.
Mean emotional identity was 5.79 with a standard deviation of 0.77. The respondents also
reported high levels of goal congruence identity with a mean of 6.16 and a standard deviation of
0.68. No correlation was found between identity and judges' ratings but identity positively
correlated with member-ratings (r= 0.60 for emotional identity and r-0.45 for goal congruence
identity, both statistically significant at p<0.01). Team members perceived their internal task
processes to be high with a mean of 5.65 and a standard deviation of 0.67. A small correlation
with judges' ratings of r-0.08 was found, but this was not statistically significant at p<0.05.
Correlation between member-ratings and internal task processes was high at r-0.61 (p<0.01).
Perceived conflicts were low with mean task conflict of 2.66 (s.d. 0.75) and mean relationship
conflict of 1.85 (s.d. 0.69).
I hypothesized that entrepreneurial team performance depended on how tasks were
allocated in the team and how members interacted with one another. Although some researchers
(e.g., Gladstein, 1984) have argued that the effects of task design is through team processes (i.e.,
as a mediated model), this study included both task design and processes as main effects because
the teams in this sample were in the early start-up phase. In this instance, the structures were not
likely to be routinized (e.g., Stinchcombe, 1965) and co-evolving with team processes. Eight
models are presented to test the hypotheses in the study. Models 1 to 4 shown in Table 4.2
regressed the effects of task allocation and member interaction on judges' ratings of
entrepreneurial team performance. Models 5 to 8 were similar to 1 to 4 except that the dependent
variable was member-ratings of entrepreneurial team performance.
INSERT TABLE 4.2 HERE
Model 1 regressed the effects of the control variable of industry and the task design
variables on judges' ratings while Model 2 regressed the control variables and the task process
variables on the same performance measure. Model 3 regressed the effects of all the variables-
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control, task design and task processes-on judges' ratings. Model 4 tested the robustness of the
findings by combining the two identity factors into the identity variable and the conflict factors
into the conflict variable.
Model 1 with an R2 of 0.27 (F=5.01, p<0.01) showed that the control variable industry
negatively predicted judges' ratings (b=-0.52, t=-3.69, p<0.01) and a reason for this finding (as
noted from the judges' comments) was that some high-technology start-up teams focused on the
technology instead of conceptualizing a business model. The judges' comments suggested that
they were looking for teams that could build a business instead of a technology play. Size
(b=0.09, t=2.57, p<0.01) positively predicted judges' ratings. One reason for this finding is that
start-up teams are small (e.g., Roberts, 1991a; Vyakarnam, Jacobs and Handelbert, 1997) and
larger start-ups teams will have access to more resources without the corresponding process loss
of large teams (West and Anderson, 1996). For the task division variables, only two of the three
task division categories (specialists, generalists and both specialists and generalists) could be
included in the same regression. Since I omitted the generalists category, the coefficients of
specialists and both specialists and generalists were compared against that omitted category (i.e.,
generalists). The findings showed that entrepreneurial teams that designed tasks with members as
specialists had lower judges' ratings (coefficient of specialists=-0.62, t=-1.67, p<0.10). The
findings also showed that entrepreneurial teams with members as both specialists and generalists
were evaluated as favorably as entrepreneurial teams where members were generalists
(coefficient of both specialists and generalists=0.03, t=0.10, n.s.). Participatory decision making
did not predict higher judges' ratings (coefficient of participation in decision making was 0.06,
t=0.84, n.s.) but was in the direction predicted. Reasons for this finding are discussed in the next
section.
Model 2 regressed the effects of team processes on judges' ratings, with industry as the
control variable. The Model's R2 was 0.21, F=2.50 (p<0.05). However, the other process
variables of team identity, goal congruence identity, internal task processes, and task and
relationship conflicts did not predict judges' ratings.
In Model 3, I included both the task-related and the team process variables in one
regression. The R2 of the Model was 0.30, F=2.72 (p<0.01). The delta R2 was only marginally
higher than that in Model 1 (from 0.27 in Model 1 to 0.30 in Model 3, n. s.). However, the delta
R2 change was statistically significant from Model 2 to 3, that is from the process only model to
the full model, at p<0.01. This suggested that task design variables were better predictors of
judges' ratings than team process variables. Supporting hypothesis 1, larger entrepreneurial
teams had higher judges' evaluations than smaller entrepreneurial teams (coefficient of
size=0.09, t=2.48, p<0.05). Hypothesis 2 that participation in decision making predicted higher
judges' ratings was not supported, but the coefficient of 0.04 (t=0.56) was in the direction
predicted. Reasons are discussed in the next section. Supporting hypothesis 3a, entrepreneurial
teams that assigned tasks to specialists were evaluated less favorably than entrepreneurial teams
that assigned tasks to generalists (coefficient of specialists=-0.85, t=-2.07, p<0.05). Supporting
hypothesis 3b, entrepreneurial teams where members were both specialists and generalists were
evaluated as favorably as entrepreneurial teams where members were generalists (coefficient of
specialists and generalists=-0.03, t=-0.08, n.s.). Hypotheses 4 to 6 on the effects of team task
processes on entrepreneurial team performance were not supported. Overall, Models 1 to 3
suggested that team task design influenced judges' ratings while team task processes did not.
In Model 4, I collapsed task and relationship conflicts into one conflict variable and the
emotional and goal congruence identities into the identity variable. This was to test the
robustness of the findings given the high correlations among the respective factors. The R2 was
0.28, with an F=3.08, p<0.01. The findings again showed that the task process variables did not
predict judges' ratings. Among the task design variables, the findings were similar to that of
Model 3 that larger teams had higher judges' ratings (b=0.09, t=2.53, p<0.01) and teams that
assigned tasks to specialists had lower judges' ratings (b=-0.68, t=-2.23, p<0.05).
INSERT TABLE 4.3 HERE
Models 1 to 4 explored the effects of task design and member interactions on judges'
evaluations of the teams. Models 5 to 8 were similar to Models 1 to 4 except that the dependent
variable was member-ratings. Model 5 included the control variable and the task design
variables. Model 5 had an R2 of 0.15, F=2.29 (p<0.10). The only predictor variable that was
supported was that the participation in decision making (b=0.25, t=2.91, p<0.01) positively
predicted member-ratings. Neither size (b=-0.05, t=-0.27, n.s.) nor specialization (b=-0.19, t=-
0.49, n.s.) predicted member-ratings.
Model 6 included the control variable of industry and the team process variables. I also
controlled for size because this variable has been found in many studies to affect how members
interacted with one another. The Model had an R2 of 0.50 with F=10.98 (p<0.01). Emotional
identity (b=0.28, t=2.51, p<0.01) and internal task processes (b=0.33, t=2.92, p<0.01) were
positively associated with member-ratings.
Model 7 included both the task design and process variables in one regression. The R2
was 0.55, with an F=7.53 (p<0.01). The delta R2 was statistically significant from Model 7 to
Model 5 at p<0.01 level but delta R2 from Model 7 to 6 was not statistically significant. This
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suggested that task processes were better predictors of member-ratings than task design.
Emotional identity with b=0.37, t=3.09 (p< 0.01), and internal task processes with b=0.32,
t=2.76 (p< 0.01) both positively predicted member-ratings. However, task conflict with b=-0.02,
t=-0.15 (n.s.) and relationship conflict b=-0.05 and t=-0.39 (n.s.) did not. Among the task design
variables, teams that assigned tasks to both specialists and generalists were evaluated by team
members less favorably than teams where members were generalists (b=-0.68, t=-2.13, p<0.05).
In Model 8 I combined the task and relationship conflicts to form the conflict variable
and emotional and goal congruence identities to form the identity variable. The R2 was 0.54,
F=9.53 (p<0.01) and the coefficients of the predictor variables were in the same direction as that
in Model 7. Hypothesis 1, 2 and 3 (all hypotheses relating to task design) were not supported.
Hypothesis 4 that internal task processes positively predicted performance was supported while
Hypothesis 5 that team identity positively predicted performance was partially supported.
However, no support was found for hypothesis 6 of the effects of conflict on entrepreneurial
team performance. Overall, Models 5 to 8 suggested that task processes influenced member-
ratings while task design did not. The results are discussed in the next section.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The study explores whether a short-term entrepreneurial team can be designed-both task
design and task processes-to be high-performing. Designing teams in the early start-up phase is
important because early activities influence the venture's culture (e.g., Schein, 1983), routines
(e.g., Stinchcombe, 1965) and performance (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990). For task
design, I hypothesize that larger entrepreneurial teams, in which members are generalists and
participate in decision making, will perform better than smaller entrepreneurial teams with
member-specialists. One possible reason is that these conditions increase the chances that teams
gain access to and are better able to combine different types of information, conditions that
facilitate the discovery of new entrepreneurial opportunities (Kirzner, 1997). For processes, I
hypothesize that team members should work towards common goals, identify strongly with the
team and focus on task rather than non-task differences. This combination of factors increases
the chance that member activities will contribute to the best entrepreneurial team performance.
The surprising finding of the study is that task design influences external evaluations,
while team processes influence member evaluations. Both evaluations are important. Favorable
evaluations by people outside the team increases the team's likelihood of getting external support
(e.g., Roberts, 1991b), which in turn predicts future growth (Roberts, 1991b). Positive internal
evaluations increase the chance that members will be satisfied with their teams and will be more
apt to continue their team involvement (e.g., Hackman, 1987). Larger teams, in which members
are generalists, predict higher external evaluations. However, participation in decision making
does not lead to better externally evaluated performance. This finding would seem to be
counterintuitive, because numerous studies (e.g., West and Anderson, 1996) have found team
decision making to be beneficial in problem-solving tasks. One possible explanation for this
finding is the ceiling effect-teams in this study have high levels of team decision making.
Another possible cause is the high team identity and lower team conflict among teams that use
participatory decision making. These conditions might cause teams to shut out dissenting views
and become insular (Janis, 1982). Further studies can explore whether the ceiling effect or the
effect of participatory decision making on team processes result in the nonfindings.
While task design influences external evaluations, the study finds that team processes
influence member-ratings. Teams that have good internal task processes and high team identity
are evaluated by members' more favorably. One possible reason is that members are aware of
their internal processes and focus on them in evaluating their team's performance. This assertion
is supported by Gladstein's (1984) finding that members' perceptions of team processes
positively predicted evaluations of team performance. Similarly, Campion et al. (1996) argue
that members' perceptions of internal processes result in perceptions of high-performance, even
if such perceptions are not accurate. However, conflict does not influence performance and one
possible reason is the low levels of conflict present in the teams-resulting in floor effects.
Another possible reason is that the effect of conflict on performance is captured by the other
process variables such as internal task processes and team identity (given the high correlations
among these variables). Future studies should explore whether task processes, team identity and
conflict are different team processes on parts of the same construct. In addition, since team
members evaluate both team processes and performance, the effects of processes of performance
could be due to common method bias. Future studies should get external evaluations of team
processes through external observers or through weekly logs kept by team members.
While the entrepreneurial team has been a black box with most studies focusing on the
individual founder (Cooper and Daily, 1996), this study in a semi-controlled environment
together with a small number of extant studies on entrepreneurial teams (e.g., Vyakarnam et al.,
1997), gives a peek into this black. The study makes the following contributions.
First, the study demonstrates that superior entrepreneurial team performance demands
management of both team task design and team processes. Successful entrepreneurial teams are
larger and assign tasks in which members are generalists rather than specialists. In addition, a
hybrid form of organizing is to divide tasks such that members are both generalists and
specialists. Moreover, teams should encourage members to work towards common goals and to
identity with the team. While some researchers focus on task design (e.g. Hackman, 1987) and
others on team processes (e.g. Senge, 1991), this study shows that either approach alone is
inadequate. The study also reveals that while task design influences external evaluations, team
processes influence internal evaluations. Although both types of evaluations are important
(Hackman, 1987), no research to my knowledge has shown how different team factors drive
different types of performance.
Second, the study elucidates the interplay of different processes, showing that different
processes can be combined. For example, instead of task, procedural and relationship conflicts
that some researchers such as Jehn et al. (1997) have proposed, this study identifies two pivotal
types of conflict, namely relationship and task conflicts, with the latter subsuming procedural
conflict. Also significant, instead of a three-factor identity scale, this study uncovers a two-factor
scale consisting of emotional and goal congruence identities with cognitive identity subsumed in
these two factors.
Third, the study also finds high correlations between internal task processes and identity,
and between internal task processes and conflict. Future studies should explore whether there is a
more concise way to describe team processes. For example, it is conceivable that two factors
might be sufficient to describe team processes. The first factor might be the extent to which
members could rally around a common goal which might include elements from internal task
processes, goal congruence identity and task conflict. The second factor might include the extent
to which members could avoid nonproductive differences and this category could encompass
elements from emotional identity and relationship conflict. Although separate analyses not
m
shown in this study did not arrive at this two-component structure, the high correlations among
the different processes suggest that a more efficient description of team processes should be
found.
To reiterate, this study finds that the design of tasks and processes influences short-term
entrepreneurial team performance. The positive effects of design are assumed to be the result of
how teams make use of information. However, one study's limitation is that it does not test a
mediated model, with information as the mediating element, a task that must be left to future
researchers. The study also highlights the need for development of a more parsimonious team
processes model. Future studies can develop such a model, perhaps expanding on the two-factor
model proposed here. However, this study concentrates on entrepreneurial teams at the early
start-up phase and future studies can explore whether the effects of task design and processes on
entrepreneurial team performance are the same at later stages of venture development. For
example, when the venture's tasks become more routinized, it is likely that task specialization,
rather than task generalization, would lead to higher performance since task generalization is
preferred when knowledge is incomplete (the early start-up phase) and specialization is more
efficient in areas where knowledge is well developed (the later start-up phase) (Alder and Borys,
1996). Another caveat is that the teams in this study are engaged in a business plan competition.
Although this context resembles that of short-term entrepreneurial teams, future studies should
replicate the study with other types of entrepreneurial teams.
Figure 4.1. Hypothesized effects of internal factors on entrepreneurial team performance.
Internal factors
How tasks are divided
* Size
(e.g. West and Anderson, 1996)
* Less specialization
(e.g., Spender, 1995)
* Group decision making
(e.g., Simons, 1995)
Performance
* External-ratings
* Member-ratings
How members go about doing tasks
* Good internal task processes
(e.g., Ancona and Caldwell, 1992)
* Clear identity
(e.g., Cohen and Bailey, 1997)
* Conflicts are task related conflict
(e.g., Jehn, 1995)
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Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations for the Dependent and Independent Variables
Variable
I Judges' Ratings of Performance (JudRate)
2 Member-Ratings of Performance (MemRate)
3 Size (Size)
4 Industry (Industry)
5 Specialists (Spec)
6 Specialists and Generalists (SpecGen)
7 Generalists (Gen)
8 Participation in Decision Making (DmGrp)
9 Emotional Identity (IdenEmot)
10 Goal Congruence Identity (IdenIdGp)
II Internal Task Processes (Internal)
12 Task Conflict (ConfTsk)
13 Relationship Conflict (ConfRel)
14 Identity (Identity)
15 Conflict (Conflict)
Mean S.D. 1 2 3
2.95 0.55 1.00
4.93 0.66 0.24 1.00
4.05 1.80 0.19 -0.12 1.00
0.77 0.43 -0.40 -0.10 0.02
0.31 0.22 -0.16 -0.11 0.36
0.27 0.21 -0.06 -0.06 -0.25
0.42 0.25 0.19 0.15 -0.12
3.56 0.89 0.17 0.33 0.00
5.79 0.77 -0.07 0.60 -0.31
6.16 0.68 0.02 0.45 -0.09
5.65 0.67 0.08 0.61 -0.25
2.66 0.75 -0.08 -0.47 0.24
1.85 0.69 0.02 -0.43 0.23
5.95 0.66 -0.05 0.61 -0.25
2.29 0.64 -0.04 -0.50 0.26
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1.00
-0.02 1.00
0.20 -0.33
-0.14 -0.62
-0.10 -0.17
0.19 -0.15
0.11 0.07
-0.22 -0.15
0.14 -0.03
0.00 0.12
0.17 -0.07
0.08 0.04
1.00
-0.54 1.00
0.16 0.01 1.00
0.31 -0.12 0.36
0.06 -0.12 0.34
0.07 0.08 0.33
0.10 -0.06 -0.14
-0.03 -0.09 -0.21
0.23 -0.13 0.38
0.05 -0.08 -0.18
1.00
0.60 1.00
0.53 0.33 1.00
-0.49 -0.45 -0.52 1.00
-0.48 -0.65 -0.37 0.66 1.00
0.94 0.83 0.51 -0.53 -0.61 1.00
-0.54 -0.58 -0.50 0.94 0.86 -0.61 1.00
Correlations of .24 and above statistically significant at p< 0.05 level (2-tailed)
Correlations of .33 and above statistically significant at p< 0.01 level (2-tailed)
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Table 4.2. Regressions Predicting the Effects of Structure and Processes on Judges' Ratings of Entrepreneurial Team Performance
Judges' Ratings of Performance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
B S.E. t B S.E. t B S.E. t B S.E. t
(Constant) 2.96 0.40 ** 7.50 2.60 1.12 * 2.33 2.85 1.16 * 2.44 3.18 1.03 ** 3.09
Industry -0.52 0.14 ** -3.69 -0.53 0.16 ** -3.34 -0.52 0.16 ** -3.34 -0.54 0.16 ** -3.47
Size 0.09 0.03 ** 2.57 0.07 0.04 t 1.80 0.09 0.04 * 2.48 0.09 0.04 ** 2.53
Spec -0.62 0.37 t -1.67 -0.85 0.41 * -2.07 -0.68 0.31 * -2.23
SpecGen 0.03 0.31 0.10 -0.03 0.33 -0.08 -0.02 0.33 -0.07
DMGrp 0.06 0.07 0.84 0.04 0.08 0.56 0.05 0.08 0.63
IdenEmot 0.03 0.12 0.23 -0.03 0.12 -0.23
IdenlndGp 0.07 0.13 0.54 0.15 0.14 1.08
Internal -0.02 0.12 -0.13 -0.07 0.12 -0.57 -0.05 0.11 -0.41
ContTsk -0.06 0.12 -0.52 -0.16 0.12 -1.33
ConRel 0.08 0.14 0.55 0.17 0.14 1.26
Identity 0.04 0.14 0.28
Conflict -0.05 0.13 -0.40
R-sq 0.27 0.21 0.30 0.28
F statistics 5.01 ** 2.50 * 2.72 ** 3.08 **
**=p<.01, *=p<.05, t=p<.10
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Table 4.3. Regressions Predicting the Effects of Structure and Processes on Members' Ratings of Entrepreneurial
Team Performance
Member-Ratings of Performance
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
B S.E. t B S.E. t B S.E. t B S.E. t
(Constant) 4.46 0.41 ** 10.81 1.13 1.05 1.08 0.86 1.05 0.82 0.47 0.98 0.48
Industry -0.05 0.04 -1.06 0.04 0.04 1.08 0.03 0.04 0.91
Size -0.05 0.18 -0.27 -0.14 0.15 -0.94 -0.11 0.15 -0.75 -0.10 0.15 -0.65
Spec -0.19 0.38 -0.49 -0.30 0.30 -0.99 -0.35 0.29 -1.22
SpecGen -0.51 0.40 -1.26 -0.68 0.32 * -2.13 -0.63 0.31 * -2.01
DMGrp 0.25 0.09 ** 2.91 0.03 0.07 0.44 0.03 0.07 0.39
IdenEmot 0.28 0.11 ** 2.51 0.37 0.12 ** 3.09
IdenlndGp 0.10 0.12 0.77 0.06 0.13 0.46
Internal 0.33 0.11 ** 2.92 0.32 0.11 ** 2.76 0.34 0.11 ** 3.15
ConfTsk -0.04 0.11 -0.36 -0.02 0.12 -0.15
ConRel -0.05 0.13 -0.36 -0.05 0.13 -0.39
Identity 0.46 0.13 ** 3.52
Conflict -0.04 0.12 -0.32
R-sq 0.15 0.50 0.55 0.54
F statistics 2.29 t 10.98 ** 7.53 ** 9.53 **
**=p<.01, *=p<.05, t=p<.10
CHAPTER 5
THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF FUNCTIONAL DIVERSITY
ON ENTREPRENEURIAL TEAM PERFORMANCE
This chapter adds to the overall understanding of entrepreneurial team performance by
studying how team composition, in particular functional diversity, influences team design, both
task division and processes, that in turn influences team performance. It has long been argued
that team composition, as defined in basic attributes, such as age, sex, educational level and race
within a group of people, is related to team outcomes (e.g., Gladstein, 1984). Although many
researchers have studied the direct effects of composition on performance (e.g., Pfeffer, 1983),
several researchers (e.g., Ancona and Caldwell, 1992a) pointed out that the effects of
composition on performance is both direct and indirect through team processes. Therefore, this
paper explores both the direct and indirect effects of team composition on performance.
Pfeffer (1983) argues that it is important to study the diversity of a team's characteristics
instead of the average level of a particular characteristic, because diversity affects how team
members interact with one another, which in turn determines team outcomes. Focusing on
diversity is also important for teams engaged in entrepreneurial tasks because it affects the type
of information available to the team (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992) and information forms the
basis of entrepreneurial opportunities (Kirzner, 1997). Since Pfeffer's (1983) article in the
Research in Organizational Behavior, many studies in team composition have examined the
effects of team-characteristic diversity on a number of outcomes including turnover (O'Reilly,
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Caldwell and Barnett, 1989), innovation (Bantel and Jackson, 1989), diversification posture
(Michel and Hambrick, 1992) and communication (Zenger and Lawrence, 1989).
The first contribution of this study is that it highlights that the effects of functional
diversity on short-term entrepreneurial team performance depend on who makes the evaluation.
Although functional diversity has no effect on externally-rated performance, it negatively
predicts member-rated performance. Both internal and external evaluations are important: While
positive external evaluations increase the chance that the business ventures get external support
(Roberts, 1991b), positive internal evaluations increase the chance that members will be satisfied
with their team involvement and will want to remain on their teams (e.g., Hackman, 1987).
Second, while some studies (e.g., Watson et al., 1993) focus on the direct effects of diversity on
performance without explicitly testing the indirect effects, this study shows that the effects of
diversity on performance is mostly indirect, through team processes. Thus, it is important to
study, which and in what ways team design mediates the effects of diversity on performance.
In the next two sections, I state the theoretical justifications for the effects of functional
diversity on entrepreneurial team performance. Since there is limited research on entrepreneurial
team performance (Cooper and Daily, 1996), the hypotheses are drawn from the
entrepreneurship and team literatures. At the same time, insights from interviews with
participants of this study are presented. The study focuses on decision making tasks instead of
implementation tasks because the teams in this study are engaged in preparing a business plan-
which is a complex decision making task. I hypothesize that diversity is beneficial to decision
making tasks, because it increases the range of information available to the team, which in turn
helps develop innovative decisions (e.g., Jackson et al., 1992). Although many types of diversity
have been studied (e.g., age and gender), this study concentrates on functional diversity, because
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some researchers argue that it is task-related diversity (e.g., Ancona and Caldwell, 1992a) that
affects team performance. After hypothesizing the direct effects of functional diversity on
entrepreneurial team performance, I explore the indirect effects of functional diversity. We need
to study the indirect effects because diversity changes the way in which members interact with
one another, and different modes of interaction ultimately influences team performance
(Lawrence, 1997).
The study focuses on the indirect effects of team holding (Louis and Yan, 1996) and the
extent of task specialization in the teams. Team holding is defined by Louis and Yan to include
perceptions by team members of who is and who is not a member of the team, of how closely
they work as a team and of their level of team identity. This construct was chosen for this study
because it represented different aspects of team processes (namely, task processes and identity)
found in the previous chapter to influence entrepreneurial team performance. Extent of member
specialization was also chosen for the same reason that it was found to influence entrepreneurial
team performance. In later sections of this paper, I describe the research methods employed for
this study. I then describe the results, and in the last section, I discuss the findings.
DIRECT EFFECTS OF FUNCTIONAL DIVERSITY
ON ENTREPRENEURIAL TEAM PERFORMANCE
Diversity and performance
The effects of diversity on performance have been studied for a long time. In 1959 for
example, in a study called Change in Work Procedure, Hoffman found that diverse teams
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produced more creative solutions than less diverse teams. Hoffman and Maier (1961) found that
mixed-gender teams produced higher quality decisions than exclusively male or female teams.
They concluded that the benefit of different perspectives on a problem results in higher quality
decisions. Bantel and Jackson (1989), who studied innovation in the banking industry, found that
more functionally diverse teams were more innovative. They concluded that functional diversity
in top management teams is beneficial for innovation. Jackson (1992) argues that diverse groups
outperform less diverse groups on tasks requiring judgmental decisions. Similarly, Ziller (1972)
argues that diversity of team composition is positively associated with a wide variety of problem-
solving tasks.
However, some researchers (e.g., Watson, Kumar and Michaelsen, 1993) have found
negative effects of diversity on team performance. In studies relating to implementation tasks,
more homogeneous teams have been found to perform better than diverse teams. For example,
Ancona and Caldwell (1992a) found that product development teams with diverse functional
backgrounds had lower team-rated and managerial-rated performance than less diverse teams.
They speculated that diverse teams could be less effective during the implementation phase due
to the lack of teamwork and integration among team members. Similarly, Finkelstein and
Hambrick (1996) argue that homogeneous teams are able to rally around a shared understanding
of what the organization needs to accomplish and that in turn increases the teams' capacity to
implement their plans.
The above review suggests that when it comes to creative and complex decision making
tasks, diverse teams perform better (e.g., Ziller, 1972) due to the diversity of perspectives in
which the team members are exposed to (e.g., Bantel and Jackson, 1989). In implementation
tasks homogeneous teams might be preferable, because commonalties improve members' ability
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to coordinate team activities (e.g., Watson et al. 1993; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). Since
the teams in this study are involved in a decision making task, I expect that diverse teams would
perform better than homogeneous teams.
Functional diversity and performance
Many facets of team diversity have been studied, including gender (e.g., Hoffman, 1959),
age (Murray, 1989), culture (e.g., Watson et al., 1993) and cognitive styles (e.g., Volkemma and
Gorma, 1998). This study, however concentrates on functional diversity which refers to
differences in team members' task-related experiences, such as the area of work specialization
(Bantel and Jackson, 1989). I focus on functional diversity because some researchers have shown
that it is primarily function-related diversity that influences team performance (e.g., Ancona and
Caldwell, 1992a). For example, Bantel and Jackson (1989) found that functional diversity had a
positive effect on bank innovation. However, nonfunctional diversity of age and tenure diversity
did not result in beneficial effects. In another study, Wiersema and Bantel (1992) found that
corporate strategic change was positively associated with area of specialization, but not with age
and tenure diversity. Similarly, Tsui et al. (1995) argues that it is task-related expertise that
matters when it comes to team performance. In keeping with earlier studies on functional
diversity, I focus on functional diversity as measured by the area of work specialization.
One member illustrated the disadvantages of not having diverse membership. He (INT 3)
said that the "Strength [of the team is that] we all understand technology, but our weakness is
that none of us have business experience. We had ideas that we knew were good but we don't
have proven experience in selling our idea to someone else. We limited [member selection] to
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people we knew. It probably would have benefited if we had a couple more people who were
unknown, but had strengths [in other areas], and added more access to the markets."
Hypothesis 1: Entrepreneurial teams that are more functionally diverse, as represented by the
area of work specialization, will have higher performance than entrepreneurial teams that are less
functionally diverse.
INDIRECT EFFECTS OF FUNCTIONAL DIVERSITY
ON ENTREPRENEURIAL TEAM PERFORMANCE
The above section argued that team functional diversity would have a direct impact on
entrepreneurial team performance. This section explores the indirect effects of functional
diversity on performance, first hypothesizing on the effects of functional diversity on team
holding and extent of task specialization. Then I hypothesize about the effects of team holding
and extent of task specialization on entrepreneurial team performance. We need to explore the
indirect effects for two reasons. First, there are often competing explanations for the effects of
diversity (Lawrence, 1997). For example, the advantage of diversity on performance could be
due to the increased exchange of ideas among team members or the increased attraction which in
turn results in greater effort put in by team members. Without a mediating approach, we cannot
discover which competing explanations are empirically supported (Lawrence, 1997). Second,
although there could be limited direct effects of diversity on entrepreneurial team performance,
there is a greater likelihood of finding indirect effects, since even trivial differences can lead to
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differences in the ways members interact with one another (e.g., Sachdev and Bourhis, 1991). In
turn, patterns of interaction affect performance (e.g., Smith et al., 1994).
In this investigation, I use two types of mediating variables-level of team holding and
extent of task specialization. Team holding includes perceptions by team members of who is and
who is not a member of the team, of how closely they work as a team and of their level of team
identity (Louis and Yan, 1996). Holding allows members to share a similar vision and develop
specific symbols and language (Louis & Yan, 1996). I chose this dimension because holding
affects members' ability to be open to outside information, and information absorption affects
performance (e.g., Kirzner, 1997). I chose the extent of task specialization because the
opportunity for members to bring their different perspectives to decisions has been shown to lead
to better performance for teams engaged in innovative tasks (e.g., West and Anderson, 1996).
Effects of functional diversity on team holding
A boundary defines the team's identity as a distinct group, set apart from those outside in
the broader environment (Arrow & McGrath, 1995) and marks who is and who is not a team
member (Louis and Yan, 1996). The effects of diversity on team holding can be explained by the
self-categorization theory (Tajfel, 1986), the basic premise of which is people desire to maintain
a positive self-image. Positive self-image is created through comparisons of self with others and
such comparisons mean that individuals must categorize themselves based on characteristics
such as age, gender and area of work specialization. According to Tajfel and Turner (1986),
people are inclined to view others who are similar to themselves positively and members of out-
groups less favorably (Tajfel, 1986). Consequently, homogeneous groups tend to be more
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cohesive (e.g., O'Reilly, Caldwell, and Barnett, 1989; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992) and members
have greater feelings of psychological attachment to one another (Tsui, Egan and O'Reilly,
1992) - factors that should lead to higher levels of team holding.
The effects of diversity on turnover also provide indirect evidence of the effects of
functional diversity on team holding. Research has consistently found turnover to be positively
associated with diversity (e.g., Pfeffer and O'Reilly, 1987). For example, Pfeffer and O'Reilly
(1987) found that the diversity of nursing staff date of entry positively predicted turnover.
Wiersema and Bird (1993) studied diversity in top management teams as determined by age,
organizational tenure, team tenure and the prestige of the university attended. They found that all
these factors, with the exception of organizational tenure, predicted turnover. Alexander,
Nuchols, Bloom and Lee (1995) note that a common explanation for the turnover is that diversity
leads to differences in values and beliefs among members, which can create conflict and weaken
integration among team members.
Consistent with the research that similarity increases cohesion (e.g., O'Reilly et al., 1989)
and psychological attachment (e.g., Tsui et al., 1992) while lowering identity differences (e.g.,
Thomas-Hunt and Gruenfeld, 1998) and decreasing turnover (e.g., Pfeffer and O'Reilly, 1987), I
expect functional diversity to result in lower team holding.
Hypothesis 2: Functionally diverse entrepreneurial teams have lower levels of team holding than
less diverse teams.
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Effects of functional diversity and extent of member specialization
A reason why diverse teams should have more specialization is suggested by the findings
of Pelled et al., (1998), who discovered that team members exerted more influence in their areas
of expertise. One possible effect of this tendency is that instead of working together, members
would divide up tasks according to their areas of expertise. Indirect evidence of the effects of
diversity on the extent of member task specialization is also provided by the decision making
literature. Barsade et al. (1998) found that in diverse teams, members made use of more
centralized decision making. The authors (1998) argue that diversity results in lower trust among
other members and a consequence is that members are less willing to share their work with other
team members.
The interviews illustrate the possibility of teams with diverse expertise using more
specialization. One team member (INT 4) commented that "on the technical side of things, the
technical people would make [the decisions] and on marketing things, Ben and I would be
consulted with." Another team member (INT 6) said that "there was a lot of area-of-expertise
kind of thing ... One person had more of an Internet type background, so he looked at more of
the technology side of things. I looked more at servers, and the last person did financial
planning." A third member (INT 9) said that Harry "established his team as 4 engineers and 4
Sloanies [i.e., students in the MIT Sloan business school] and the engineers will take care of the
hardware and the software and the Sloanies will take care of the business plan and dealing with
marketing and the business side of it." I therefore hypothesize that:
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Hypothesis 3: Entrepreneurial teams that are functionally diverse specialize more than
homogeneous entrepreneurial teams.
Effects of team holding and extent of task specialization on entrepreneurial team
performance
Louis and Yan (1996) define team holding to be the extent members view themselves to
be a team that works closely together with a sense of identity and knowledge of who is and is not
a member of the team. Team holding is expected to have a curvilinear effect on team
performance. Too little holding could be detrimental for team performance, because teams that
are more socially integrated are more efficient in coordinating team tasks (Shaw, 1981).
Similarly, Ancona and Caldwell (1992b) argue that holding helps members work towards similar
objectives. However, they caution that too much holding could hurt performance because such
teams might be less open to outside influences (Ancona and Caldwell, 1992b) and found team
cohesion to be negatively associated with Scouting activities (defined as general scanning of the
environment). Similarly, Ancona (1990) found that teams who stressed the importance of making
external connections tended to have lower team cohesion.
Although no one to my knowledge has directly studied the effects of team holding on
performance, the groupthink phenomenon gives indirect evidence of the effects of excessive
team holding on team performance. According to Janis (1982), teams that are overly cohesive
could face problems of groupthink; the symptoms are an overestimation of team capabilities,
closed-mindedness to new or differing information and pressures toward uniformity. These in
turn lead to an incomplete survey of available options for the team, failure to assess the risks
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associated with the preferred option and a selective bias in information processing. Reviewing
the groupthink literature, Gladstein and Reilly (1985) note that groups facing groupthink censor
the input of dissenting views and insulate themselves from differing opinions, from both outside
and inside the team. Subsequently, teams that experience groupthink are defective in decision
making.
While teams that have too little holding may not be able to function effectively as one
unit and consequently perform poorly (Louis and Yan, 1996; Ancona and Caldwell, 1992b),
teams that have too much holding become less open to outside influences (Louis and Yan, 1996;
Ancona, 1990) and thus might also perform poorly. Within the range of team holding in
entrepreneurial teams, higher levels of team holding should result in lower performance, because
people tend to choose those who are similar to themselves to be teammates (e.g., Westphal and
Zajac, 1995). These factors in turn lead to high cohesion (e.g., O'Reilly et al., 1989), and
attachment (e.g., Tsui et al., 1992)-factors which are related to high levels of holding.
Although the interviewees did not mention the effects of holding on performance, their
statements support the assertion that entrepreneurial teams are likely to have high levels of
holding. For example, one team member (INT 13) said, "We interviewed [for new members] at
Au Bon Pain, in the middle of February. We were looking for various people ... Mandy was the
first person who got in contact with us and the reason she was interested was because [like us]
she believed in medical products ... This is one area which she thought was moving and when
we talked to her she understood our idea." Another interviewee said that the team was founded
when "two guys met in MIT, . . . and the third person is a friend of the guy at IDE. And I am
also a friend of this guy from IDE. So it is more like a friend's friend and friend kind of thing."
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Hypothesis 4: Within the range of team holding in entrepreneurial teams, teams with lower levels
of team holding is expected to perform better than teams with higher levels of team holding.
In the previous chapter, I argued that entrepreneurial teams that divide tasks such that
members are generalists should perform better than teams with members as specialists. This is
because in non-routine tasks, task generalization enables team members to better understand the
issues faced by the team as a whole (Van de Ven, 1986) and that in turn improves team
performance (Alder and Borys, 1996; Spender, 1995).
Hypothesis 5: Entrepreneurial teams in which specialize are expected to perform worse than
entrepreneurial teams with more member generalization.
A summary of the hypothesis on the direct and indirect effects of functional diversity on
team performance is shown in figure 5.1.
INSERT FIGURE 5.1 HERE
RESEARCH METHOD
Sample and procedure
The sample comprised the 73 teams who participated in the MIT $50K Competition in 1998.
Of the team members, 257 out of 310, or 83 percent, returned the questionnaire. No statistical
113
differences was found between the respondents and non-respondents in the dimensions of age,
sex, and team size, suggesting that the sample was representative of all the participants in the
MIT $50K Competition for that year.
Operationalization of independent variables
Team holding
Louis and Yan's (1996) measure of team holding was used. Respondents rated their
agreement on a scale of 1 to 7 with 1 meaning disagree to a large extent and 7 agree to a large
extent. The scale comprised the questions: "It often hard to figure out who is and who is not a
member of this team" (reverse coded); "Members of this team clearly view themselves as a team
of people who work closely together, not as a collection of individuals who have their own
particular job to do"; "This team tried to create a clear sense of identity and purpose"; and "This
team made an effort to develop an image that distinguishes it from other teams." The Cronbach
alpha for the pre-test of this scale during the MIT $1K Competition was 0.77. The Cronbach
alpha for the MIT $50K sample was 0.71. The level of team holding was calculated by averaging
members' response to the four scale items. One-way ANOVA showed that the mean square of
error between and within teams for the scale were 2.05 and 1.03 respectively, statistically
significant at p<0.01. This suggested within team agreement on the level of team holding,
providing some support for averaging individual member scores to a team score.
The effect of team holding on entrepreneurial team performance is expected to be
curvilinear; teams with too low holding are unable to work towards a common direction (e.g.,
Ancona and Caldwell, 1992) while teams with too high holding are less open to dissenting views
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Level of specialization
As noted in the previous chapter, the questionnaire asked participants to evaluate whether
each team member was a specialist, a generalist or both. The level of specialization was
calculated by averaging the number of responses to that category.
Diversity of functional expertise
Diversity of functional expertise (Functional Diversity), as determined by the area of
work specialization, was measured using the Herfindal-Hirschman index. This is a commonly
used measure (controlling for team size) to determine diversity of categorical variables (e.g.,
Hambrick et al., 1996).
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and outside sources of information (e.g., Janis, 1982). However, in this study I only modeled a
first-order relationship between team holding and performance. This was because entrepreneurial
teams are founded teams where members select who they want to be team members. These teams
are expected to have high holding (see Shah and Jehn, 1993 asserting that people tend to
associate with others who are their friends) and consequently, higher levels of holding would be
detrimental to entrepreneurial team performance. In addition, in this study the average team
holding was 5.3 with a standard deviation of 0.86. Given the high levels of team holding, and
relatively low range of this variable, the correlation between team holding and its square term
was 0.995. Thus, in this study, it was not possible to empirically disentangle the curvilinear
effects of team holding on entrepreneurial team performance.
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Where H is the diversity measure (the higher, the more diverse) and P is the
proportion of team members in each category.
As part of the entry requirement, each team member had to submit a copy of his or her
resume to the competition organizers. From the resumes, I coded the participants' most recent
area of work into the categories of engineering, computer or management. The coding scheme
was adapted from Hambrick et al. (1996) who had the categories of management, technology,
information systems or engineering. Eighty seven percent of the participants' area of work
specialization fell within one of the three categories developed for this study. The areas of work
specialization for the other participants were coded as others. Since I did the coding alone, no
reliability statistics are reported. However, most of the statements were short, about a phase long,
and not ambiguous.
Operationalization of control variables
Team size
Teams participating in the competition had to submit a form to the competition
organizers listing the members of their teams. The number of members listed in the form was
used to determine team size. I controlled for size because small teams of two to three members
lacked diversity of information for innovation while large teams of above 12 to 13 people would
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Diversity of managerial level
I controlled for the managerial level because this factor had been found by Stuart and
Abetti (1990) to predict entrepreneurial performance. Following Pfeffer's (1983) argument that it
is the extent of diversity that influences performance, I calculated the diversity of managerial
level using the Herfindal-Hirschman index. I placed it as a control variable instead of a predictor
variable because few studies, both in the entrepreneurship and in the team literatures, have
explored how differences in levels of managerial experience influenced entrepreneurial
performance. The managerial level was coded from the participants' most recent job listed in the
resumes. The level of managerial level was coded as 3 for members with founding experience or
with job titles of executive vice presidents and above; 2 for members who are in middle
management, e.g., bank manager; and 1 for people with general work experience, e.g., store clerk
and students doing internships.
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be too unmanageable for good information exchange (West and Anderson, 1996). Although the
effects of team size on performance is expected to be curvilinear, in this study, I modeled a first
order effect of size on entrepreneurial team performance. This was because empirical research on
entrepreneurial teams showed that these teams tended to be small, ranging from two (Roberts,
1991) to four (e.g., Chandler and Hanks, 1998; Vyakarman, Jacobs and Handelberg, 1997). In
this study, the average team size was four with 95 percent of teams with seven or fewer
members. In addition, given the small range of team size, there was high correlation between
team size and the square of team size of r= 0.97. Thus, in this study, it would not be possible to
empirically detect the curvilinear effects of team size on entrepreneurial team performance.
Although it is likely that other factors can influence entrepreneurial team performance,
given the limited sample size and the exploratory nature of this study, only these three variables
were controlled.
Industry control
I controlled for industry since investors preferred some industries for early financing
(Haar, Starr and MacMillan, 1988). Teams that were involved in technology products or services
were given the code of 1 and the rest with a code of 0. Although a more refined measure-
comprising more categories-could lead to a better understanding of the attractiveness of
different industries, the small sample size limited the number of categories I could include.
RESULTS
Table 5.1 reports the correlations among the independent and dependent variables. None
of the correlations were above 0.6 level where multicollinearity problems might be present
(Kennedy, 1992).
INSERT TABLE 5.1 HERE
In the area of functional expertise, 30 percent of the respondents had worked in the
computer area, 24 percent in engineering, 12 percent in management and 13 percent in other
areas. The correlations showed that functional diversity positively correlated with judges' ratings
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(r=0.13) but negatively with member-ratings (r=-0.05). However, both correlations were not
statistically significant at p<0.05.
I hypothesized that the effects of functional diversity on entrepreneurial team
performance depended on the direct effects of diversity on performance and the indirect effects
through team holding and extent of task specialization. To test these hypotheses, two sets of
regressions are required: First, the direct effects of the predictor and mediating variables on
performance and second, the effects of the predictor variables on the mediating variables. The
first set is presented in Models 1 to 6. Model 1 regressed the control variables of size, industry
and diversity of managerial level on judges' ratings. Model 2 added the predictor variable-
functional diversity. Model 3 regressed the effects of the control, predictor and mediating
variables on judges' ratings. Models 1 to 3 are presented in Table 5.2. Models 4 to 6 presented in
Table 5.3 were similar to Models 1 to 3 except that the dependent variable was members'
performance ratings. The second step-the effects of functional diversity on the mediating
variables-is presented in Models 7 and 8 (shown in Table 5.4). Model 7 and 8 regressed the
effects of functional diversity on team holding and extent of member specialization, respectively.
INSERT TABLE 5.2 HERE
Model 1, with R2 of 0.20 (F=5.73, p<0.01) showed that the control variables of size
(beta=0.20, t=1.84, p<0.10) and industry (beta=-0.40, t=-3.62, p<0.01) both predicted judges'
ratings. Reasons for these findings are discussed in the next section. However, the control
variable of diversity of managerial level (beta=-0.00, t=-0.02, n.s.) did not predict judges'
ratings. Model 2, with R2 of 0.20 (F=4.00, p<0.01) showed that functional diversity (beta=0.07,
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t=0.51, n.s.) did not predict judges' ratings. Thus, hypothesis 1 that functionally diverse
entrepreneurial teams would have higher performance than more homogeneous teams was not
supported. Model 3, regressed the control, functional diversity, and mediating (i.e. team holding
and extent of specialization) variables on judges' ratings. The model with R2 of 0.28 (F=4.18,
p<0.01) did not support hypothesis 4 that entrepreneurial teams with lower levels of team
holding would perform better than entrepreneurial teams with higher levels of team holding
(beta=-0.07, t=-0.57, n.s.). Hypothesis 5 that teams with more member specialization performed
worse than teams where members generalized was supported (beta=-0.28, t=-2.42, p<0.05).
Overall, the findings suggested that functional diversity did not directly predict judges' ratings.
However, there was support for the hypotheses that how members divided tasks predicted judges'
ratings.
INSERT TABLE 5.3 HERE
Models 4 to 6 explored the direct effects of functional diversity on member ratings of
performance. Model 4, which included only the control variables had a low R2 of 0.03 (F=0.60,
n.s.). The model showed that size (beta=-0.87, t=-0.64, n.s.), industry (beta=-0.11, t=-0.89, n.s.)
and diversity of managerial level (beta=-0.05, t=-0.40, n.s.) did not predict member ratings.
Model 5, with R2 of 0.03 showed that functional diversity and the control variables did not
predict member ratings. The betas were -0.09 (t=-0.63, n.s.) for size, -0.12 (t=-0.92, n.s.) for
industry, -0.07 (t=-0.48, n.s.) for diversity of managerial level, and -0.04 (t=-0.30, n.s.) for
functional diversity. Thus, no support was found for hypothesis 1 ,that predicted positive direct
effects of functional diversity on performance. Model 6 added the mediating variables of team
I,
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INSERT TABLE 5.4. HERE
Models 1 to 6 above explored the effects of the variables on entrepreneurial team
performance. Models 7 and 8, explored the effects of functional diversity on the mediating
variables of team holding and extent of member task specialization. Covariance structure
analysis, such as LISREL, was not used because the team level variables were aggregated from
individual level responses and covariance structure analysis is not able to handle two different
levels of analysis at the same time (Smith et al., 1994). Model 7 regressed the effects of the
control variables (size, industry and diversity of managerial level) and functional diversity on
team holding. The model, with an R2 of 0.15 (F=2.99, p<0.05) supported hypothesis 2 that
functionally diverse entrepreneurial teams had lower levels of team holding than homogeneous
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holding and extent of member specialization. The R2 of the model was 0.25 (F=4.04, p<0.01).
The change in R2 was statistically significant from Model 5 at the p<0.0 1 level. This suggested
that the mediating variables collectively influenced member ratings of performance. The
coefficient of team holding (beta=0.51, t=4.43) was statistically significant at p<0.01. This
showed that higher levels of team holding positively predicted member-ratings-the opposite
direction predicted in hypothesis 4. Reasons for this finding are discussed in the next section.
Hypothesis 5 that entrepreneurial teams with more specialization would perform worse than
teams that divided tasks with members as generalists was not supported (beta=-0.15, t=-1.26,
n.s.). However, the coefficient was in the direction predicted. Overall, the findings in Models 4
to 6 were similar to that of Models 1 to 3 that functional diversity did not have a direct effect on
performance while how members interacted influenced performance.
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teams (beta =-0.28, t=-2.17, p<0.05). As shown in Model 8, hypothesis 3 that more functionally
diverse teams had less member specialization was not supported (beta = 0.12, t=0.91, n.s.).
Overall, Models 1 to 8 suggested that functional diversity had an influence on entrepreneurial
team performance through team holding. The results of the findings are discussed in the next
section.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this study, I argue that function diversity is beneficial to short-term entrepreneurial
team performance because more perspectives are available to the team leading to better team
decisions. Although functional diversity has been extensively studied (e.g., Bantel and Jackson,
1992), this study adds to the literature by studying not only the direct and indirect effects, but
also both internal and external evaluations of performance. The results of the study are
summarized in figure 5.2. Among the control variables, a surprising finding is that people
outside the team evaluate teams in the high-technology area less favorably than teams in other
areas. One explanation is that some teams focus on the technology instead of conceptualizing a
business model. The judges commented that some teams were interested in "technology plays"
without a clear revenue model. For example, a judge commented that a particular plan was based
"on a technology, not a product or a solution . . . [and] this is a common problem in plans
developed by technically-oriented engineers. " Another judge said that "it is almost given that the
technology works; it's the selling and the personnel who can do it that differentiates one plan
from another." The control variables also show that team size positively predicts external
evaluations. One reason for the finding is that entrepreneurial teams are small (e.g., Roberts,
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1991a). Thus, within the range of size in entrepreneurial teams, larger teams will have access to
more information without the process losses associated with larger teams (West and Anderson,
1996).
INSERT FIGURE 5.2 HERE
Hypotheses 1 through 3 explore the direct effects of functional diversity on
entrepreneurial team performance, team holding and extent of task specialization. As shown in
figure 5.2, only indirect effects of functional diversity on entrepreneurial team performance are
found. Thus hypothesis 1 is not supported. Hypothesis 2, that functional diversity leads to lower
levels of team holding, is supported. However, hypothesis 3 that functionally diverse teams are
more likely to divide tasks with members as specialists is not supported. One reason that
functionally diverse teams do not specialize more is provided by Williams (1998) who found that
when team members expect differences in opinions, such as the case when they have functional
differences, they are more willing to engage other members to discuss such differences
(Williams, 1998).
Hypotheses 4 and 5 explore the effects of the mediating variables (i.e., team holding and
extent of task specialization) on entrepreneurial team performance. Hypothesis 4 predicts that
entrepreneurial teams with lower holding will perform better than entrepreneurial teams with
higher holding because founded teams-such as entrepreneurial teams-are expected to have
high levels of holding (see Shah and Jehn, 1993). That in turn could reduce members' acceptance
of dissenting views and outside information (Janis, 1982). As shown in figure 5.2, the surprising
finding is that the effects of team holding on entrepreneurial team performance depend on who
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makes the evaluation. The results show that higher levels of team holding positively predict
internal evaluations of performance but team holding does not predict external evaluations of
performance. Although team holding does not predict external evaluations, one possible reason it
positively predicts internal evaluations is that members use perceptions of team functioning to
infer how well the team performs, equating good processes to good performance. This assertion
is supported by Gladstein's (1984) finding that members' perceptions of team processes
positively predicted their evaluations of team performance. Similarly, Campion et al. (1996)
argue that members' perceptions of good internal processes result in perceptions of high-
performance, even if such perceptions are not accurate.
Hypothesis 5 predicts that entrepreneurial teams that divide tasks with members as
specialists will perform better than entrepreneurial teams with members as generalists because in
non-routine activities, task generalization allows members to better understand team issues (Van
de Ven, 1986) resulting in better decisions. This hypothesis is partially supported with task
specialization negatively predicting performance for externally-rated performance but no support
is found for member-rated performance.
Overall, as shown in figure 5.2, the effects of functional diversity on team holding
(hypothesis 2) and that of team holding on entrepreneurial team performance (hypothesis 4)
suggests that functional diversity affects entrepreneurial team performance through team
holding. Through team holding as a mediator, functionally diverse teams, compared to more
homogeneous teams, are evaluated by members less favorably. However, there is no difference
in externally-rated performance for diverse and homogeneous teams.
The study makes the following contributions. First, it extends our understanding of how
team composition influences the performance of entrepreneurial teams by showing that
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functional diversity could lead to different internal and external evaluations of entrepreneurial
team performance. Both evaluations are important because teams that are evaluated favorably by
people outside the team are more likely to get external support that in turn predict future growth
(Roberts, 1991b) and internal evaluations increase the chance that members continue their team
involvement (Hackman, 1987). Many popular books on how to build successful start-ups (e.g.,
Timmons, 1977) have focused on the need to build functionally diverse teams. This study shows
little evidence to substantiate this argument (as evaluated by people outside the team) and
indeed diverse teams may have worse team processes leading to less favorable internal
evaluations. The second contribution of this study is that it shows the need to study the mediating
effects of diversity. Some researchers such as Pfeffer (1983) argue that more "objective"
variables such as team member demographics should be used to determine the effects of
diversity on performance without the need to measure "subjective" variables such as team
processes. Contrary to Pfeffer's (1983) argument, this study finds no direct effects of diversity on
performance; however indirect effects are found. In addition, the study shows that while team
holding mediates the effects of functional diversity on performance, extent of task specialization
does not.
One limitation of this study is that the high levels of team holding coupled with limited
variance in this variable makes it statistically not possible to model the curvilinear effects of
holding on performance. As noted earlier, this weakness is expected in self-selected teams, such
as entrepreneurial teams, because of the way members select potential team members. Future
studies using a laboratory approach can test for curvilinear effects. For example, some teams can
comprise members with similar interests (high holding condition) while other teams can
comprise members with few common interests (low holding condition). Another limitation of
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this study is that it focuses on the effects of functional diversity on short-term entrepreneurial
teams. Future studies can explore the effects of functional diversity on entrepreneurial teams at
later stages of development. For example, when the venture is implementing its plan, a
homogeneous team may perform better than a diverse team since a homogeneous team is better
at coordinating activities (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). Further, this study focuses on two
mediating variables-team holding and extent of member task specialization. Future studies can
explore the effects of functional diversity on other processes. For example, researchers have
argued that diversity influences team communication (Zenger and Lawrence, 1989) and in turn
communication could influence performance through the type and amount of information
exchanged among team members.
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Figure 5.1. Hypothesized Direct and Indirect Effects of Functional Diversity on Entrepreneurial Team Performance.
H2 (-)
H3 (+)
H4 (-)
H5 (+)
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Figure 5.2. Effects of Functional Diversity on Entrepreneurial Team Performance.
0.51"*
Functional -.24t Level of H4
Diversity Team Holding
H2
Extent of
Specialization -0.28*
H5
t statistically significant at p<. 10
**statistically significant at p<.01
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Table 5.1. Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations for the Dependent and Independent Variables.
Judges' Ratings (JudRate)
Members' Ratings (MemRate)
Size (Size)
Industry (Industry)
Mangerial Level Diversity (CoyLvl)
Functional Diversity (CoFunc)
Team Holding (Hold)
Extent of task specialization (Spec)
Mean
2.94
4.93
4.05
0.77
0.68
0.60
5.27
0.31
S.D
0.55
0.66
1.80
0.43
0.31
0.22
0.86
0.22
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1.00
0.22
0.19
-0.40
0.13
0.13
-0.17
-0.16
1.00
-0.12
-0.10
-0.04
-0.05
0.46
-0.11
1.00
-0.01
0.20
0.37
-0.32
0.36
1.00
-0.21
-0.04
-0.04
-0.02
1.00
-0.26 1.00
-0.15 -0.28 1.00
0.09 0.22 -0.02 1.00
* Correlations of .19 and above are significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlations of .27 and above are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 5.2. Effects of Functional Diversity on Judges' Ratings of Entrepreneurial Team
Performance.
**=p<.0 1, *=p<.05 , t=p<.10
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Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B (S.E.) t B (S.E.) t B (S.E.) t
Size 0.20 0.03 t 1.84 0.16 0.04 1.24 0.25 0.04 * 1.97
Industry -0.40 0.14 ** -3.62 -0.38 0.15 ** -3.37 -0.40 0.14 ** -3.63
CoyLvl 0.00 0.20 -0.02 0.07 0.32 0.51 0.02 0.22 0.20
CoFunc 0.03 0.22 0.26 0.08 0.32 0.64
Hold 
-0.07 0.07 -0.57
Spec 
-0.28 0.29 * -2.42
R2  0.20 0.20 0.28
F-stats 5.73 ** 4.00 ** 4.18 **
- ii I I I I I --- ---~----- --- -----
Table 5.3. Effects of Functional Diversity on Members' Ratings of Entrepreneurial Team Performance.
**=p<.01, *=p<.05 , t=p<.10
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Variables Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
B (S.E.) t B (S.E.) t B (S.E.) t
Size -0.87 0.04 -0.64 -0.09 0.05 -0.63 0.02 0.05 0.15
Industry -0.11 0.19 -0.89 -0.12 0.19 -0.92 -0.10 0.17 -0.91
CoyLvl -0.05 0.27 -0.40 -0.07 0.29 -0.48 0.07 0.27 0.54
CoFunc 
-0.04 0.42 -0.30 0.12 0.39 0.93
Hold 0.51 0.09 ** 4.43
Spec 
-0.15 0.35 -1.26
R2  0.03 0.03 0.25
F-stats 0.60 0.46 4.04
I I I . II I , ---- - -- - -
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Table 5.4. Effects of Functional Diversity on Team Holding and
Extent of Task specialization
Variables Model 7 Model 8
Team Extent of
Holding Specialization
B (S.E.) t B (S.E.) t
Size -0.12 0.06 -0.94 .30 0.02 * 2.36
Industry -0.03 0.24 -0.25 -0.01 0.06 -0.62
CoyLvl -0.24 0.36 t -1.89 0.62 0.09 0.48
CoFunc -0.28 0.51 * -2.17 0.12 0.13 0.91
R2  0.15 0.14
F-stats 2.99 * 2.76 *
**=p<.01, *=p<.05, t=p<.10
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CHAPTER 6
EFFECTS OF MEMBER INTERACTIONS WITH EXTERNAL CONTACTS
ON ENTREPRENEURIAL TEAM PERFORMANCE
While the earlier chapters show how factors within the team influence performance, this
paper explores the effects of external contacts on short-term entrepreneurial team performance.
The need to study external contacts is shown in the social capital literature. According to social
capital theorists, information is embedded within and derived from network of relationships
(Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998:243). Through contacts with others, individuals can be positioned to
gain informational benefits and thereby gain entrepreneurial opportunities (Powell, 1990). This
study concentrates on the need to gather the right information, from the right people and as
efficiently as possible. The reason for this need is that information forms the basis for
entrepreneurial opportunities (e.g., Kirzner, 1997).
This study shows, not merely that external contacts matter, but that who team members
interact with influences performance. While previous studies have shown that having more
external contacts is beneficial to team performance (e.g., Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998), these
studies have not demonstrated the types of interactions that matter. Second, the study extends
both the team and social capital literature by integrating social capital concepts into the team
literature. Most studies on social networks have focused at the individual (e.g., Granovetter,
1973) or at the organizational (e.g., Soh and Roberts, 1998) levels. However, researchers have
for the most part, ignored social capital concepts at the team level. This study shows that social
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capital concepts, such as strong and weak ties, are equally applicable to the team level of
analysis.
Consistent with Kirzner's (1997) argument that information is the basis for
entrepreneurial opportunities, I hypothesize that entrepreneurial teams that are able to gather a
wide range of information should perform better than entrepreneurial teams that gather only a
narrow range of information. I focus on information related to the task of preparing a business
plan. Since this task requires a holistic approach that conceptualizes a whole business model
(Olive, 1996), I hypothesize that teams that are able to get assistance from external contacts with
broad perspective should perform better than teams with assistance from people with a narrow
perspective. Although I expect information from social contacts to improve entrepreneurial team
performance, entrepreneurial teams often have limited resources (e.g., Casson, 1982). Therefore,
I expect that entrepreneurial teams that are able to gather information efficiently will perform
better than entrepreneurial teams that are less efficient in information gathering. Granovetter
(1973) argues that getting information from weak ties-which he defines as the combination of
time spent with, emotional intensity and level of intimacy with external contacts-is more
efficient than getting information from strong ties. Individuals tend to move in different social
circles from those with whom they have weak ties (Granovetter, 1973). Consequently,
information from weak ties is likely to be more novel than information from strong ties
(Granovetter, 1973). I therefore hypothesize that entrepreneurial teams that engage weak ties
perform better than entrepreneurial teams that engage strong ties.
The paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, I develop the theoretical arguments in
support of the hypotheses. Since there is limited research on entrepreneurial teams (Cooper and
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Daily, 1996), the hypotheses are drawn from the team, entrepreneurship and social capital
literatures. At the same time, insights from interviews with participants of this study are
presented. Then I describe the research methods and report the findings. Finally, I discuss the
findings and provide conclusions on how entrepreneurial teams can engage external contacts to
improve team performance.
THEORY DEVELOPMENT
According to Venkataraman (1997), entrepreneurship is the process where "future goods
and services are discovered, created and exploited (Venkataraman, 1997:120)." Drawing from
Kirzner (1997), Shane and Venkataraman (forthcoming) argue that entrepreneurial opportunities
exist because of information asymmetry, and those who have access to more information are
better able to discover entrepreneurial opportunities. They add that an entrepreneurial act occurs
when someone has an insight that "Some resources are priced 'too low', given the price at which
the output from their combination could be sold in another location, at another time, or in another
form." This insight in turn requires the possession of private information about the opportunity.
Range of information gathered and performance
While social contacts are by themselves important, Burt (1992) argues that to get
information advantages, we should be able to broker across different information channels.
Moving in different social circles is advantageous because information from people of different
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circles is less likely to be duplicative. By having and combining different types of information,
entrepreneurial opportunities can be obtained (Nahapiet & Ghosal, 1998, Kirzner, 1997).
Indirect evidence of the benefits of a diverse range of information is also suggested by
the decision making literature. West and Anderson (1996), who studied the effects of member
participation in decision making on team performance, found that having diverse information
increases the level of team innovation. Similarly, the conflict literature also provides indirect
evidence for the benefits of getting diverse information. According to Mitroff (1982), having a
diversity of views enables team members to challenge existing ideas, which leads to a better
understanding of the issues (Eisenhardt, Kahwajy and Bourgeois, 1997).
However, not all types of information may be relevant to an entrepreneurial team. Some
researchers (e.g., Ancona and Caldwell, 1992a) argue that the types of resources that are
beneficial to teams should be those that are task relevant. Similarly, in studies relating to team
composition, Tsui et al. (1995) argue that it is task-related expertise that matters to team
performance. Teams in this study are engaged in the task of preparing a business plan. According
to Olive (1996), a business plan is a document that conceptualizes the totality of a business
opportunity. The plan gives people who are interested in the business the chance to form
strategies in areas such as marketing, finance and operations. It also allows potential
entrepreneurs to think through critical business decisions and to decide whether they have a
viable business. Given the need for a business plan to cover a wide range of functional areas, I
expect that entrepreneurial teams that are able to gather information from this wide range of
functional areas would perform better than entrepreneurial teams that gather a narrow range of
information related to preparing a business plan.
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The comments of the competition judges also suggest that a range of information related
to a business plan is required. For example, one judge said, "I have to be able to read this once
and understand what the business is about. Included in this, I want to know what kind of
business this is, what the products and services are, who the customer is, and what the realistic
(instead of overall) market opportunity is ... what kind of business this is, what the products and
services are, who the customer is, and what the realistic market opportunity is. I also want to
know why the founders are uniquely qualified to build this business." Another judge commented
that "the plan should convince the reader that it actually can be executed. This involves a
convincing story of how the product will actually accomplish its purpose-will it actually
work?-and how the proprietors of the plan intend to design, manufacture and market it. The
plan should explain why the reader should believe that this team has or can obtain the experience
and expertise necessary to make it happen. It should ruthlessly assess risk and outline how to
deal with it."
Hypothesis 1: Entrepreneurial teams that are able to gather information in different areas relating
to a business plan would perform better than entrepreneurial teams that gather information in
fewer areas relating to preparing a business plan.
Experience of external contact and performance
In the above paragraphs, I argued that the teams preparing a business plan should gather a
wide range of information, because such preparation requires the development of different
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functional areas such as marketing, finance and product development. Related to the need for
task-relevant information, I expect that entrepreneurial teams who are able to get information
from people with a broad perspective will perform better than entrepreneurial teams that get
information from people with a more narrow perspective. The reason for this expectation is that a
business plan is a holistic document that conceptualizes the whole business model (Olive, 1996).
Although no study to my knowledge has tested this hypothesis, Stuart and Abetti (1990) provide
indirect evidence that management experience can be a predictor of entrepreneurial performance.
In addition, Bygrave and Timmons (1992) argue that advice from venture capitalists-who are
able to provide this broad perspective-improves the chances of venture success. Similarly,
Schilit (1996) argues that venture capitalists strengthen a new venture by providing a broad
perspective and help in strategy development.
The interviews also suggest that having people with a broad perspective-such as venture
capitalists or those with founding experience-can improve entrepreneurial team performance
because it helps the entrepreneurial team focus on critical issues. For example, one team member
(INT 12) said, "The major weakness for a start-up to get started is to get a client. This
[knowledge] is from our discussions with Jim ... [who has start up experience. He told us] ...
that if you have a client it makes it easier to get additional clients; working with the first client
yourself is very good. You learn a lot and you get feedback which helps you." Another team
member said that "One of the great contributors was my father [who had] ... started a business
in Silicon Valley. He helped us set a direction for the business, what kinds of markets were out
there, how to address the markets, how to develop a business plan." Another team member who
did not get advice from people with start-up experience regretted that decision and said (INT 11),
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"I think that it would be a very good idea [to have a mentor]... We [will] get one of those the
next time. I think they have experience in the whole thing-like all the things in our team that we
did badly, they would tell us ahead of time and we would realize that and we would change."
Hypothesis 2: Entrepreneurial teams that are able to get information from people with a broad
perspective-such as venture capitalists, CEOs or people with founding experience-will
perform better than entrepreneurial teams with external contacts having a narrower perspective.
Efficiency of information gathering and performance
Although I argued that entrepreneurial teams should gather a wide range of information
and gather it from the right people, information gathering can be costly, since time and effort
must be expended in the process. Unfortunately, entrepreneurial teams are resource-constrained
(Casson, 1982), and often for several reasons. First, entrepreneurial teams tend to be small.
Empirical studies suggest that the average entrepreneurial team has four or fewer members (e.g.,
Roberts, 1991a; Vyakarnam, Jacobs and Handelberg, 1997). In this study, average team size is
also small, with a mean and median of four and a range of two to 10. Second, as illustrated by
Roberts (1991a), many of the founders first "moonlight" during the early start-up phase and
continue to hold a full-time job. In this sample, over 90 percent of the participants are either
holding a full-time job or are full-time students.
I argue that, with limited resources at their disposal, entrepreneurial teams that are able to
gather information efficiently should have higher performance than teams that are less efficient
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in gathering information. This assertion is supported by the social capital literature (e.g. Burt,
1992). Burt (1992) argues that an efficient network that bridges different networks bring about
more information for the same number of contacts and presents opportunities for entrepreneurial
behavior (Burt, 1997). More specifically, Granovetter (1973) found that most people got
information that led to jobs from weak rather than strong ties. He defines weak ties as the
combination of time spent with (the lesser the time, the weaker the tie strength), emotional
intensity (the less emotional intensity, the weaker the tie strength) and level of intimacy (the
lower the level of intimacy, the weaker the tie strength) with external contacts.
According to Granovetter (1995:41), strong ties are in general not the most efficient types
of job contact (Granovetter, 1995: 48). He (Granovetter, 1995: 53) explains that those to whom
one is closest to tend to move in similar social circles. Consequently, the information that strong
ties are able to provide tends to be the same as that which one already has. On the other hand,
weak ties serve as connections for people to reach sources of information that are otherwise not
directly accessible (Granovetter, 1973). In his study, he measured the strength of tie as the
amount of time spent together by two persons (Granovetter, 1995: 53). These fell into the three
categories, of "often"-at least twice a week; "occasionally"-more than once a year but less
than twice a week; and "rarely"--once a year or less. In another study, Lin, Ensel and Vaugh
(1981) also found that weak ties are more beneficial than strong ties in the job search process.
They followed Granovetter's (1973) argument that tie strength can be determined by the nature of
relationships, measured by categories such as relatives, friends, neighbors and acquaintances.
The benefits of weak ties have also been mathematically demonstrated in a model developed by
Montgomery (1992).
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Following Granovetter (1973), who empirically found the benefits of weak ties, I
hypothesize that entrepreneurial teams that are more efficient in information gathering-as
evidenced by having weak ties-would perform better than entrepreneurial teams that make use
of strong ties. Following the arguments of Granovetter (1973) and the empirical support by
Granovetter (1973) and Lin et al. (1981), I will use both the frequency of interactions and the
nature of relationships to determine strength of a tie between team members and external
contacts.
Although the interviewees did not specifically mention the benefits of weak ties over
strong ties, several highlighted the benefits of new ties that they made during the course of the
competition. One team member (INT 5) illustrated that "the judges helped a lot. [My team
member] called both the judges who wrote our evaluations and had long discussions with both of
them, to try and find out what were the problems with our business plan and where we should go
[from here and] they were really helpful." Another team member (INT 13) illustrated that a new
contact "told us exactly how the process currently works, where all the bottlenecks are, and
where we can fit our products so we can speed up that insurance process and make sure that
doctors are correctly doing billing applications."
Hypothesis 3a: Entrepreneurial teams with members having weak ties, as determined by the
nature of relationships, will perform better than entrepreneurial teams with members having
strong ties.
Hypothesis 3b: Entrepreneurial teams with members having weak ties, as determined by the
frequency of interactions, will perform better than entrepreneurial teams with members having
strong ties.
RESEARCH METHOD
Sample and procedure
The sample comprised the 73 teams who participated in the MIT $50K Competition in 1998.
Of the team members, 257 out of 310, or 83 percent, returned the questionnaire. No statistical
differences was found between the respondents and non-respondents in the dimensions of age,
sex, and team size, suggesting that the sample was representative of all the participants in the
MIT $50K Competition for that year.
Independent variables
Respondents were given a table where they were asked to list all the people that were
important to their teams. They were asked to rate the position of the person, the type and extent
of interaction, and the prior relationship. The questions were adapted from Burton (1995),
Granovetter (1973) and Lin et al. (1981).
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Range of external contacts
Team members' responses to the question on the type and extent of interaction were used
to determine the range of external contacts. I coded the type of information they received from
these contacts into 10 categories, closely following that of the layout of a business plan. The 10
categories, together with sample descriptions given by the questionnaire respondents were: (1)
business idea, e.g., "meet twice a week to discuss business plan and he helped with research for
plan", (2) business strategy, e.g., "suggesting strategy, business direction", (3) product, e.g.,
"discuss design of active noise reduction adapter to telephone", (4) technology, e.g., "discuss
methods of active noise reduction via email and telephone conversations", (5) general, e.g.,
"gave advice on whether the project was ok", (6) start-up advice, e.g., "advised on starting up a
company", (7) network, e.g., "has assisted in arranging meetings with interested parties", (8)
financing, e.g., "helped financial arrangement", (9) legal, e.g., "helped with patent issues and
incorporations", and (10) market and industry, e.g., "industry resource interview". The total
numbers of teams in this study with contacts in each category were 19, 11, 5, 26, 29, 5, 5, 8, 9,
and 24 respectively. Since I did the coding alone, no reliability statistics are available. However,
the answers were short, about a phrase or sentence long and unambiguous. To minimize rater
bias, the coding was done without knowing either the names of the teams or the names of the
respondents. The range of external contact was calculated by the number of categories out of the
five major categories' (defined as more than 10 teams gathering information in these areas) that
1 Using all 10 categories to determine the range of information gathered produced similar results as that using
the five major categories. The five-category coding system was adopted because it better represented the actions of
the teams in this study.
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the team gathered from external contacts For example, a team that received advice on how to
market the product and to solve a technical issue regarding that product received a score of 0.4.
Experience of external contact
Participants were asked to describe the title or job position of the external contacts that
they had dealings with. I assumed that the type of perspective that the contact had depended on
the job level of that contact. Contacts with jobs with titles such as President of Kitty Research
Associates, Chairman of the MIT Corporation or Lotus founder were coded as contacts with
broad perspective and were each given a score of 3. Contacts with more specialized jobs were
each given a score of 2. This included contacts with titles such as Banker in BankBoston,
Professor at Sloan, attorney or vice-president of Marketing. Contacts without any specific
experience relating to starting a business, were each given a score of 1 (e.g., classmates). In total,
37, 130 and 50 were in levels 1, 2 and 3 respectively. I used the highest experience level to
represent the extent a team used contacts with broad perspective2 .
Frequency of interaction with external contacts
I coded the frequency of interaction with external contacts from the respondents' answer
to the type and extent of interaction with people outside the team. These interactions were coded
as 1 = one meeting or two meetings, 2 = few meetings (approximately three to five meetings)
and 3 = regular meetings. For example, one respondent answered in the questionnaire that he
"met [the contact] once to discuss scope of project and solicit suggestions" and another "I called
her once to check method to do financial projections." These respondents were each given a
score of 1. Respondents who answered "talked regularly about pharmaceutical
trends/opportunities" or "meet twice a week to discuss business plan" were each given a score of
3. In less frequent instances, respondents said that they interacted with the respondents a few
times. A respondent answered "one meeting at his office, 3-4 email and phone calls, did market
research" and another answered "a few phone calls"; they were each given a score of 2. 143
interactions with external contacts were coded as 1, 13 as 2 and 36 as 3. This coding system was
adapted from Granovetter (1973) who developed three categories of often"-at least twice a
week, "occasionally"-more than once a year but less than twice a week; and "rarely"--once a
year or less. One problem of this coding system was that the scales did not correspond to the
actual frequencies (and in addition, different points in the scale are not linearly related).
However, the advantage was that the participants were free to describe the type of interactions
that mattered to their teams. I used the maximum frequency level as a proxy of the extent utilized
strong ties 3
Relationship with external contacts
2Using the three experience levels as categorical variables produced similar results.
3 It is likely that entrepreneurial team performance will be influenced by the interaction of experience level of
contact and frequency of interaction. However, in this study, it was not possible to model this interaction effect
because of the high correlation (above .9) between the main and interaction variables.
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Respondents were asked in the questionnaires to describe their relationships with external
contacts. These were coded as follows: 1= no ties, 2 = weak ties and 3 = strong ties. For
example, a respondent who answered in the questionnaire "met through his talks" and another
who answered "introduced by a friend" were each given a score of 1. A respondent who
answered "vendor that I dealt with at work" and another who answered "person is a friend of
mine" were each given a score of 2. A respondents who answered "father of team member" and
another who answered "friend of 20 plus years" were each given a score of 3. This coding system
was adapted from Granovetter (1995:41) who described ties as "family-social"-relatives, friend
of the family-or "work contact"-a person known in a work situation. Granovetter (1995:41)
found that although these categories were logically not mutually exclusive, in 90 percent of the
cases they were. Similarly, Lin et al. (1981) operationalized strength of ties into relationships
such as relatives, friends, neighbors and acquaintances. In this study, 73 external contacts were
given scores of 1, 107 scores of 2 and 32 scores of 3. The answers were short, about a phrase
long. Following the frequency of interaction with external contacts variable, the maximum level
was used as a proxy of the extent that teams engaged in inefficient information gathering (i.e.
using strong ties).
Control Variables
As shown in chapter 4, both team size and industry should be controlled. Entrepreneurial
teams tended to be small (e.g., Roberts, 1991a) and within the range of size in entrepreneurial
teams, larger teams are more likely to have more information resulting in higher performance
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levels (e.g., West and Anderson, 1996). Industry was controlled because investors preferred
some industries for early financing (Haar, Starr and MacMillan, 1988).
RESULTS
Table 6.1 shows the bivariate correlations, means and standard deviations of the variables
in this study. Most of the teams were rated by the judges as slightly above average in
performance with a mean judge score of 2.95, s.d.=0.55 (on a scale of 1 to 5). The members were
also positive about their teams' performance, with a mean member-rating of 4.93, s.d. 0.66 (on a
scale of 1 to 7). The average team size was small, with 4.05 members and a standard deviation of
1.8. About 77 percent of the teams in this competition did a plan that related to a technology
area-such as computer hardware and software. The average highest level person that a team
contacted was 2.48 (s.d. 0.57)-somewhere between a specialist and a person with founding
experience. The average range of areas consulted with external contacts was 0.29 (s.d. 0.25)-
implying that external contacts were consulted in one or two areas. None of the correlations were
above 0.60 where multicolinearity problems might be present (Kennedy, 1992).
INSERT TABLE 6.1 HERE
The effects of external contacts on entrepreneurial team performance were expected to
depend on a series of factors, including the type of information collected, who the information
was collected from and the efficiency of information collection. To collectively explore the
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effects of these factors on team performance, I presented a series of 12 regressions. Models 1 to
6, shown in Table 6.2, explored the effects of external contacts on judges' performance ratings.
Model 1 included only the control variables of size and industry. Models 2 to 5 included the
control variables and each of the external contact variables. They were the range of information
gathered, experience level, interaction frequency and relationship with contact respectively.
Model 6 included the control variables together with all the external contact measures. Models 7
to 12, shown in Table 6.3, were similar to Models 1 to 6 respectively except that the dependent
variable was member-ratings of team performance.
INSERT TABLE 6.2 HERE
Model 1 with an R2 of 0.20 (F=8.72, p<0.01) showed that the control variables of size
and industry predicted judges' ratings. Size positively predicted external evaluations (b=0.06,
t=1.88, p<0.10). Given the small average size of teams in this study, larger teams were expected
to perform better than smaller teams. This was because entrepreneurial teams that were relatively
larger had access to greater resources, without the corresponding process loss of large teams
(West and Anderson, 1996). As explained in earlier chapters, one possible reason that
entrepreneurial teams in technology-related plans were evaluated less favorably by the judges
(b=-0.52, t=-3.76, p<0.01) was that some of these teams focused on the technology and not on
building a business.
Model 2 included the control variables and range of information gathered on judges'
ratings. The R2 remained at 0.22 (F=6.50, p<0.01) and the change in R2 from the baseline model,
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i.e., comprising the control variables, was not statistically significant at p<0.10. Range of
information gathered did not predict judges' ratings (b=0.33, t=1.36, n.s.). Model 3 included the
control variables and experience level. Again the R2 was 0.20 (F=4.38, p<0.01) and the
coefficient of experience level (b=0. 17, t=1.40) was not statistically significant at p<O. 10. Model
4 included the control variable and interaction frequency. The model showed that the interaction
frequency variable was not statistically significant at the p<0.10 level (b=-0.06, t=-0.84, n.s.).
Model 5 included the control variables and relationship with contact. As predicted, stronger
relationships (b=-0.20, t=-1.87, p<O. 10) predicted lower judges' ratings.
Model 6 included the control and predictor variables. The model's R2 increased to 0.33
(F=3.79, p<0.01) from the baseline of 0.20, a statistically significant difference at p<0.01.
Although the coefficients showed that engaging external contacts that can provide a broad
perspective positively predicted performance (b=0.14, t=1.16), the result was not statistically
significant. The benefit of engaging weak ties was partially supported; relationship with contact
negatively predicted judges' ratings (b=-0.27, t=-2.62, p<0.01). However, no support for
interaction frequency (b=-0.09, t=-1.23, n.s.) and range of information gathered (b=0.46, t=1.40,
n.s.) on judges' ratings were found. The findings are discussed in the next section.
INSERT TABLE 6.3 HERE
The next set of Models 7 to 12, regressed the effects of the independent variables on
member-ratings. Model 7 included only the control variables of industry and team size and
neither coefficients of size (b=-0.04, t=-0.97) and industry (b=-0.15, t=-0.82) were statistical
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significant at p<0.10. The R2 of the model was also low with (R2=0.02, F=0.82, n.s.). Model 8
included the control variables and range of information gathered. The Model R2 remained low
(R2=0.11, F=2.88, p<0.05) but the coefficient of range of information gathered (b=0.80, t=2.62)
was statistically significant at p<0.05 level. Models 9, 10, 11 included the control variables and
experience level, interaction frequency and relationship with contact respectively. All three
predictor variables of experience level (b=0.19, t=1.25), interaction frequency (b=0.05, t=0.51)
and relationship with contact (b=0.12, t=0.90) were not statistically significant. Model 12
included the control variables and all the predictor variables. The overall Model's R2 was 0.17
(F=1.64, n.s.). The only variable that was statistically significant was range of information
gathered (b=0.91, t=2.17, p<0.05). Reasons for these findings are discussed in the next section.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The study looked at how team member interactions with people outside the team can
influence short-term entrepreneurial team performance. An external perspective is important for
entrepreneurial activities because social contacts provide information that would otherwise be
unavailable to the entrepreneur (e.g., Burt, 1997). The study explores different ways in which
external contacts could influence performance. First, I explored the effects of having access to a
range of information, expecting a wider range of information to result in higher entrepreneurial
team performance. Since preparation of a business plan requires the conceptualization of the
whole business model (Olive, 1996), I expected that teams with contacts having a broad
perspective would have higher team performance. However, as entrepreneurial teams have
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limited resources (e.g., Casson, 1982), I also expected that those capable of gathering
information efficiently (using weak ties who can introduce new information) would have higher
performance.
Overall, there is only limited support that the way entrepreneurial teams engage external
contacts influences performance. For external evaluations of entrepreneurial team performance,
there is no support for Hypothesis 1 that entrepreneurial teams that gather a wide range of
information from external contacts perform better than those that gather a narrow range of
information. In addition, no support is found for Hypothesis 2 that entrepreneurial teams should
engage external contacts with a broad perspective. One possible reason for these findings is that
it is only beneficial to engage external ties to get information that members cannot gather
internally, suggesting that internal factors should be considered in conjunction with external
factors. This assertion is supported by the research of Ancona and Caldwell (1992a) who studied
external factors together with internal task processes. However, in this paper, internal factors are
not included in the models and this limitation is addressed in the concluding chapter. There is
support, however, for Hypothesis 3 that entrepreneurial teams that use weak ties (e.g.,
acquaintances or infrequent contacts) would perform better than teams that use strong ties. The
finding that too strong external ties are detrimental to entrepreneurial team performance is
consistent with Ancona and Caldwell's (1992b) finding that excessive environmental scanning
hurt team performance. This study, together with other studies (e.g., Ancona and Caldwell,
1992b) suggest that entrepreneurial teams must network with external ties, but should do so
efficiently.
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In member evaluations of team performance, the results show that teams who get a wide
range of information from external contacts evaluate their teams more favorably. Therefore,
Hypothesis 1, on the benefits of getting a range of information, is supported. However, there is
no supportive evidence of Hypothesis 2 that contacts with broader experience can contribute
more to the entrepreneurial team than contacts with a narrower perspective. In addition,
Hypotheses 3 on the benefits of weak ties, are not supported. These findings suggest that the
"naive" theory is one postulating that diversity of information from external contacts is
beneficial for team performance, with less regard for how the information is gathered.
To review, this study extends the small yet growing body of entrepreneurial team
literature. It is only recently that greater attention has been placed on the whole team and not on
the lone entrepreneur (e.g., Cooper and Daily, 1996; Vyakarnam et al., 1997). This study adds to
earlier research and makes the following contributions. First, it shows how engaging in external
contacts can affect performance but instead of studying the benefits of external contacts per se,
the study explores the content of the interactions and the backgrounds of the people with whom
the team members interact. Together with previous studies (e.g., Ancona and Caldwell, 1992a;
and Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998) that have shown that external contacts can have performance
effects, this study leads to a comprehensive understanding of precisely how external contacts
influence team performance.
Second, this study shows that social capital network concepts, such as strong and weak
ties, are applicable to the team level of analysis. Most social capital studies have focused either at
the individual (e.g., Granovetter, 1973) or at the organizational (e.g., Soh and Roberts, 1998)
level. However, researchers have for the most part, neglected social capital concepts at the team
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level. At the same time, the studies on team external relationships (e.g., Ancona and Caldwell,
1992) have mostly ignored the social capital research. This study represents a step towards
integrating these two sets of literature. For example, I show that strength of tie is one network
area that could be integrated into the team literature. Other network concepts that could be
integrated include structural holes (the extent that nodes in the network are able to bridge
different networks), centrality (position of node in the network) and density (proportion of nodes
in the network with which a node has contacts). These network factors influence the uniqueness
and the quality of information that a team is able to gather, and also affect thoroughness of
information gathering. In turn, these elements influence the performance of entrepreneurial
teams. This study also emphasizes the different internal and external evaluations of team
performance.
Focusing on how teams at the early start-up phase can engage external contacts to
improve entrepreneurial team performance, this study finds that entrepreneurial teams that
receive favorable external evaluations should gather information efficiently. One limitation of
the study is that the types of information acquired by team members are self-reported. Future
research can use laboratory methods to manipulate the range and types of information available
to the teams to increase the confidence of the results. Future studies can also explore the types of
external contacts that are needed at later stages of a venture's development. For example,
Roberts (1991) notes that many entrepreneurs get their funds from friends and family (e.g.,
Roberts, 1991). Thus, during the stage when the venture requires funds to implement its plans or
expand its scope of operations strong ties may be preferable to weak ties. Uzzi (1996) also notes
that suppliers who have close links to a firm may be more willing than other suppliers to invest
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in specialized equipment to service that firm. In this instance, strong ties may be better than weak
ties. Future studies can also explore how different network concepts-such as structural holes,
centrality and density-influences entrepreneurial team performance.
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Table 6.1. Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations for the Dependent and Independent Variables
Mean SD I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 Judges' Ratings of Performance (JudRate) 2.95 0.55 1.00
2 Member-Ratings of Performance (MemRate) 4.93 0.66 0.24 1.00
3 Size (Size) 4.05 1.80 0.19 -0.12 1.00
4 Industry (Industry) 0.77 0.43 -0.40 -0.10 0.02 1.00
5 Range of External Contacts (Range) 0.29 0.25 0.22 0.26 0.25 -0.07 1.00
6 Experience Level of External Contacts (Level) 2.48 0.57 0.19 0.15 0.12 -0.02 0.30 1.00
7 Frequency of Contact (Freq) 1.79 0.91 -0.10 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.20 0.03 1.00
8 Relationship with Contact (Relation) 2.23 0.66 -0.23 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.19 0.07 0.04 1.00
* Correlations of .23 and above are significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlations of .40 and above are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 6.2. Regressions Predicting the Effects of Team External Contacts on Judges' Ratings of Entrepreneurial Team
Performance
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Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B (S.E.) t B (S.E.) t B (S.E. t
Constant 3.10 0.18 ** 17.33 3.12 0.18 ** 16.66 2.78 0.35 ** 8.06
Size 0.06 0.03 t 1.88 0.05 0.03 1.49 0.04 0.04 0.98
Industry -0.52 0.14 ** -3.76 -0.51 0.14 ** -3.67 -0.49 0.16 ** -3.16
Range 0.33 0.24 1.36
Level 0.17 0.12 1.40
Freq
Relation
R 2  0.20 0.22 0.20
F-stats 8.72 ** 6.50 ** 4.38 **
i I I I I -- ---- - ---- -- - I i
**=p<.01, *=p<.05, t=p<.10
Table 6.2 cont. Regressions Predicting the Effects of Team External Contacts on Judges' Ratings of
Entrepreneurial Team Performance
Variables Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
B (S.E.) t B (S.E.) t B (S.E. t
Constant 3.37 0.25 ** 13.47 3.05 0.31 ** 11.55 3.55 0.42 ** 8.44
Size 0.04 0.04 0.94 0.04 0.04 1.11 0.02 0.04 0.54
Industry 
-0.54 0.16 ** -3.32 -0.47 0.16 ** -2.93 
-0.52 0.16 ** -3.21
Range 0.46 0.33 1.40
Level 0.14 0.12 1.15
Freq 
-0.06 0.08 -0.84 
-0.09 0.07 -1.23
Relation 
-0.20 0.10 t -1.87 
-0.27 0.10 ** -2.62
R 2  0.19 0.20 0.33
F-stats 4.14 ** 4.28 ** 3.79 **
**=p<.01, *=p<.05, t=p<.10
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Table 6.3. Regressions Predicting the Effects of Team External Contacts on Member-Ratings of Entrepreneurial Team
Performance
**=p<.0 1 , *=p<.05, t=p<.10
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Variables Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
B (S.E.) t B (S.E.) t B (S.E.) t
Constant 5.22 0.24 ** 22.10 5.08 0.23 ** 21.78 4.80 0.45 ** 10.77
Size -0.04 0.04 -0.97 -0.07 0.04 -1.64 -0.06 0.05 -1.28
Industry -0.15 0.18 -0.82 -0.12 0.18 -0.67 -0.11 0.20 -0.53
Range 0.80 0.31 ** 2.62
Level 0.19 0.15 1.25
Freq
Relation
R2  0.02 0.11 0.06
F-stats 0.82 n.s. 2.88 * 1.09 n.s.
-- I
Table 6.3 cont. Regressions Predicting the Effects of Team External Contacts on Member-Ratings of
Entrepreneurial Team Performance
**=p<.0 1, *=p<.05, t=p<.10
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Variables Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
B (S.E.) t B (S.E.) t B (S.E. t
Constant 5.39 0.30 ** 17.98 4.95 0.41 ** 12.10 5.01 0.53 ** 9.51
Size -0.08 0.05 t -1.80 -0.05 0.05 -0.99 -0.09 0.05 t -1.83
Industry -0.18 0.20 -0.93 -0.10 0.21 -0.47 -0.13 0.20 -0.64
Range 0.91 0.42 * 2.17
Level 0.01 0.16 0.07
Freq 0.05 0.09 0.51 0.01 0.09 0.14
Relation 0.12 0.14 0.90 0.01 0.13 0.09
R 2  0.08 0.04 0.17
F-stats 1.46 n.s. 0.68 n.s. 1.64 n.s.
; - - -I - - I - -- ---- - ---------------- - - - I-...~I.--..--~~T;-~,1 ,___
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
This thesis is about how short-term entrepreneurial teams can be designed to be high
performing. Using the findings in the last three chapters, this chapter develops a preliminary
model of new venture team performance. As shown in Figure 7.1, performance is predicted to
be influenced by internal and external factors, with diversity (both functional and non-functional)
as antecedents of team activities. This model is tested in this chapter and the results are used to
develop a revised model. Given the small sample size, and the small number of control variables,
the models should be interpreted as preliminary that should be tested in future studies. The
chapter also compares the findings in the thesis to the team and new venture literatures,
concluding with the study's limitations that point to areas for future research.
INSERT FIGURE 7.1 HERE
PRELIMINARY MODEL OF FACTORS INFLUENCING ENTREPRENEURIAL
TEAM PERFORMANCE
As highlighted in Figure 7.1, the effects of non-functional diversity on team activities
Swere not explored in previous chapters. The previous papers focused on functional diversity
because some studies on work teams (e.g., Bantel and Jackson, 1989) found that while functional
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diversity influenced performance, non-functional diversity did not. In addition, several
researchers (e.g., Tsui et al., 1989 and Ancona and Caldwell, 1992a) argue that it is the task and
skill related differences in a team that affect performance. This chapter included non-functional
diversity to have a more complete understanding of how high-performing entrepreneurial teams
should be designed. Furthermore, some recent studies on work teams (e.g., Barsade, et al., 1998)
found that some types of non-functional diversity, such as affective differences among team
members, have performance effects.
The remaining parts of this section summarize the literature and findings from previous
chapters that support this model first showing how diversity influences team internal and
external team activities, followed by an explanation of how these activities influence
performance.
In the model, functional diversity is an antecedent of team holding, with team holding
defined by Louis and Yan (1996) to include perceptions by team members of who is and is not a
member of the team, how closely they work as a team and their level of team identity. Following
the results in paper 2, Figure 7.1 predicts that teams with greater functional diversity will have
lower levels of team holding than teams with less functional diversity. A reason for the
prediction is that similarity increases cohesion (e.g., O'Reilly et al., 1989) and psychology
attachment (e.g., Tsui et al., 1992) while lowering identity differences (e.g., Thomas-Hunt and
Gruenfeld, 1998) and decreasing turnover (e.g., Pfeffer and O'Reilly, 1987). The model also
predicts that the effects of non-functional diversity on team holding is the same as that of
functional diversity because all types of diversity lead to lower cohesion (e.g., O'Reilly et al.,
1989) and psychology attachment (e.g., Tsui et al., 1992).
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Hypothesis 1: Functionally diverse entrepreneurial teams have lower levels of team holding than
less diverse teams.
Hypothesis 2: Non-functionally diverse entrepreneurial teams have lower levels of team holding
than less diverse teams.
In addition to the effects of diversity on internal factors, diversity could also influence the
range of information available to the team. Diversity of team membership, both functional and
non-functional, should be associated with a wider range of information that the team members
collect from external contacts because members with different backgrounds tend to move in
different social circles. People in different social circles in turn are expected to contribute
different types of information (Burt, 1992). The findings of Ancona and Caldwell (1992a) (and
summarized by Ancona and Caldwell, 1998) provide indirect support for this assertion. They
found that as compared to homogeneous teams, heterogeneous teams have higher connectedness
(i.e., are more involved) with the external environment.
Hypothesis 3: Functionally diverse entrepreneurial teams are expected to gather a wider range of
information from external contacts than less diverse entrepreneurial teams.
Hypothesis 4: Non-functionally diverse entrepreneurial teams are expected to gather a wider
range of information from external contacts than less diverse entrepreneurial teams.
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The effects of internal factors on entrepreneurial team performance, namely team holding
and task division, had been explored in papers 1 and 2 and the results are summarized here.
Paper 2 found that team holding positively predicted member performance ratings. A possible
reason that team holding could lead to positive member-ratings is that team members use
perceptions of how they worked together to evaluate performance, equating better processes to
better performance even if these perceptions are not accurate (Campion et al., 1996). I do not
hypothesize the effects of team holding on externally-rated performance because paper 2 found
that this factor did not predict external performance ratings.
Hypothesis 5a: Higher levels of team holding will be associated with higher levels of member-
rated team performance.
Paper 1 found that entrepreneurial teams that divided tasks with members as generalists
performed better than teams that had members specialize in different tasks. A reason for the
finding is that in innovative activities, where tasks are non-routine and knowledge is incomplete,
task generalization is preferred (Alder and Borys, 1996; Spender, 1995) because it enables team
members to have a better understanding of the issues faced by the whole team (Van de Ven,
1986).
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Hypothesis 5b: Entrepreneurial teams in which tasks are divided so that members are specialists
perform worse than entrepreneurial teams in which tasks are assigned to members who are
generalists.
The final set of hypotheses explores the effects of team external contacts on
entrepreneurial team performance. The previous chapter studied the effects of the backgrounds
of external contacts, the types of information and how the information was collected on
performance. The results showed that external contacts had limited effects on externally-rated
performance with only efficiency of information collection influencing performance. This
limited support for external activities on performance is surprising because several researchers
(e.g., Ancona and Caldwell, 1992a) have shown that external activities influence team
performance and as argued by Ancona and Caldwell (1998), in some instances, external
activities are better predictors of team peformance than a team's internal characteristics. One
possible reason is that external interactions should be studied in conjunction with a team's
internal characteristics, suggesting that both internal and external factors must be managed
simultaneously. This assertion is indirectly supported by Ancona and Caldwell's (1992a)
research: they found external effects on performance but their models included internal task
processes.
Following paper 3, the model in Figure 7.1 predicts that the type of information a team
collects from external contacts, the type of perspective (broad or narrow) that these contacts
bring to the team and the efficiency of information collection influence performance. Getting a
wider range of information is expected to be beneficial for entrepreneurial team performance
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1Hypothesis 6a: Entrepreneurial teams that are able to gather information in different areas
relating to a business plan would perform better than entrepreneurial teams that gather
information in fewer areas relating to preparing a business plan.
Hypothesis 6b: Entrepreneurial teams that are able to get information from people with a broad
perspective-such as venture capitalists, CEOs or people with founding experience-will
perform better than entrepreneurial teams with external contacts having a narrower perspective.
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because having and combining different types of information can lead to the discovery of
entrepreneurial opportunities (Nahapiet and Ghosal, 1998; Kirzner, 1997). Getting information
from contacts that provide a broad perspective (e.g., founders or CEOs) is beneficial because
advice from these contacts can strengthen a venture by helping the team in strategy development
(Schilit, 1996) and increasing the venture's chances of success (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992).
Finally, because entrepreneurial teams are resource-constrained (Casson, 1982), teams that are
efficient in information gathering should perform better than teams that are less efficient in
information gathering. The social capital literature (e.g., Granovetter, 1973) shows that gathering
information from weak ties is more efficient because those to whom one is closet to tend to move
in similar social circles and the information strong ties provide tends to be the same as that which
one already has. Granovetter (1973) explains that the strength of tie can be determined by the
frequency of interaction (greater frequency predicts stronger ties) and type of relationship (e.g.,
acquaintances are weak ties while family members are strong ties).
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Hypothesis 6c: Entrepreneurial teams with members having weak ties, as determined by the
nature of relationships, will perform better than entrepreneurial teams with members having
strong ties.
Hypothesis 6d: Entrepreneurial teams with members having weak ties, as determined by the
frequency of interactions, will perform better than entrepreneurial teams with members having
strong ties.
Research Method and Results
The methods used to measure the variables in Figure 7.1, with the exception of non-
functional diversity, had been described in previous chapters. This section only describes how
functional diversity was measured, followed by a description of the results.
Diversity of organization affiliation, as defined by the proportion of non-MIT members in
the team', was used as a proxy of non-functional diversity. This measure was used since
anecdotal evidence (e.g., Roberts, 1991a) suggested that many companies, such as DEC, were
formed by team members who belonged to the same organization. Powell and Foley (1998) in a
the literature review also found that people were likely to form groups with people-such as
Eighty percent of the participants, including at least one member in each team, were full-time MIT students. One
limitation of using the extent of MIT affiliation to measure diversity of organization affiliation is that in some cases
all the non-MIT team members came from one other organization (e.g., Harvard Business School) while in other
instances, they came from different organizations. Unfortunately, in some instances, the affiliations of the non-MIT
team members were not known and given the exploratory nature of this thesis, I decided to use this simple
classification as the proxy for diversity of organizational affiliation. Future studies should use a more fine-grained
measure to determine the affiliations of all members in the team.
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INSERT TABLES 7.1 AND 7.2 HERE
Model 1 (F=2.56, p<0.05, R2=0.15) showed that Industry (beta=-0.37, t=-2.56, p<0.01)
negatively predicted judges' ratings. The other variables of size (beta=0.17, t=1.18, n.s.) and
company level diversity (beta=-0.14, t=-0.99, n.s.) were not statistically significant. Model 2
(R2=0.36, t=4.54, p<0.01) added the internal variables of level of specialization and team
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colleagues-that were proximal to them. The model explores whether the tendency to select
members among people with common organizational affiliation has performance effects.
Twelve models were used to test Figure 7.1, with the results used to develop a revised
preliminary model of the factors influencing entrepreneurial team performance. Models 1 to 8
explored the direct effects of all the predictor variables, i.e., internal, external and diversity, on
judges' and member-ratings of performance. Model 1 regressed the control variables of size,
industry and managerial level diversity on judges' performance ratings. Model 2 added the
internal factors to model 1 while model 3 added the external factors to model 2. Model 4
regressed the effects of all the variables on judges' ratings. Models 5 to 8 were similar to that of
1 to 4 except that the independent variable was member-ratings of entrepreneurial team
performance. The next set of models 9 to 12 explored the effects of diversity, both functional and
nonfunctional (represented by extent of non-MIT affiliation) on team holding and range of
information from external contacts. The descriptive statistics, correlation coefficients together
with the models are attached in Tables 7.1 to 7.5. To be consistent with previous papers, team
size, industry and extent of managerial level diversity were controlled.
il-
holding. Both team holding (beta=-0.09, t=-2.06, p<0.05) and specialization (beta=-0.34, t=-2.70,
p<0.01) negatively predicted judges' rated performance. Reasons for these findings are discussed
in the next section.
Model 3 (R2=0.57, F=5.45, t<0.01) added external variables to Model 2. While previous
papers focused on external and internal factors separately, this model factored in both sets of
variables. As in Model 2, team holding (beta=-0.33, t=2.75, p<0.01) and specialization (beta=-
0.23, t=2.04, p<0.05) negatively predicted performance. There was partial support for the
benefits of engaging contacts that can provide a broad perspective (beta of experience level of
contact =0.23, t=1.87, p<0.10). The benefits of engaging weak ties was also partially supported
with frequency (beta=-0.23, t=1.98, p<O. 10) negatively predicting performance.
Model 4 (R2=0.57, F=4.85, p<0.01) added the functional diversity and extent of non-MIT
affiliation variables. The model showed that these antecedents to internal and external activities
did not directly predict performance. The results were mostly similar to Model 3 with two
exceptions. First, the strength of tie was statistically significant (beta=-0.42, t=-3.67, p<0.01)
while experience level of contact was not (beta=0.10, t=0.82, n.s.). However, the experience
level variable was in the direction predicted. Overall, Models 1 to 4 showed that both internal
and external factors influenced judges' ratings of performance while functional diversity and
non-functional diversity did not directly predict judges' ratings.
INSERT TABLES 7.3 HERE
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Models 5 to 8 explored the factors that influenced member-ratings of performance.
Model 5 (R2=0.10, F= 1.56, n.s.) included the control variables of size (beta=-0.14, t=-0.93, n.s.),
industry (beta=-0.16, t=-1.05, n.s.) and managerial level diversity (beta=-0.25, t=-1.67, n.s.). All
the control variables were not statistically significant. Model 6 included both the internal factors
of team holding (beta=0.23, t=1.54, n.s.) and level of specialization (beta=-0.22, t=1.57, n.s.).
Both variables were not statistically significant at the p<0.10 level. Model 7 (R2=0.32) included
the internal and external factors. The F statistics of 1.92 (p<0.10) provided partial support that
external and internal factors together predicted member performance ratings with team holding
(beta=0.26, t=1.68, p<0.10) and range of contacts (beta=0.08, t=0.53, p<0.05) positively
predicting member-ratings of performance. Model 8 included the direct effects of functional
diversity and extent of non-MIT affiliation on performance. As in Model 7, there was partial
support that team holding (beta=0.27, t=1.62, p<0.11) and range of information gathered from
external contacts (beta=0.36, t=2.28, p<0.05) positively predicted member-ratings of
entrepreneurial team performance. Functional and non-functional diversity did not directly
predict performance.
INSERT TABLES 7.4 AND 7.5 HERE
While the earlier models showed how the variables directed predicted performance, the
remaining models explored the effects of functional and non-functional diversity on team
activities. Model 9 presented the effects of functional diversity on range of information collected
from external contacts. The results showed that functional diversity (beta=-0.09, t=-0.79, n.s.)
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Discussion and Revised Preliminary Model
A summary of the results together with the beta coefficients is shown in Figure 7.2. This
revised preliminary model presents an initial attempt to have a comprehensive understanding of
the factors, both internal and external to the team, that influence entrepreneurial team
performance.
The results are in the direction found in the earlier papers with three new findings. First,
the model shows that the effects of non-functional diversity, as measured by the extent of non-
MIT affiliation, have the same effects on entrepreneurial team performance as functional
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did not predict range of information collected. Model 10 (R2=0.15, F=2.99, p<0.05) with a beta
coefficient of -0.28 (t=-2.17, p<0.05) showed that functionally diverse teams had lower levels of
team holding than less functionally diverse teams. This results of this model together with that of
Model 8 (the direct effects of all the predictor variables on member-ratings) suggested that
functional diversity had indirect negative effects on member-ratings but positive effects on
judges' ratings through the mediating variable of team holding.
Model 11 (R2 = 0.10, F=1.89 n.s.) showed that the extent of non-MIT affiliation did not
predict range of information collected (beta=-0.03, t=-0.26, n.s.) while Model 12 (R2=0.15,
F=3.11, t=0.05) suggested that the variable negatively predicted team holding (beta=-0.27, t=-
2.27, n.s.). As in the case of the functional diversity variable, this finding showed that teams with
more non-MIT affiliation indirectly predicted lower member-ratings but higher judges' ratings
through the mediating variable of team holding.
diversity. As compared to teams with more homogeneous membership, more diverse teams have
lower team holding, suggesting that the effect of diversity is to lower team holding. This result is
consistent with Ancona and Caldwell's (1998) assertion that diversity leads to lower team
boundedness. The second new finding is that all the external contact variables, with the
exception of expertise level of contacts, predict external-ratings. This finding is contrasted to
paper 3, where only the extent of past relationship (i.e., acquaintance as weak tie and family
member as strong tie) predicted externally-rated performance. The main difference between the
models in this study and that in paper 3 is that internal factors are included suggesting that
external factors should be studied in conjunction with how a team manages internal processes.
The third new finding is that team holding negatively predicts external performance ratings but
positively predicts member-performance ratings. One explanation for the negative association
between team holding and performance is that teams with higher holding (teams in this sample
have high holding with a mean of 5.27 on a seven-point scale), as compared to teams with lower
holding, could be less open to differing views (Janis, 1982) resulting in defective decision-
making strategies. However, the literature (e.g., Campion et al., 1986) also suggests that
members associate better internal processes to better performance, even if these perceptions are
not accurate. While previous studies (e.g., Gladstein, 1984) have shown that there could be
different member and external interpretations of performance, no study to my knowledge has
shown opposite performance effects.
The other findings are consistent with the previous three papers providing some support
for the robustness of the findings. To summarize the findings show that teams that divide tasks
such that members are generalists perform better than teams that divide tasks with members as
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specialists. This finding is expected because in innovative activities, where knowledge is
incomplete, doing different tasks enable members to better understand team issues (Van de Ven,
1986). The findings also show that while range of contacts positively predicts both internal and
external performance evaluations, efficiency of data gathering predicts member performance
evaluations. These findings suggest that both internal and external factors have performance
consequences.
For the control variables, industry negatively predicts performance, with a possible
reason illustrated by a judge who commented that some teams in technology related areas focus
on the technology instead of conceptualizing a whole business model. After including the
internal and external factors, size does not predict performance. This finding is unexpected since
within the range of team size (which tends to be small, e.g., Roberts, 1991a) in entrepreneurial
teams, larger teams should have access to more resources, without the corresponding process
losses of larger teams (West and Anderson, 1996). One possible reason that size does not matter
is that the benefits of larger teams have been accounted for by the internal and external factors in
this model. Finally, the control variable of diversity of managerial level negatively predicts
external-ratings. This finding is unexpected because one benefit of diverse membership is that
people of different backgrounds bring in different information (e.g., Burt, 1992) that in turn
predict entrepreneurial performance (e.g., Kirzner, 1997). Further research can explore the
reasons for this finding.
The remaining sections of this chapter conclude the dissertation by first comparing the
results with the existing team and entrepreneurship literatures before presenting the limitations of
the study that present opportunities for future research.
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The remaining sections of this chapter conclude the dissertation by first comparing the
results with the existing team and entrepreneurship literatures before presenting the limitations of
the study that present opportunities for future research.
COMPARING RESULTS WITH THE TEAM AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP LITERATURES
Comparing Results With the Team Literature
This study supports some findings in the team literature more than other findings. First, it
shows that there are different drivers of internal and external performance ratings. While several
researchers have shown differences between these ratings (e.g. Campion et al., 1996), this study
clarifies that external-ratings are influenced by team task design and how team members engage
external contacts while member-ratings are influenced by task processes. Although some
researchers (e.g., Hackman, 1987) assert that it is design that influences performance while
others (e.g., Senge, 1991) focus on internal factors, this study shows that both sets of researchers
are partially correct because different factors have different performance effects.
The thesis also finds that while diversity is beneficial to externally-rated performance, it
negatively predicts member-rated performance. This finding suggests that diversity needs to be
properly managed so that the negative effects on member perceptions of team performance do
not offset the benefits of diversity. Both sets of performance measures are important. While
positive external evaluations can lead to more funding (e.g., Roberts, 1991b) and lower failure
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rates (e.g., Shane and Foo, 1999), positive internal evaluations can increase member satisfaction
and continued team involvement (Hackman, 1987).
The study also clarifies the mechanisms through which diversity, both functional and
non-functional, affect entrepreneurial team performance. It shows that diversity influences
performance indirectly (and not directly) through some internal factors such as team holding and
not through the way member divide tasks. The finding that only some internal factors mediate
the effects of diversity on performance support Lawrence's (1997) assertion that mediating
effects must be studied in order to understand exactly how diversity influences performance.
This study, together with an increasing number of studies that use a mediated approach (e.g.
Barsade et al., 1998) can lead to a better understanding of diversity effects on performance.
The thesis supports previous studies that there are different dimensions of team identity
(Hinkle et al., 1989) and conflict (e.g., Jehn, 1995). However, the study also finds that the sub-
factors are highly correlated and subsequently have similar performance effects. Thus while
some researchers (e.g., Jehn, 1995) argue that task conflict can be beneficial to team performance
because it leads to a better understanding of team issues, promoting this conflict type could also
lead to negative consequences through relationship conflicts. This thesis using the conflict scale
developed by Jehn and associates (e.g., Jehn, et al., 1997) finds a two factor structure comprising
task and relationship conflicts. This finding is in the same direction of many past studies of a
two-factor conflict structure (e.g., Amason and Sapienza, 1997), showing no support for the
presence of process conflict found by Jehn (1995). To my knowledge only the research by Jehn
and associates have found the dimension of process conflict and future studies can test when this
conflict type exist.
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This thesis also highlights that the current way of describing team processes is too
unwieldy because many processes, including task conflict, relationship conflict, emotional
identity and goal congruence identity are highly correlated. A parsimonious model should be
developed, such as a two-factor structure comprising the team's ability to focus on common
objectives and the ability of members to avoid non-task related differences suggested in chapter
4. However, this thesis does not test the model, a task that is left for future research.
The study supports previous studies (e.g., Van de Ven, 1986) that in non-routine tasks,
dividing tasks such that members are generalists rather than specialists is beneficial for team
performance. This study adds to the literature by showing that in addition to task specialization
or generalization, a hybrid form of organizing combines both specialization and generalization.
The effect of this mode of labor division for new venture teams is to get performance benefits of
generalization without the negative performance effects of task specialization.
The thesis also replicates existing studies that both internal (e.g., West and Anderson,
1996) and external (e.g., Louis and Yan, 1996, Ancona and Caldwell, 1992a and 1992b) factors
influence performance. It also adds to the literature by showing that both factors need to be
studied together since without controlling for internal factors, few of the external factors
influence performance. In addition, while many existing studies (e.g., Louis and Yan, 1996) have
argued that external factors predict performance, this study adds to the literature by showing how
external factors matter. The thesis also shows that some social capital concepts (e.g., strong and
weak ties) can be integrated with the team literature. Future studies can explore whether other
social capital concepts such as density and centrality can also be used to better understand the
effects of external contacts on team performance.
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Finally, the study partially replicates existing studies (e.g., West and Anderson, 1996)
that for small teams, size positively predicts performance. However, when external factors are
included, size does not predict performance. One explanation is that the resources external
contacts bring into the teams have accounted for the benefits of larger teams. However, this
assertion is only tentative and future studies can explore how team size influences performance
and whether external resources can substitute for internal resources.
Comparing Results With the New Venture Literature
As a whole, this thesis adds to the new venture literature because little research has been
done on new venture teams (Cooper and Daily, 1996). In addition, this thesis adds to the factors
that influence early start-up success, a period that has received limited attention (Reynolds,
1996) but is an important stage because early experiences shape future routines (e.g.,
Stinchcombe, 1965; Burton, 1995:13), culture (e.g., Schein, 1983) and performance (e.g.,
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990). In particular, this thesis adds to the new venture team
literature by showing how members should design internal processes and structures and engage
people outside the team.
The thesis shows that short-term entrepreneurial teams that have good internal processes
as indicated by high levels of internal task processes, team holding, identity and low conflict
levels, have high member performance ratings. While this finding is not surprising, a surprising
finding is that higher holding levels in entrepreneurial teams predict lower externally-rated
performance. One reason for this finding is that team members tend to choose among people that
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However, resources can be gathered not only within the team but also through contacts
with people outside the team. This study replicates the findings in the entrepreneurship literature,
both the popular press (e.g., by Stevenson, Cruikshank and Moldoveanu (1998) titled Do lunch
or be lunch) and the academic research (e.g., Dubini and Aldrich, 1991), that external factors
influence entrepreneurial success. However, the study also finds that entrepreneurial teams must
engage external contacts strategically by gathering a wide range of information and to do that
efficiently. A tentative conclusion is that while entrepreneurs must "do lunch or be lunch," the
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they know (Shah and Jehn, 1993) and as a consequence, too much internal focus could lead to
groupthink (Janis, 1982). One tentative conclusion from this study is that the entrepreneurial
context is important to study because this context moderates the effects of different factors on
performance. This conclusion is only tentative because no other context is studied in the thesis.
In addition, the study replicates other studies (e.g., Vyakarnam et al., 1997) that
entrepreneurial teams are small, suggesting that larger entrepreneurial teams should perform
better than smaller teams. In addition, the study finds that there are benefits of having diverse
membership (for external evaluations). While there is some evidence that members are aware of
the need to build a diverse team as illustrated by a member (INT 13) that the team has to be "as
diverse as possible, diverse in [both] the technical side and in the business development side,"
the study finds that members tend to choose among those with similar functional backgrounds
and organizational affiliation. In INT 13 for example, all the team members were MIT students
with engineering majors. A caveat is that this is a short-term entrepreneurial team and future
studies should explore whether over the long term entrepreneurial teams become more or less
diverse.
'-- IL-
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LIMITATIONS OF STUDY POINTING TO AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The last section of this thesis discusses the limitations of this study and highlights
opportunities for future research. In particular, the section discusses the limitations of thesis
coverage, the thesis sample and the research method.
Limitations of Coverage
Since this thesis is an exploratory study of the factors influencing entrepreneurial team
performance, a broad range of factors was covered, with the consequence that only a limited
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findings in this study suggest that team members should also watch how and whom they do
lunch with.
Finally, this study supports other studies (Haar, Starr and MacMillan, 1988) that there are
industry effects on new venture performance, finding that ventures in technology related plans
have lower externally-rated performance than non-technology related plans. While this is only a
control variable and therefore no hypothesis is presented, the finding is surprising because many
people (e.g., Rosegrant and Lampe, 1992) have associated the Boston region as a hotbed of high-
technology start-ups. However, this finding of the benefits of non-high-technology firms on
performance is only tentative because the teams are only in the planning stages. It is possible that
during the implementation phase, potential investors will first decide to invest in high-
technology firms, before choosing among the better-conceived high-technology plans.
number of variables could be studied for each factor. For example, in team diversity, only one
type of functional diversity and one type of non-functional diversity were studied. Future studies
can explore each of these areas in greater detail to get more in-depth understanding of how each
factor influences new venture team performance. Moreover, there were high correlations among
the internal factors suggesting that some of these internal factors might not be different
processes. Future studies can develop more parsimonious models of team processes and use
scales derived from these models to better understand team performance.
Limitations of Sample
Chapter 3 argues that a business plan competition within MIT is a suitable sample
because it overcomes some problems of studying entrepreneurial teams including left censoring
biases, population identification and low response rates. In addition, the characteristics of the
sample resemble that of other entrepreneurial teams. However, there were several limitations of
using this sample. First, many of the participants were highly educated and wrote technology-
related plans. Thus it is uncertain whether the study's results are applicable to samples
comprising of less high-technology based products. As a first step towards increasing the
generalizability of the findings, future studies can replicate the study with other business plan
competitions. This should be easy to do given that there are over 50 business plan competitions
in the U.S. (Ballon 1998a, Ballon, 1998b). In addition, to test the generalizability of the findings
outside of business plan competitions, future research should also use other types of start-up
teams, such as founding teams from a sample of incubator company spin-offs.
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Second, these are short-term teams and the results might not apply to teams in later stages
of development. For example, while weak ties (i.e., acquaintances rather than family members)
can improve early stage performance, it is possible that strong ties may be beneficial at later
stages of development. Roberts (1992a) for example, surmise that many new ventures get
funding support from friends and family. Future studies can study the teams over time to
determine how internal and external activities predict performance over different team stages.
Third, the participants might have different motivations for joining the competition and
some participants might join the competition to gain experience in preparing a business plan,
with no intention of starting a business. However, this problem was minimized by the
competition's structure since the winners received half the prize money upon incorporation and
the remainder after demonstrating sufficient progress in their business ventures (sufficient
progress was left to the judges to determine). Future studies can also gather questions on the
participants' intentions for joining the competition and to use these intentions to control for
member motivations.
Limitations of Method
The high response rate in this study increased the confidence that the findings accurately
reflected the sample under scrutiny. In addition, the researcher was involved in the competition
as an organizer thereby increasing the amount of "inside" knowledge. However, there were
several limitations in the way the data were collected. First, information from team members
were collected only after the participants' submitted their entries and the time lapse between
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actual team activities and the submission deadline could result in recall biases. These biases were
compounded by the fact that some data were collected after the competition results were
announced. Future studies could collect information from the participants several times over the
competition process. For example one approach is to collect information through weekly logs
that tracked developments in team processes, structures and contacts with external contacts. This
method while increasing the richness of information collected would also minimize recall bias.
Second, while this study is on new venture teams in the early start-up phase, the teams
were tracked only after they had been formed and little was known about the team pre-formation
stage. Tracking teams from the pre-formation stage could lead to a better understanding of
factors that facilitated (or hindered) individuals in forming successful teams. For example, future
studies could track individuals from the time they indicate interest in participating in the
competition (e.g., they attend the competition events). A limitation of the approach is that the
population of nascent entrepreneurs is not known, a weakness that can be mitigated by getting
potential participants register their interest to participate in the competition a few months before
the competition deadline. Another possibility is to track individuals who approach agencies that
assist nascent entrepreneurs, such as the Singapore Trade Development Board, over time.
Third, the interviews only provide illustrations of team activities. More intensive
interviewing would enable the research to not only use these interviews for illustrative purposes
but to further understand new venture teams. For example, interviews with at least two members
of every team could be conducted. This would increase the chances that the interviews reflect the
views of the sample and allow the creation of a measure of within team agreement on team
processes. In addition, the interviews should be started early in the competition process to
minimize recall bias and not after the competition deadline as was the case in this study.
Finally, there were some limitations in the treatment of variables in the models. First,
only first order models were developed in this study. Some variables, such as size and team
holding could have curvilinear performance effects. However, these could not be modeled in this
study because of the high correlations among the variables and their squared term. Further, some
variables such as quality of external contact and the frequency of interaction could have
interaction effects on performance. Again, these interaction effects were not modeled because of
the high correlations between the variables and their interaction terms. Future studies with
greater variances in these variables (or larger sample sizes) can explore the curvilinear and
interaction effects of these variables on entrepreneurial team performance. Second, only a few
control variables were included because of the small sample size. Future studies with larger
sample sizes could include more control variables so that competing explanations for
entrepreneurial team performance can be ruled out (for example some researches [e.g., Becherer
and Maurer, 1999] argue that personalities can influence entrepreneurial success). Third, more
fine-grained measures of some control variables, such as industry, can be developed. In this
study a dichotomous variable of "high-technology" versus "non-high-technology" industry
control was used. A consequence was that different high-technology firms (e.g., computer
hardware and biotechnology) and different low-technology firms (e.g., funeral services and
volunteer services) were grouped together. Nevertheless, the relatively simple measure resulted
in significant and consistent performance differences between these industries.
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To conclude, this dissertation explores how different facets of short-term entrepreneurial
team activities influence performance with Figure 7.2 as the main study output. Future studies
can test this model and to increase both the breadth and depth of coverage. Other than the
theoretical contributions highlighted in the papers, the study gives some tentative suggestions as
to how members of early stage entrepreneurial teams can build high-performing ventures.
Entrepreneurial teams in this stage need to design good structures and processes and to develop a
network of contacts. In particular, entrepreneurial teams should be designed to divide tasks such
that members are generalists rather than specialists. Members of entrepreneurial teams should
also build teams with clear objectives and high levels of team identity. However members should
be cognizant that too much focus on internal factors could be detrimental to entrepreneurial team
performance. While cultivating external contacts, members of entrepreneurial teams must be
aware of the need to gather a wide range of information, and develop "weak" rather than
"strong" ties. Although the advice given above might seem obvious, the actions of the nascent
entrepreneurs in this study suggest otherwise. Members tend to build small teams, are not aware
of the need to assign tasks to generalists and for efficient information gathering.
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Figure 7.1. Preliminary Model of the Internal and External Factors Influencing Entrepreneurial Team Performance
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Figure 7.2. Revised Preliminary Model of the Internal and External Factors Influencing Entrepreneurial Team Performance
PERFORMANCE
EXTERNAL FACTORS CONTROL VARIABLES
**=p<.01, *=p<.05, t=p<.10
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Table 7.1. Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations for the Dependent and Independent Variables.
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1 Judges' Ratings of Performance (JudRate) 2.95 0.55 1
2 Member-Ratings of Performance (MemRate) 4.93 0.66 0.24 1
3 Size (Size) 4.05 1.8 0.19 -0.12 1
4 Industry (Industry) 0.77 0.43 -0.4 -0.1 0.02 1
5 Managerial Level Diversity (CoyLvl) 0.68 0.31 0.13 -0.04 0.18 -0.24 1
6 Team Holding (Hold) 5.27 0.86 -0.17 0.46 -0.27 0.04 -0.18 1
7 Level of Specialization (Spec) 0.38 0.18 -0.22 -0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.09 0.2 1
8 Range of External Contacts (Range) 0.29 0.25 0.22 0.26 0.25 -0.07 0.23 -0.03 -0.03 1
9 Experience Level of External Contacts (Level) 2.48 0.57 0.19 0.15 0.12 -0.02 -0.05 0 -0.15 0.3 1
10 Frequency of Contact (Freq) 1.79 0.91 -0.1 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.15 -0.28 -0.08 0.2 0.03 1
11 Relationship with Contact (Relation) 2.23 0.66 -0.23 0.12 0.02 0 0.02 0.03 0.14 0.19 0.07 0.04 1
12 Functional diversity (Functional) 0.59 0.24 0.09 -0.05 0.35 -0.05 -0.37 -0.30 -0.03 0.01 -0.21 0.05 0.12 1
13 Extent NonMIT Affiliation (NonMIT) 0.19 0.21 0.22 -0.16 0.21 0.02 0.26 -0.29 0.17 0.12 -0.01 0.10 0.20 0.06
Correlations of .24 and above statistically significant at p< 0.05 level (2-tailed)
Correlations of .35 and above statistically significant at p< 0.01 level (2-tailed)
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Table 7.2. Regressions Predicting the Effects of Team Internal and External Factors on
Judges' Ratings of Entrepreneurial Team Performance
**=p<. 0 1 , *=p<.05, t=p<.10
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Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Beta (S.E.) t Beta (S.E.) T Beta (S.E.) t Beta (S.E.) t
Size 0.17 0.04 1.18 0.07 0.04 0.55 0.06 0.04 0.49 0.09 0.04 0.77
Industry -0.37 0.2 ** -2.56 -0.39 0.18 ** -3.02 -0.37 0.15 ** -3.27 -0.35 0.15 ** -3.13
CoyLvl -0.14 0.3 -0.99 -0.22 0.27 -1.63 -0.22 0.24 t -1.85 -0.25 0.28 t -1.87
Hold 
-0.28 0.09 * -2.06 -0.33 0.08 ** -2.75 -0.29 0.09 * -2.21
Spec 
-0.34 0.39 ** -2.7 -0.23 0.35 * -2.04 -0.27 0.36 * -2.28
Range 
-0.4 0.1 ** -3.52 0.22 0.30 t 1.73
Level 0.23 0.3 t 1.87 0.10 0.11 0.82
Frequency 
-0.23 0.07 t -1.98 -0.23 0.07 f -1.97
Relation 0.1 0.11 0.85 -0.42 0.10 ** -3.67
Functional 
-0.07 0.35 -0.50
NonMIT 0.16 0.32 1.38
R2 0.15 0.36 0.57 0.59
F-stats 2.56 * 4.53 ** 5.45 ** 4.69 **
-----; -- -- I--- ; -; : - --- - -, -'- I- ---------- I- ---.; I-- ,.--"~--~
Table 7.3. Regressions Predicting the Effects of Team Internal and External Factors on
Member-Ratings of Entrepreneurial Team Performance
**=p<.0 1, *=p<.05, t=p<. 11
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Variables Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Beta (S.E.) t Beta (S.E.) T Beta (S.E.) t Beta (S.E.) t
Size -0.14 0.05 -0.93 -0.09 0.05 -0.64 -0.09 0.05 -0.62 -0.18 0.05 -1.21
Industry -0.16 0.21 -1.05 -0.14 0.21 -0.99 -0.12 0.2 -0.82 -0.11 0.20 -0.82
CoyLvl -0.25 0.32 -1.67 -0.2 0.32 -1.35 -0.26 0.32 t -1.77 -0.14 0.36 -0.85
Hold 0.23 0.11 1.54 0.26 0.11 t 1.68 0.27 0.12 t 1.617
Spec 
-0.22 0.46 -1.57 -0.14 0.46 -0.96 -0.10 0.46 -0.72
Range 0.32 0.4 * 2.01 0.36 0.40 * 2.282
Level 0.04 0.15 0.25 0.07 0.15 0.46
Frequency 0.13 0.09 0.87 0.11 0.09 0.777
Relation 0.02 0.13 0.14 0.03 0.13 0.22
Functional Diversity 0.25 0.46 1.467
NonMIT 
-0.16 0.42 -1.07
R2 0.1 0.18 0.32 0.36
F-stats 1.56 n.s. 1.85 n.s. 1.92 t 2.02 *
:- ----;----- ;- -- -- ------ -,----- ---- ------ ----- - ---- ------- - ; - -~-.~ _......_.____ _ _..~. ~
Table 7.4. Effects of Functional Diversity on Range of Information Gathered From
External Contacts and Team Holding.
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Variables Model 9 Model 10
Range Information Team Holding
Beta (S.E.) T Beta (S.E.) t
Size 0.46 0.01 ** 4.24 -0.12 0.06 -0.94
Industry -0.14 0.06 -1.29 -0.03 0.24 -0.25
CoyLvl -0.36 0.08 ** -3.22 -0.24 0.36 t -1.89
CoFunc -0.09 0.09 -0.79 -0.28 0.51 * -2.17
R2 0.27 0.15
F-stats 6.32 ** 2.99 *
;:--;-- - I - -- ;-- - --- - ,- ---- - -- -- --- --- -- ---- ------ I- - - .- -,;.--
- ----------------
**=p<.01, *=p<.05, t=p<. 10
Table 7.5. Effects of Non-Functional Diversity on Range of Information Gathered From
External Contacts and Team Holding
**=p<.0 1 , *=p<.05, t=p<.10
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Variables Model 11 Model 12
Range Information Team Holding
Beta (S.E.) t Beta (S.E.) t
Size 0.22 0.02 t 1.87 -0.22 0.05 t -1.95
Industry -0.02 0.07 -0.20 0.01 0.23 0.06
CoyLvl 0.19 0.10 1.55 -0.06 0.34 -0.52
NonMIT -0.03 0.15 -0.26 -0.27 0.48 * -2.27
R2 0.10 0.15
F-stats 1.89 n.s. 3.11 *
__~
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Appendix 1. List of Judges for the MIT $50K Competition
Name Affiliation
Brad Feld Partner, Softbank Ventures and Founder,
Intensity Ventures
Mark Gorenberg Partner, Hummer Winblad Venture
Partners
Joseph Hadzima Jr. Senior VP, Quantum Engery Technologies
Dan Hart Founder, Fundamental
Adam Honig Founder and President, Open Environment
Corporation, C-bridge Internet Solutions
Mitch Kapor Founder, Lotus Development Corporation
and Co-founder, Electronic Frontier
Foundation
Omar Khudari Founder, Papyrus, Viaweb
Duncan McCallum Partner, OneLiberty Ventures
Ed Miller Partner, Testa, Hurwitz and Thibeault
David Morgenthaler Founder, Morgenthaler Ventures
Jean Notis-McConarty Partner, Coopers and Lybrand
John Piccione Partner, Sullivan and Worcester
Edmund Pitcher Partner, Testa, Hurwitz and Thibeault
E. Robin Plumer Partner, Wolf, Greenfield and Sacks
J. William Poduska Founder, Prime Computer, Apollo
Computer
Dan Roach Director of High Technology Services,
Coopers and Lybrand
Dan Schwinn Founder, Shiva Corporation, Avidyne
Corporation
Blair Whitaker Partner, Norwest Venture Capital
George Zachary Partner, Mohr, Davidow Ventures
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Team Name [Replace with team name] Judge Name [Replace with your full name.
Include how you would like
teams to contact you (if at all)
- e.g. at final awards on 5/7,
via email, call to arrange 15
min. conference call, etc.]
Overall Business Idea
[Replace this text with at least 1) one thing the team did well, 2) one constructive suggestion to help the
team move forward, and 3) one overall burning question.]
Opportunity Statement/Elevator Speech
[Replace this text with at least one burning question.]
Market Opportunity and Strategy
[Replace this text with at least one burning question.]
Competitive Position
[Replace this text with at least one burning question.]
Product
[Replace this text with at least one burning question.]
Execution: Financial/Operational/Team
[Replace this text with at least one burning question.]
Presentation
[Replace this text with an assesment of the presentation of the executive summary and the full business
plan. NOTE: This is an evaluation of the presentation, not the content.]
Quick Check
In this executive summary, does the team clearly: (place an X
Poor Better
in the box, 5 is better)
Poor Better
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1. Define the customer 6. Differentiate from competitors
2. Say who pays for the 7. Protect the competitive
product/service advantage
3. Show high potential 8. Balance the team
4. Describe the product/service 9. Substantiate claims
5. Analyze the competitors 10. Quantify the business model
Additional Comments
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Appendix 2. Form Used by the Judges to Evaluate the Teams
1998 MIT $50K Entrepreneurship Competition
Full Business Plan Feedback
Appendix 3. Questionnaire sent to the MIT $1K participants in November 20, 1997
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Dear $1K Warm-Up Business Idea Competition participant,
This questionnaire seeks to understand Teambuilding issues among participants of the MIT $50K
Business Plan Competition. The information will be used to improve the management of the
MIT $50K Competition and the data for Maw Der's Ph.D. thesis. The survey should take about
20 to 25 minutes to complete. Please mail the survey by 04 December 1997 to the address below.
Your responses will be kept completely confidential. Only the lead investigators of the $50K
Teambuilding project will have access to the information. Your data is important and we hope
that you will fill the questionnaire as completely as possible. You may however skip any
question you do not wish to answer.
In each section, you will be given specific instructions. Please answer each question as best and
frankly as you can. Some of the questions will seem repetitive. This is not to test you; rather it is
a method researchers use to measure opinions more effectively. Feel free to jot comments in the
margin if any of the questions prompt additional thoughts.
Thank you in advance for your cooperation. We hope you will find the questionnaire interesting
and thought provoking. Use the enclosed envelope to return the questionnaire via
interdepartmental mail to Maw-Der Foo. If you do not have access to interdepartmental mail, use
regular mail and the cost of postage will be refunded to you.
Maw-Der Foo
MIT Sloan School of Management
50 Memorial Drive, Room E52-511
Cambridge, MA 02139
(617) 253-6680
foomd@mit.edu
Thank you for completing this survey. Please mail your
responses by 04 December 1997. As a token of our appreciation,
a small gift will be given to you for your kind participation.
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Name :
Throughout this questionnaire, questions will refer to your team. When answering questions
about your team, please consider only the people listed below as part of your team.
1. **Names of team members omitted in this appendix**
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
If you feel that other individuals who are not listed above have been integral members of the
team, write their names below. However, when answering the questionnaire DO NOT include
them in the team. Thank you.
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Team Name :
Section I
Listed below are some statements that could describe how your team goes about carrying out its
tasks. Try to be as objective as you can in considering each statement - regardless of whether
you like or dislike being on this team.
Write a number in the blank for each statement, based on this scale :
Mostly Slightly
Inaccurate Inaccurate
Uncertain Slightly
Accurate
6 7
Mostly Very
Accurate Accurate
Coordl. Team members do a good job coordinating their activities.
Mix 1. Members of this team are so different from one another that we have serious difficulties
even understanding one another.
Stratl. Our team comes up with innovative ways of proceeding with the work that turn out to be
just what is needed.
Intl. The team is able to define its goals.
Coord2. The team has done a good job of figuring out how work will flow among team
members.
Strat2. This team is able to change the way we work when a problem requires a different
approach.
Int2. The team is able to develop workable plans.
Mix2. Members of this team are so much alike that it is as if we are peas from the same pod.
Coord3. Team members have developed effective plans and procedures to coordinate work.
Int3. The team is able to prioritize work and determine which aspects of the work are
important.
Mix3. This team has a good "mix" of members - a diverse set of people who bring different
perspectives and experiences to the work.
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1
Very
Inaccurate
Section 2
This section asks you about how tasks are allocated and decisions are made in the team.
1. Put an [X] against the statement that best describes how your team makes main decisions.
One member makes most of the key decisions for the team.
One member makes most of the key decisions for the team after consulting other team
members individually, without bringing the team together as a group.
One member makes most of the key decisions for the team after consulting all team members
as a group.
Team decision making is shared but members have greater influence in their areas of
specialization.
The team makes most decisions together as a group.
2. Estimate the length of time that you spent working on $1K activities:
Effl. How many hours did you spend working with your team during the last week of the $1K
competition? hours.
Eff2. How may hours did you spend working individually during the last week of the $1K
competition? hours.
Eff3. What percentage of team meetings did you attend during the last week of the $1K
Competition? percent
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Task Allocation
3. Teams divide up work differently. We hope to understand how your team allocates tasks. In
the table below list the tasks each member specializes in. Give an overall evaluation whether
each member is a team specialist, generalist or both. A specialist participates in a few key tasks
or decisions. A generalist participates in the full range of team decisions and tasks. Three
examples are shown below.
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Team Member Tasks member specializes in
Peter Smith Focuses mostly on financial projections and marketing
plan
Jane Louis Participates in all tasks except developing prototype.
Considered to be team leader.
Doug Joe Participates in all tasks and focuses on writing computer
codes
___________________________________ I _________________________________________________________________________________________________
_ ___ ~
Section 3 - Team external relations
Developing a business concept often involves the assistance of people outside the team. In the
table below, list all the people that were important to your team during the $1 K competition.
Include the position they hold, the type and extent of interaction and prior relationship. Add
more rows if necessary. Two examples are shown.
Name Position Type and extent of Interaction Prior relationship
Ed. Roberts Prof. in Sloan School, Team member Peter meets with him on Took his Management
Management of average once a week to get feedback on of Technology class.
Technology the development of our business concept.
Margaret Smith Financial controller, I called her once to check method to do Mother of my MIT
IBM financial projections. course 6 classmate.
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1 I I
Write a number in the blank for each statement, based on this scale :
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Very Mostly Slightly Uncertain Slightly Mostly Very
Inaccurate Inaccurate Inaccurate Accurate Accurate Accurate
BM 1. This team does a good job obtaining the resources needed to do its work.
BM2. Team members take it upon themselves to go to external resources to obtain
needed materials, personnel, or information.
BM3. Members of this team are good at interacting with outside sources to get information to
aid in determining what the product or service should be.
BM4. It is often hard to figure out who is and who is not a member of this team.
BM5. Members of this team clearly view themselves as a team of people who work closely
together, not as a collection of individuals who have their own particular job to do.
BM6. To what extent has this team tried to create a clear sense of identity and purpose?
BM7. To what extent has this team made an effort to develop an image
that distinguishes it from other teams?
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Section 4 - Team functioning
Below are a number of statements that could describe how members of a team work together.
Please indicate how accurately each statement describes the dynamics in your team.
Write a number in the blank for each statement, based on this scale :
1
Very
Inaccurate
SocIn 1.
SocIn2.
Socln3.
SocIn4.
SocIn5.
SocIn6.
SocIn7.
SocIn8.
SocIn9.
Not Much
at all
Mostly Slightly
Inaccurate Inaccurate
Uncertain Slightly
Accurate
Mostly Very
Accurate Accurate
The members of the team are quick to defend each other from criticism by outsiders.
The successes of other members of the team help me achieve my own objectives.
Everyone's input is incorporated into the most important team decisions.
The members of the team get along very well.
Relationships between members of the team are best characterized by "win-lose"; if
he/she wins, I lose.
The members of the team are always ready to cooperate and help each other.
When final decisions are reached, it is common for at least one member of the team to
be unhappy with the decision.
There is a great deal of competition between members of the team.
The members of the team really stick together.
A Lot
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ConRl. How much friction was there among team members?
ConTL. How often do people in your team disagree about opinions regarding
the work being done?
ConPl. To what extent did you disagree about the procedures in your team?
ConR2. How much were there personality conflicts among team members?
ConT2. How frequently are there conflicts about ideas in your team?
ConP2. To what extent did you disagree about the way to do things in your team?
ConR3. How much tension was there among team members?
ContT3. How much conflict about the work you do was there is your team?
ConP3. How frequently were there disagreements about who should do what in your team?
ConR4. How much emotional conflict was there among team members?
ContT4. To what extent are there differences of opinion in your work unit?
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Section 5 - Individual and team outcomes
Each of the statements below is something that a person might say about his or her team. Please
indicate you own personal feelings about your team.
Write a number in the blank for each statement, based on this scale :
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Very Mostly Slightly Uncertain Slightly Mostly Very
Inaccurate Inaccurate Inaccurate Accurate Accurate Accurate
Iden 1. I identify with this team.
Iden2. I am glad to belong to this team.
Iden3. I feel held back by this team.
Iden4. I think this team worked well together.
Satl. I am satisfied with this team.
Iden5. I see myself as an important part of this team.
Iden6. I do not fit in well with the other members of this team.
Iden7. I do not consider the team to be important.
Iden8. I feel uneasy with the members of this team.
Iden9. I feel strong ties to this team.
Sat2. Circle the face that best describes your feelings toward the team. )): ): © (: (:
How does your team rate on each of the following?
Write a number in the blank for each statement, based on this scale :
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Deeply Exceeds my
disappointing my expectations
Perfl. Efficiency of team operations.
Perf2. Quality of work we produce.
Perf3. Number of innovations or new ideas introduced by the team.
Perf4. Our adherence to schedules.
Perf5. Our reputation for work excellence.
Perf6. Our overall performance.
Thank you for completing this survey. Mail your responses to be
received by 04 December 1997.
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Appendix 4. Email Sent to the MIT $50K Participants on February, 26 1998 Informing
Them that a Questionnaire Would be Sent to Them.
Dear $namefile$,
[Note: The email program automatically substitutes $name$ with the participant's name,
so that each participant is addressed by name]
Teams participating in the $50K Competition have started many businesses with over $30
Million invested in them. Unfortunately, little is known about the influence of the teams'
early experiences and their ability to start successful companies.
You are one of the participants in a competition that will lead to future leading firms. As
such, we hope to have your opinion on team issues that you faced during this
competition. Given the diverse characteristics of the participants, it is essential that we
get your views so that a complete picture of levers of team success can be determined.
This study is sponsored by the Kauffman Foundation and the MIT $50K Competition.
A questionnaire seeking your experiences during the Executive Summary phase of the
$50K competition is being sent to you. If by any chance you do not receive this
questionnaire by Tuesday, Mar 4 1998, please email me at foomd@mit.edu or call (617)
253-6680. I will make sure that a copy will be sent to you immediately.
Sincerely,
Maw-Der Foo
Project Coordinator
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Appendix 5. Questionnaire Mailed to the MIT $50K Participants on February 27, 1998
Requesting that they Return it by March 8, 1998.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Room E52-511 Telephone: (617) 253-6680
Sloan School of Management 50 Memorial Drive Facsimile: (617) 253-2660
Behavioral & Policy Sciences Cambridge, MA 02139 E-Mail: foomd@mit.edu
[Team Name] Feb 25, 1998
Dear [Participant Name],
Past participants of the MIT $50K Competition have started over 26 companies with over $30 million invested in
them. What are the factors that facilitate the transition from business plans to new venture formation? How did the
teams work together during the pre-firm phase of existence? How did they make use of internal and external
resources? How did the teams perform? Unfortunately, little is known about the early experiences of the teams
participating in the MIT $50K Competition.
You are one of the people that are being asked to give your opinion about your team experiences in this competition.
The $50K Competition is participated by a wide range of people from undergraduate to graduate students as well as
non-students. In order that the results will truly represent the early experiences of a wide range of participants, it is
important that each questionnaire be completed and returned. Over the course of the $1K competition, the
questionnaire has been pre-tested for its ability to predict team performance.
You are assured of complete confidentiality. The questionnaire has an identification number for matching purposes
only. This is so that we may check your name off the mailing list when your questionnaire is returned. Your identity
will never be placed on the questionnaire.
The results of this research will be made available to the sponsors of this project, the Ewing Marion Kauffman
Foundation and the MIT $50K Competition. Only summaries will be reported and no teams will be identified. Your
responses will in no way affect your performance in the competition. You may receive a summary of results by
writing "copy of results requested" on the back of the return envelope, and printing your name and address below it.
Please do not put this information on the questionnaire itself.
I will be most happy to answer any questions you might have. Please write, email or call. The email address is
foomd@mit.edu and the telephone number is (617) 253-6680.
Thank you for your assistance. Enclosed is a small gift as a token of our appreciation.
Sincerely,
Maw-Der Foo
Project Coordinator
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Building
Tomorrow's
Leading Firms
Alumni of the MIT $50K
Competition have started successful
companies. What common
characteristics did these teams have?
How did they work together during
the competition? What resources did
they gather? How did the teams
perform at this early stage?
Understanding these questions is in
essence the scope of this project.
Please answer the questions. If
you wish to comment on any
questions or qualify your answers,
please feel free to use the space in
the margins. Your comments will
be read and taken into account.
The $50K Teambuilding Project is
sponsored by the Ewing Marion
Kauffman Foundation and the
MIT $50K Competition.
Please return this questionnaire to
Maw-Der Foo
MIT Sloan School of Management
Rm E52-511, Cambridge, MA
02139
Thank you for your help.
218
In the sections, you are asked about your team. Please consider only the people
listed in your team entry as part of your team. A list of these people is in page 3 of
this survey.
Section 1
Listed below are some statements that could describe how your team goes about
carrying out its tasks. Please write a number in the blank for each statement, based
on this scale:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Very Mostly Slightly Uncertain Slightly Mostly Very
Inaccurate Inaccurate Inaccurate Accurate Accurate Accurate
1. The team is able to define its goals.
2. This team is able to change the way we work when a problem requires a
different approach.
3. This team has a good "mix" of members - a diverse set of people who
bring different perspectives and experiences to the work.
4. Our team comes up with innovative ways of proceeding with the work
that turn out to be just what is needed.
5. The team is able to prioritize work and determine which aspects of the
work are important.
6. Members of this team are so different from one another that we have
serious difficulties even understanding one another.
7. The team is able to develop workable plans.
8. Members of this team are so much alike that it is as if we are peas from
the same pod.
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Section 2
This section asks you about how tasks are allocated and decisions are made in the
team.
1. Please circle the number that best describes how your team makes main
decisions.
1 ONE MEMBER MAKES MOST OF THE KEY DECISIONS FOR
THE TEAM.
2 ONE MEMBER MAKES MOST OF THE KEY DECISIONS FOR
THE TEAM AFTER CONSULTING OTHER TEAM MEMBERS
INDIVIDUALLY, WITHOUT BRINGING THE TEAM TOGETHER AS
A GROUP.
3 ONE MEMBER MAKES MOST OF THE KEY DECISIONS FOR THE
TEAM AFTER CONSULTING ALL TEAM MEMBERS AS A GROUP.
4 TEAM DECISION-MAKING IS SHARED BUT MEMBERS HAVE
GREATER INFLUENCE IN THEIR AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION.
5 THE TEAM MAKES MOST DECISIONS TOGETHER AS A
GROUP.
In the next three questions, please estimate the length of time that you spent during
the last week of the executive summary phase of the competition:
2. How many hours did you spend working with your team?
3. How may hours did you spend working individually?
4. What percentage of team meetings did you attend?
HOURS
HOURS
PERCENT
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Section 2b
We hope to understand how your team allocates tasks. In the table below, would
you please list the tasks each member specializes in. Please give an overall
evaluation whether each member is a team specialist, generalist or both. A
specialist participates in a few key tasks or decisions. A generalist participates in
the full range of team decisions and tasks. Three examples are shown below.
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Team Tasks member specializes in Special- Genera
Member ist 1-ist
Peter Smith Focuses mostly on financial projections X
and marketing plan
Jane Louis Participates in all tasks except developing X
prototype. Considered to be team leader.
Doug Joe Participates in all tasks and focuses on X X
writing computer codes
---k -Fi illi---i-~- rP19PL T~-
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Team Tasks member specializes in Special- Genera
Member ist 1-ist
-.... i~-- -il -C ~DP YPbii;-
Section 3a
Team external relations. Developing a business concept often involves the
assistance of people outside the team. In the table below, would you please list all
the people that were important to your team during this stage of the competition.
Include the position they hold, the type and extent of interaction and prior
relationship. Add more rows if necessary at the end of this booklet. Two examples
are shown.
Name Position Type and extent of Prior
Interaction relationship
Ed. Prof. In Sloan Team member Peter meets Took his
Roberts School, Management with him on average once Management
of Technology a week to get feedback on of
the development of our Technology
business concept. class.
Margaret Financial controller, I called her once to check Mother of my
Smith IBM method to do financial MIT course 6
projections. classmate.
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Section 3b
Our next concern is about the team's perception of external relations. Please write a
number in the blank for each statement, based on this scale :
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Very Mostly Slightly Uncertain Slightly Mostly Very
Inaccurate Inaccurate Inaccurate Accurate Accurate Accurate
1. This team does a good job obtaining the resources needed to do its
work.
2. Team members take it upon themselves to go to external resources to
obtain needed materials, personnel, or information.
3. Members of this team are good at interacting with outside sources to get
information to aid in determining what the product or service should be.
4. It is often hard to figure out who is and who is not a member of this
team.
5. Members of this team clearly view themselves as a team of people who
work closely together, not as a collection of individuals who have their
own particular job to do.
6. This team tried to create a clear sense of identity and
purpose?
7. This team made an effort to develop an image
that distinguishes it from other teams?
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Section 4
Another important purpose of this study is to learn more about how team members
work together. Please indicate how accurately each statement describes the
dynamics in your team.
Write a number in the blank for each statement, based on this scale :
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Very Mostly Slightly Uncertain Slightly Mostly Very
Inaccurate Inaccurate Inaccurate Accurate Accurate Accurate
1. I identify with this team.
2. I am glad to belong to this team.
3. I feel held back by this team.
4. I think this team worked well together.
5. I am satisfied with this team.
6. I see myself as an important part of this team.
7. I do not fit in well with the other members of this team.
8. I do not consider the team to be important.
9. I feel uneasy with the members of this team.
10. I feel strong ties to this team.
11. Circle the face that best describes your feelings )): ): © (: ((:
toward the team.
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Write a number in the blank for each statement, based on this scale :
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not much A lot
at all
12. How much friction was there among team members?
13. How often do people in your team disagree about opinions regarding
the work being done?
14. To what extent did you disagree about the procedures in your team?
15. How much were there personality conflicts among team members?
16. How frequently are there conflicts about ideas in your team?
17. To what extent did you disagree about the way to do things in your
team?
18. How much tension was there among team members?
19. How much conflict about the work you do was there is your team?
20. How frequently were there disagreements about who should do what
in your team?
21. How much emotional conflict was there among team members?
22. To what extent are there differences of opinion in your work unit?
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Section 5
Our next concern is the outcomes of your team.
Write a number in the blank for each statement, based on this scale :
Deeply
Disappointing
Exceeds
My Expectations
1. Efficiency of team operations.
2. Quality of work we produce.
3. Number of innovations or new ideas introduced by the team.
4. Our adherence to schedules.
5. Our reputation for work excellence.
6. Our overall performance.
Section 6
Finally, we would like to ask a few questions to understand your background.
1. Your sex (Circle number of your answer)
1 MALE
2 FEMALE
2. Your present age : YEARS
3. Your race : (Circle number)
1 WHITE/CAUCASIAN
2 AFRICAN-AMERICAN
3 HISPANIC
4 AMERICAN INDIAN
5 ASIAN
6 ASIAN-AMERICAN
7 OTHERS (PLEASE SPECIFY) :
4. Your nationality :
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Is there anything else you would like to tell us about your team? If so, please use
this space for that purpose.
Also, any comments you wish to make that you think may help us in future efforts
to understand factors creating tomorrow's leading firms will be appreciated, either
here or in a separate letter.
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Your contribution to this effort is very greatly appreciated.
Please mail your responses by March 8 1998.
I 3LsiiYf -
Appendix 6. Postcard Mailed to the MIT $50K Participants on March 5, 1998 Reminding Them
to Complete the Questionnaire.
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March 5, 1998
Last week a questionnaire seeking your opinion about team
experiences in the $50K Competition was mailed to you. Your
name was drawn from the participants in this competition.
If you have already completed and returned it to us please accept
our sincere thanks. If not, please do so today. Because there are
only a small number of participants, it is extremely important that
yours also be included in the study if the results are to accurately
represent the opinions of the teams.
If by some chance you did not receive the questionnaire, or it got
misplaced, please call me right now, 617-253-6680 or email,
foomd@mit.edu and I will get another one in the mail to you
today.
Sincerely,
Maw-Der Foo
Project Coordinator
iim.-r;- -~^
Appendix 7. Reminder Letter Mailed to the MIT $50K Participants on March 18, 1998
Requesting that They Complete the Questionnaire.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Sloan School of Management
Behavioral & Policy Sciences
Room E52-511
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02139
Telephone: (617)253-6680
Facsimile: (617) 253-2660
E-Mail: foomd@mit.edu
18 March 1998
HIS~aDear [participant name],
Yes, me again. I know we've been pushing, cajoling and pleading for responses to our questionnaire
and you're probably tried of hearing from us. I apologize for adding to an already stressful time when
you have many things to do.
But this is my dissertation and we are trying to learn about what makes $50K teams effective. So once
again I am asking that you help us out and fill in the questionnaire.
If you could spare even a little bit of time - you will make a big difference
and I hope you won't hear from me much more. In the event that your
misplaced, a replacement is enclosed.
in this research. Thanks
questionnaire has been
Cordially,
Maw-Der Foo
Project Coordinator
P.S. A number of people have written to say that they had limited involvement with
their teams during the Executive Summary phase of the competition. If this applies to you,
please also complete the questionnaire because the questions mostly concern how you feel
about your team rather than how much you know about certain things.
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Appendix 8. Interview Guide Used in the Semi-structured Interviews from April 20, 1999
to May 5, 1999.
Interview Guide
General questions
1. How did the business concept evolve?
Prompt:
Who initiated it?
How did it develop over time?
Did the team have the concept before or after deciding to join the competition?
2. We are trying to understand the process through which a team is formed. Can you
describe how each team member was identified? Which members knew one another
before the team was formed? In what context and for how long?
Prompt:
Friend of a team member
Someone that member have worked together in the past
Introduced by someone? Who? Within or outside the team?
Met at a $50K activity. Which activity?
3. Why that person was selected?
Prompt:
Was there a need that had to be filled?
Was it a good friend or spouse that the team member wanted to include?
Was it someone that team member had worked for and had good opinions about?
Was it someone that the team member trusts?
Team fit: what criteria?
Credential? What credential?
Industry or business experience? What experience?
Specialized skill. What skill?
Overall motivation and drive?
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Team Activities
4. How many meetings did your team have? How long did each meeting last? Where did
you meet?
5. Describe a typical team meeting.
Prompt:
Who is the lead person?
How are decisions made?
How are conflicts resolved?
6. What are the major activities of the team for the competition? How long did the team
spend on the activity? What are the outcomes?
7. We are interested in the milestone events that have shaped your team.
Milestones are those events or transitions that signal a clear change in the team. They are
events that an historian of your team could not overlook. Examples might be a change of
goals, leadership, a new product or losing an important team member. Please describe the
important milestone events for your team, their approximate dates and why they
occurred.
Team structure
8. How is work divided among team members?
9. What kinds of things do you do together? What things do you do separately?
10. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the team?
Prompt:
Comprehensive skills
Member satisfaction
Getting the job done successfully
Good interpersonal processes
Good performance
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11. How serious is your team in setting up a business in future? Who has agreed to do that?
Is this just a business plan contest to gain experience or a step towards starting a real
business?
12. What is the biggest resource constraint in your team? What additional resources does the
team need to perform well?
13. If there is one thing different that you could change in the team, what would that be?
External Members
14. The process of founding a new company often involves a number of external partners or
advisors including lawyers, advisors, experienced entrepreneurs, $50K organizers,
professors, fellow students. We would like to know who was involved in the founding of
your team.
15. How did they become involved?
Prompt:
$50K Entrepreneurship Competition events. Which ones?
Contacts? Which contacts?
Relatives
Friends, (in what context)
Recommendations. Whose recommendations?
Active search. How? Where?
16. The type of interaction with the external contacts.
Prompt:
How often and how long each meeting
Where do they meet - in the person's office? With the team during their meetings?
Are they still involved?
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17. What did they contribute and how have they affected the team?
Prompt:
Business concept
Money
Advice - what advice
Financial planning or advice
Market planning or advice
Operations planning or advice
Technical planning or advice
Overall advice
Business Formation
18. What steps have your team taken toward the formation of a business?
Prompt:
Organized startup team
Devoted full time
Devoted part time
Asked for funding
Received financial support
Invested money
Looked for facilities
Applied license or patent
Looked into license or patent
Prepared plan
Formed legal entity
Hired employees
Rented facilities, equipment
Bought facilities, equipment
Developed prototypes
Developed technical plans
Developed operational models
Had first sale
Positive cash flow
Dun and Bradstreet credit listing
Unemployment insurance
FICA
Filed federal tax
Hired a lawyer
Consulted a lawyer
Consulted a banker
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